

hold him in close communion with his friends. The congressional district that he represented was greatly honored by his service, while his personal friends could be numbered by thousands in every walk of life, a rare tribute to his magnetic genius and his attractiveness as a man.

His colleagues from Michigan looked forward with confidence to a continuance of his public service in this Capitol. His defeat was not personal and cast no stigma upon him. In the recent election he ran far ahead of the candidates upon his ticket, and indeed his candidacy greatly strengthened the party to which he belonged.

He was a man of unusual talent, and had the rare faculty of seeing clearly and distinctly the path of highest duty, and when convinced of his course nothing could influence or dissuade him to turn aside or falter in its performance.

Something has been said about his interest in Alaskan affairs. I know full well how deeply he was concerned in all the legislation intended to relieve those sturdy people in that distant Territory. Often he has come to me in this Chamber and urged that those people might have the right of self-government, and we worked together in the accomplishment of that result. When the bill was passed his happiness was unrestrained.

He was deeply interested in the Territorial bill before he entered Congress, and as I see my honored friend from Arizona [Mr. ASHURST] across the aisle I am again reminded of that contest in which our beloved friend was deeply concerned.

Mr. President, our friend has gone. We are overwhelmed by the catastrophe which ended a life of such singular usefulness. I do not pretend to comprehend it. I know that he had much to live for. He was rarely blessed in his home circle and devoted to his wife and children. His companions in life sympathized in his every aspiration. He had climbed the ladder from humble beginning without aid and had made for himself an enviable place in his Commonwealth and in his country.

His death cast a gloom over our entire State. Its darkness refuses to be dispelled. We hope it is for the best, but many of us can not understand why such a tragedy should have befallen our friend in the very vigor of his young manhood and at the time of his greatest usefulness to the State.

After the Battle of Lodi it is said that the soldiers of Napoleon noticed that his eyes were closed and that, overcome with the exactions and the labors of the day, he had fallen asleep upon the field. Those nearest to him formed a hollow square about him and stood with patient vigil until rest opened his tired eyes. In this awful calamity those who knew and loved our friend, inspired by his memory, have formed a hollow square about his loved ones and will guard with earnest vigil the fatherless little children and the stricken widow in her woe.

I love to think of WEDEMEYER, of his happy, cheerful, beautiful affection for his friends, of his loyalty and love for those who were dependent upon him, of the charm and grace of his manner, and the purity of his private and public life.

Mr. President, I offer the resolution which I send to the desk. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be read:

The Secretary read the resolution (S. Res. 475), as follows: *Resolved*, That as a further mark of respect to the memory of Mr. RAYNER, Mr. UTTER, and Mr. WEDEMEYER the Senate do now adjourn.

The resolution was unanimously agreed to; and (at 4 o'clock and 20 minutes p. m.) the Senate adjourned until Monday, February 24, 1913, at 10 o'clock a. m.

#### NOMINATION.

*Executive nomination received by the Senate February 22, 1913.*

#### UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Samuel H. Fisher, of Connecticut, to be United States district judge for Connecticut, vice James P. Platt, deceased.

### HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

*SATURDAY, February 22, 1913.*

The House met at 10.30 o'clock a. m.

The Chaplain, Rev. Henry N. Couden, D. D., offered the following prayer:

We thank Thee, our Father in heaven, that time has not diminished the admiration, gratitude, and reverence for the "Father of his Country"; that he still lives in the hearts of all true men the ideal patriot, soldier, statesman, Christian gentleman. "Taking him for all in all, we shall not look upon his like again." Wise, strong, pure, noble, brave, his deeds live in a Republic which has become the admiration of all peoples. We thank Thee that millions of hearts still beat in unison with his great heart, for so long as his influence shall thus live our Nation shall live and liberty widen its sweep among the

peoples of the earth, to the honor and glory of Thy holy name. Amen.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will read the Journal.

Mr. Sisson rose.

The SPEAKER. For what purpose does the gentleman rise? Mr. Sisson. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that there is no quorum present.

The SPEAKER. The point of order is well taken. Evidently there is no quorum present.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House. The motion was agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The Doorkeeper will close the doors, the Sergeant at Arms will notify absentees, and the Clerk will call the roll.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following members failed to answer to their names:

Adair	Fitzgerald	Korby	Prince
Aiken, S. C.	Focht	Lafcan	Redfield
Alney	Fornes	Lafferty	Reilly
Ames	Gardner, Mass.	Langham	Reynolds
Andrus	Gardner, N. J.	Langley	Riordan
Anslerry	George	Lery	Roberts, Nev.
Anthony	Gill	Lindsay	Rodenberg
Ayres	Glass	Littleton	Rucker, Colo.
Barchfeld	Godwin, N. C.	Longworth	Sabath
Berger	Goldfogle	Loud	Scully
Blackmon	Gregg, Pa.	McCall	Smith, J. M. C.
Bradley	Gudger	McCreary	Speer
Brautley	Guernsey	McDermott	Stack
Brown	Hamill	McGuire, Okla.	Stanley
Burke, Pa.	Hamilton, W. Va.	McKinney	Stevens, Minn.
Calder	Hardy	McMorran	Sweet
Carlin	Harris	Maher	Talbot, Md.
Carter	Harrison, N. Y.	Matthews	Taylor, Ohio.
Cenry	Hart	Mays	Thistlewood
Cooper	Hartman	Merritt	Townsend
Copley	Heald	Mondell	Underhill
Crago	Hill	Moon, Pa.	Vare
Cravens	Hinds	Morgan, Okla.	Vreeland
Crumacker	Howard	Needham	Warburton
Danforth	Howell	Olmsted	Watkins
Davenport	Howland	O'Shaunessy	Weeks
De Forest	Hughes, Ga.	Palmer	Wilson, Ill.
Dickson, Miss.	Hull	Parran	Wilson, N. Y.
Difenderfer	Johnson, Ky.	Patten, N. Y.	Wood, N. J.
Donohoe	Kent	Peters	
Evans	Kindred	Post	
Ferris	Konig	Pray	

The SPEAKER. On this roll, 257 Members have answered to their names, a quorum.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Speaker, I move to dispense with further proceedings under the call.

The motion was agreed to.

The doors were opened.

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

#### PENSIONS.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Speaker, I call up from the Speaker's table the bill (S. 8275) granting pensions and increase of pensions to certain soldiers and sailors of the Regular Army and Navy and of wars other than the Civil War and to certain widows and dependent relatives of such soldiers and sailors, and move that the House insist on its amendments thereto and agree to a conference.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Alabama calls up the bill S. 8275, an omnibus pension bill, and moves that the House insist on its amendments thereto and agree to a conference.

The motion was agreed to.

The SPEAKER announced the following conferees: Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. DICKSON of Mississippi, and Mr. Wood of New Jersey.

#### WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS.

Mr. CLARK of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that Washington's Farewell Address may be read to the House.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Florida asks unanimous consent that Washington's Farewell Address be read to the House. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. The Chair appoints the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BARNHART] to read the address. [Applause.]

Mr. BARNHART read the address, as follows:

*To the people of the United States:*

FRIENDS AND FELLOW CITIZENS: The period for a new election of a citizen to administer the executive government of the United States being not far distant, and the time actually arrived when your thoughts must be employed in designating the person who is to be clothed with that important trust, it appears to me proper, especially as it may conduce to a more distinct expression of the public voice, that I should now apprise you of the resolution I have formed, to decline being considered among the number of those out of whom a choice is to be made.



I beg you, at the same time, to do me the justice to be assured that this resolution has not been taken without a strict regard to all the considerations appertaining to the relation which binds a dutiful citizen to his country, and that in withdrawing the tender of service which silence in my situation might imply, I am influenced by no diminution of zeal for your future interest, no deficiency of grateful respect for your past kindness, but am supported by a full conviction that the step is compatible with both.

The acceptance of and continuance hitherto in the office to which your suffrages have twice called me have been a uniform sacrifice of inclination to the opinion of duty and to a deference for what appeared to be your desire. I constantly hoped that it would have been much earlier in my power, consistently with motives which I was not at liberty to disregard, to return to that retirement from which I had been reluctantly drawn. The strength of my inclination to do this previous to the last election had even led to the preparation of an address to declare it to you, but mature reflection on the then perplexed and critical posture of our affairs with foreign nations, and the unanimous advice of persons entitled to my confidence, impelled me to abandon the idea.

I rejoice that the state of your concerns, external as well as internal, no longer renders the pursuit of inclination incompatible with the sentiment of duty or propriety, and am persuaded, whatever partiality may be retained for my services, that in the present circumstances of our country you will not disapprove my determination to retire.

The impressions with which I first undertook the arduous trust were explained on the proper occasion. In the discharge of this trust I will only say that I have, with good intentions, contributed toward the organization and administration of the Government the best exertions of which a very fallible judgment was capable. Not unconscious in the outset of the inferiority of my qualifications, experience, in my own eyes, perhaps still more in the eyes of others, has strengthened the motives to diffidence of myself, and every day the increasing weight of years admonishes me more and more that the shade of retirement is as necessary to me as it will be welcome. Satisfied that if any circumstances have given peculiar value to my services they were temporary, I have the consolation to believe that while choice and prudence invite me to quit the political scene patriotism does not forbid it.

In looking forward to the moment which is to terminate the career of my political life, my feelings do not permit me to suspend the deep acknowledgment of that debt of gratitude which I owe to my beloved country for the many honors it has conferred upon me, still more for the steadfast confidence with which it has supported me, and for the opportunities I have thence enjoyed of manifesting my inviolable attachment by services faithful and persevering, though in usefulness unequal to my zeal. If benefits have resulted to our country from these services, let it always be remembered to your praise, and as an instructive example in our annals, that under circumstances in which the passions, agitated in every direction, were liable to mislead amidst appearances sometimes dubious, vicissitudes of fortune often discouraging—in situations in which, not unfrequently, want of success has countenanced the spirit of criticism—the constancy of your support was the essential prop of the efforts and a guaranty of the plans by which they were effected. Profoundly penetrated with this idea, I shall carry it with me to my grave as a strong incitement to unceasing vows that heaven may continue to you the choicest tokens of its beneficence; that your union and brotherly affection may be perpetual; that the free Constitution, which is the work of your hands, may be sacredly maintained—that its administration in every department may be stamped with wisdom and virtue; that, in fine, the happiness of the people of these States, under the auspices of liberty, may be made complete by so careful a preservation and so prudent a use of this blessing as will acquire to them the glory of recommending it to the applause, the affection, and adoption of every nation which is yet a stranger to it.

Here, perhaps, I ought to stop. But a solicitude for your welfare, which can not end but with my life, and the apprehension of danger natural to that solicitude urge me, on an occasion like the present, to offer to your solemn contemplation and to recommend to your frequent review some sentiments which are the result of much reflection, of no inconsiderable observation, and which appear to me all important to the permanency of your felicity as a people. These will be offered to you with the more freedom as you can only see in them the disinterested warnings of a parting friend who can possibly have no personal motive to bias his counsel. Nor can I forget, as an encouragement to it, your indulgent reception of my sentiments on a former and not dissimilar occasion.

Interwoven as is the love of liberty with every ligament of your hearts, no recommendation of mine is necessary to fortify or confirm the attachment.

The unity of government which constitutes you one people is also now dear to you. It is justly so, for it is a main pillar in the edifice of your real independence, the support of your tranquility at home, your peace abroad, of your safety, of your prosperity, of that very liberty which you so highly prize. But as it is easy to foresee that from different causes and from different quarters much pains will be taken, many artifices employed, to weaken in your minds the conviction of this truth, as this is the point in your political fortress against which the batteries of internal and external enemies will be most constantly and actively, though often covertly and insidiously, directed, it is of infinite moment that you should properly estimate the immense value of your national union to your collective and individual happiness; that you should cherish a cordial, habitual, and immovable attachment to it, accustoming yourselves to think and speak of it as of the palladium of your political safety and prosperity, watching for its preservation with jealous anxiety, discountenancing whatever may suggest even a suspicion that it can in any event be abandoned, and indignantly frowning upon the first dawning of every attempt to alienate any portion of our country from the rest or to enfeeble the sacred ties which now link together the various parts.

For this you have every inducement of sympathy and interest. Citizens by birth or choice of a common country, that country has a right to concentrate your affections. The name of American, which belongs to you in your national capacity, must always exalt the just pride of patriotism more than any appellation derived from local discriminations. With slight shades of difference you have the same religion, manners, habits, and political principles. You have in a common cause fought and triumphed together; the independence and liberty you possess are the work of joint counsels and joint efforts, of common dangers, sufferings, and successes.

But these considerations, however powerfully they address themselves to your sensibility, are greatly outweighed by those which apply more immediately to your interest. Here every portion of our country finds the most commanding motives for carefully guarding and preserving the union of the whole.

The North in an unrestrained intercourse with the South, protected by the equal laws of a common government, finds in the productions of the latter great additional resources of maritime and commercial enterprise and precious materials of manufacturing industry. The South in the same intercourse, benefiting by the same agency of the North, sees its agriculture grow and its commerce expand. Turning partly into its own channels the seamen of the North it finds its particular navigation invigorated, and while it contributes in different ways to nourish and increase the general mass of the national navigation, it looks forward to the protection of a maritime strength to which itself is unequally adapted. The East in a like intercourse with the West already finds, and in the progressive improvement of interior communications by land and water will more and more find, a valuable vent for the commodities which it brings from abroad or manufactures at home. The West derives from the East supplies requisite to its growth and comfort, and, what is perhaps of still greater consequence, it must of necessity owe the secure enjoyment of indispensable outlets for its own productions to the weight, influence, and the future maritime strength of the Atlantic side of the Union, directed by an indissoluble community of interest as one nation. Any other tenure by which the West can hold this essential advantage, whether derived from its own separate strength or from an apostate and unnatural connection with any foreign power, must be intrinsically precarious.

While, then, every part of our country thus feels an immediate and particular interest in union, all the parts combined can not fail to find in the united mass of means and efforts greater strength, greater resource, proportionably greater security from external danger, a less frequent interruption of their peace by foreign nations, and, what is of inestimable value, they must derive from union an exemption from those broils and wars between themselves which so frequently afflict neighboring countries not tied together by the same government, which their own rivalry alone would be sufficient to produce, but which opposite foreign alliances, attachments, and intrigues would stimulate and embitter. Hence likewise they will avoid the necessity of those overgrown military establishments, which under any form of government are inauspicious to liberty and which are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty. In this sense it is that your union ought to be considered as a main prop of your liberty, and that the love of the one ought to endear to you the preservation of the other.



These considerations speak a persuasive language to every reflecting and virtuous mind, and exhibit the continuance of the Union as a primary object of patriotic desire. Is there a doubt whether a common government can embrace so large a sphere? Let experience solve it. To listen to mere speculation in such a case were criminal. We are authorized to hope that a proper organization of the whole, with the auxiliary agency of governments for the respective subdivisions, will afford a happy issue to the experiment. It is well worth a fair and full experiment. With such powerful and obvious motives to union, affecting all parts of our country, while experience shall not have demonstrated its impracticability, there will always be reason to distrust the patriotism of those who in any quarter may endeavor to weaken its hands.

In contemplating the causes which may disturb our Union, it occurs as matter of serious concern that any ground should have been furnished for characterizing parties by geographical discriminations—northern and southern, Atlantic and western—whence designing men may endeavor to excite a belief that there is a real difference of local interests and views. One of the expedients of party to acquire influence within particular districts is to misrepresent the opinions and aims of other districts. You can not shield yourselves too much against the jealousies and heartburnings which spring from these misrepresentations; they tend to render alien to each other those who ought to be bound together by fraternal affection. The inhabitants of our western country have lately had a useful lesson on this head; they have seen, in the negotiation by the Executive and in the unanimous ratification by the Senate of the treaty with Spain, and in the universal satisfaction at the event throughout the United States, a decisive proof how unfounded were the suspicions propagated among them of a policy in the General Government and in the Atlantic States unfriendly to their interests in regard to the Mississippi. They have been witnesses to the formation of two treaties—that with Great Britain and that with Spain—which secure to them everything they could desire, in respect to our foreign relations, toward confirming their prosperity. Will it not be their wisdom to rely for the preservation of these advantages on the union by which they were procured? Will they not henceforth be deaf to those advisers, if such they are, who would sever them from their brethren and connect them with aliens?

To the efficacy and permanency of your Union a government for the whole is indispensable. No alliances, however strict, between the parts can be an adequate substitute; they must inevitably experience the infractions and interruptions which all alliances in all times have experienced. Sensible of this momentous truth, you have improved upon your first essay by the adoption of a constitution of government, better calculated than your former, for an intimate union and for the efficacious management of your common concerns. This Government, the offspring of our own choice, uninfluenced and unawed, adopted upon full investigation and mature deliberation, completely free in its principles, in the distribution of its powers, uniting security with energy, and containing within itself a provision for its own amendment, has a just claim to your confidence and your support. Respect for its authority, compliance with its laws, acquiescence in its measures, are duties enjoined by the fundamental maxims of true liberty. The basis of our political systems is the right of the people to make and to alter their constitutions of government; but the constitution which at any time exists, until changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all. The very idea of the power and the right of the people to establish government presuppose the duty of every individual to obey the established government.

All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all combinations and associations, under whatever plausible character, with the real design to direct, control, counteract, or awe the regular deliberations and action of the constituted authorities, are destructive of this fundamental principle and of fatal tendency. They serve to organize faction, to give it an artificial and extraordinary force, to put in the place of the delegated will of the Nation the will of party, often a small but artful and enterprising minority of the community; and, according to the alternate triumphs of different parties, to make the public administration the mirror of the ill-concerted and incongruous projects of faction, rather than the organ of consistent and wholesome plans digested by common councils, and modified by mutual interests.

However combinations or associations of the above description may now and then answer popular ends, they are likely, in the course of time and things, to become potent engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men, will be enabled to subvert the power of the people, and to usurp for themselves

the reins of government; destroying afterwards the very engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion.

Toward the preservation of your Government and the permanency of your present happy state, it is requisite, not only that you steadily discountenance irregular opposition to its acknowledged authority, but also that you resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its principles, however specious the pretext. One method of assault may be to effect, in the forms of the Constitution, alterations which will impair the energy of the system; and thus to undermine what can not be directly overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be invited, remember that time and habit are at least as necessary to fix the true character of governments, as of other human institutions; that experience is the surest standard by which to test the real tendency of the existing constitution of a country; that facility in changes, upon the credit of mere hypothesis and opinion, exposes to perpetual change from the endless variety of hypothesis and opinion; and remember, especially, that for the efficient management of your common interests in a country so extensive as ours, a government of as much vigor as is consistent with the perfect security of liberty is indispensable. Liberty itself will find in such a government, with powers properly distributed and adjusted, its surest guardian. It is, indeed, little else than a name, where the government is too feeble to withstand the enterprises of faction, to confine each member of the society within the limits prescribed by the laws, and to maintain all in the secure and tranquil enjoyment of the rights of person and property.

I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the State, with particular references to the founding them on geographical discrimination. Let me now take a more comprehensive view, and warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally.

This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of the human mind. It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less stifled, controlled, or repressed; but in those of the popular form it is seen in its greatest rankness, and is truly their worst enemy.

The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries which result gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of an individual; and, sooner or later, the chief of some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the purpose of his own elevation on the ruins of public liberty.

Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of sight), the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it.

It serves always to distract the public councils and enfeeble the public administration. It agitates the community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms; kindles the animosity of one part against another; foment occasional riot and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which finds a facilitated access to the Government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another.

There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the administration of the government, and serve to keep alive the spirit of liberty. This, within certain limits, is probably true; and in governments of a monarchical cast patriotism may look with indulgence, if not with favor, upon the spirit of party. But in those of the popular character, in governments purely elective, it is a spirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency it is certain there will always be enough of that spirit for every salutary purpose. And there being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it. A fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, lest, instead of warming, it should consume.

It is important likewise that the habits of thinking in a free country should inspire caution in those intrusted with its administration to confine themselves within their respective constitutional spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one department to encroach upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A just estimate of that love of power and proneness to abuse it which predominate in the human



heart is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of this position. The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of political power, by dividing and distributing it into different depositories and constituting each the guardian of the public weal against invasions of the others, has been evinced by experiments, ancient and modern, some of them in our country and under our own eyes. To preserve them must be as necessary as to institute them. If in the opinion of the people the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the Constitution designates. But let there be no change by usurpation, for, though this in one instance may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time yield.

Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connections with private and public felicity. Let it simply be asked, Where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths which are the instruments of investigation in courts of justice? And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.

It is substantially true that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government. The rule, indeed, extends with more or less force to every species of free government. Who that is a sincere friend to it can look with indifference upon attempts to shake the foundation of the fabric?

Promote, then, as an object of primary importance, institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge. In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion it should be enlightened.

As a very important source of strength and security cherish public credit. One method of preserving it is to use it as sparingly as possible, avoiding occasions of expense by cultivating peace, but remembering also that timely disbursements to prepare for danger frequently prevent much greater disbursements to repel it; avoiding likewise the accumulation of debt, not only by shunning occasions of expense, but by vigorous exertions in time of peace to discharge the debts which unavoidable wars may have occasioned, not ungenerously throwing upon posterity the burden which we ourselves ought to bear. The execution of these maxims belongs to your representatives, but it is necessary that public opinion should cooperate. To facilitate to them the performance of their duty it is essential that you should practically bear in mind that toward the payment of debts there must be revenue; that to have revenue there must be taxes; that no taxes can be devised which are not more or less inconvenient and unpleasant; that the intrinsic embarrassment inseparable from the selection of the proper object, which is always a choice of difficulties, ought to be a decisive motive for a candid construction of the conduct of the government in making it, and for a spirit of acquiescence in the measures for obtaining revenue, which the public exigencies may at any time dictate.

Observe good faith and justice toward all nations, cultivate peace and harmony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct, and can it be that good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and at no distant period a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence. Who can doubt but, in the course of time and things, the fruits of such a plan would richly repay any temporary advantages which might be lost by a steady adherence to it; can it be that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a nation with its virtue? The experiment, at least, is recommended by every sentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas, is it rendered impossible by its vices?

In the execution of such a plan nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others should be excluded; and that, in place of them, just and amicable feelings toward all should be cultivated. The nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its

duty and its interest. Antipathy in one nation against another disposes each more readily to offer insult and injury, to lay hold of slight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable when accidental or trifling occasions of dispute occur. Hence, frequent collisions, obstinate, envenomed, and bloody contests. The nation, prompted by ill will and resentment, sometimes impels to war the government, contrary to the best calculations of policy. The government sometimes participates in the national propensity and adopts through passion what reason would reject; at other times it makes the animosity of the nation subservient to projects of hostility, instigated by pride, ambition, and other sinister and pernicious motives. The peace often, sometimes perhaps the liberty of nations, has been the victim.

So, likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest, in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter, without adequate inducements or justifications. It leads also to concessions to the favorite nation or of privileges denied to others, which is apt doubly to injure the nation making the concessions, by unnecessarily parting with what ought to have been retained, and by exciting jealousy, ill will, and a disposition to retaliate in the parties from whom equal privileges are withheld; and it gives to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens who devote themselves to the favorite nation, facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own country, without odium, sometimes even with popularity; gilding with the appearances of a virtuous sense of obligation, a commendable deference for public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good, the base or foolish compliances of ambition, corruption, or infatuation.

As avenues to foreign influence in innumerable ways, such attachments are particularly alarming to the truly enlightened and independent patriot. How many opportunities do they afford to tamper with domestic factions, to practice the arts of seduction, to mislead public opinion, to influence or awe the public councils. Such an attachment of a small or weak toward a great and powerful nation dooms the former to be the satellite of the latter.

Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence—I conjure you to believe me, fellow citizens—the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantly awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government. But that jealousy to be useful must be impartial, else it becomes the instrument of the very influence to be avoided instead of a defense against it. Excessive partiality for one foreign nation and excessive dislike for another cause those whom they actuate to see danger only on one side, and serve to veil and even second the arts of influence on the other. Real patriots, who may resist the intrigues of the favorite, are liable to become suspected and odious, while its tools and dupes usurp the applause and confidence of the people to surrender their interests.

The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence therefore it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation, when we may choose peace or war as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.

Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor, or caprice?

It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliance with any portion of the foreign world—so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it—for let me not be understood as capa-



ble of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than private affairs that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.

Taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.

Harmony and a liberal intercourse with all nations are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand; neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences, consulting the natural course of things, diffusing and diversifying by gentle means the streams of commerce, but forcing nothing; establishing with powers so disposed, in order to give trade a stable course, to define the rights of our merchants, and to enable the Government to support them, conventional rules of intercourse, the best that present circumstances and mutual opinion will permit, but temporary and liable to be from time to time abandoned or varied as experience and circumstances shall dictate; constantly keeping in view that it is folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another; that it must pay with a portion of its independence for whatever it may accept under that character; that by such acceptance it may place itself in the condition of having given equivalents for nominal favors and yet of being reproached with ingratitude for not giving more. There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation. It is an illusion which experience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard.

In offering to you, my countrymen, these counsels of an old and affectionate friend, I dare not hope they will make the strong and lasting impression I could wish—that they will control the usual current of the passions or prevent our Nation from running the course which has hitherto marked the destiny of nations—but if I may even flatter myself that they may be productive of some partial benefit, some occasional good, that they may now and then recur to moderate the fury of party spirit, to warn against the mischiefs of foreign intrigue, to guard against the impostures of pretended patriotism, this hope will be a full recompense for the solicitude for your welfare by which they have been dictated.

How far, in the discharge of my official duties, I have been guided by the principles which have been delineated, the public records and other evidences of my conduct must witness to you and to the world. To myself the assurance of my own conscience is that I have, at least, believed myself to be guided by them.

In relation to the still subsisting war in Europe, my proclamation of the 22d of April, 1793, is the index to my plan. Sanctioned by your approving voice and by that of your Representatives in both Houses of Congress, the spirit of that measure has continually governed me, uninfluenced by any attempts to deter or divert me from it.

After deliberate examination, with the aid of the best lights I could obtain, I was well satisfied that our country, under all the circumstances of the case, had a right to take and was bound in duty and interest to take a neutral position. Having taken it, I determined, as far as should depend upon me to maintain it with moderation, perseverance, and firmness.

The considerations which respect the right to hold this conduct, it is not necessary on this occasion to detail. I will only observe that, according to my understanding of the matter, that right, so far from being denied by any of the belligerent powers, has been virtually admitted by all.

The duty of holding a neutral conduct may be inferred, without anything more, from the obligation which justice and humanity impose on every nation, in cases in which it is free to act, to maintain inviolate the relations of peace and amity toward other nations.

The inducements of interest for observing that conduct will best be referred to your own reflections and experience. With me a predominant motive has been to endeavor to gain time to our country, to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress, without interruption, to that degree of strength and consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes.

Though in reviewing the incidents of my administration I am unconscious of intentional error, I am nevertheless too sensible of my defects not to think it probable that I may have committed many errors. Whatever they may be, I fervently beseech the Almighty to avert or mitigate the evils to which they may tend. I shall also carry with me the hope that my country will never cease to view them with indulgence, and that, after 45 years of my life dedicated to its service with an upright zeal,

the faults of incompetent abilities will be consigned to oblivion, as myself must soon be to the mansions of rest.

Relying on its kindness in this as in other things and actuated by that fervent love toward it, which is so natural to a man who views in it the native soil of himself and his progenitors for several generations, I anticipate with pleasing expectation that retreat in which I promise myself to realize, without alloy, the sweet enjoyment of partaking in the midst of my fellow citizens the benign influence of good laws under a free government—the ever favorite object of my heart and the happy reward, as I trust, of our mutual cares, labors, and dangers.

GEO. WASHINGTON.

UNITED STATES, 17th September, 1796.

ADDRESS OF PORTO RICAN FREE FEDERATION OF LABOR (H. DOC. NO. 1415).

Mr. WILSON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to have printed as a House document an address by the Porto Rican Free Federation of Labor relative to the tyranny of the House of Delegates of Porto Rico and setting forth legislation which, in the judgment of the federation, is essential to the welfare of Porto Rico.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WILSON] asks unanimous consent to print as a House document an address of the Porto Rican Free Federation of Labor. Is there objection?

Mr. EDWARDS. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Speaker, I would like to know how this document is to be distributed—whether through the folding room or document room.

Mr. WILSON of Pennsylvania. Through the document room. The SPEAKER. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

#### LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE, AND JUDICIAL APPROPRIATION BILL.

Mr. JOHNSON of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I wish to present conference report and statement on the bill H. R. 26680, the legislative, executive, and judicial appropriation bill, and I ask unanimous consent that the statement be read in lieu of the report.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. JOHNSON of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I desire to say that there is one mistake as printed in the Record, and I send a corrected copy of the statement to the Clerk's desk.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will read from the corrected copy.

The conference report is as follows:

#### CONFERENCE REPORT (NO. 1563).

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on certain amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 26680) making appropriations for the legislative, executive, and judicial expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1914, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the Senate recede from its amendments numbered 2, 27, 61, 68, 76, 77, 78, 139, 148, 149, 151, 152, 154, 155, 160, 161, 162, 163, 179, and 235.

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate numbered 7, 8, 11, 23, 24, 25, 26, 37, 38, 39, 147, 180, 181, and 190, and agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 79: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 79, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the matter inserted by said amendment insert the following:

"Assay office at Boise, Idaho: For the following, including wages of workmen and contingent expenses, from July 1 to December 31, 1913, both dates inclusive: Assayer in charge, who shall also perform the duties of melter, \$1,125; assistant assayer, \$800; chief clerk, who shall also perform the duties of cashier, \$750; assayer's assistant, \$750; clerk, \$600; in all, \$4,025."

And the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 80: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 80, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum named in said amendment insert "\$1,770"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 81: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 81, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum named in said amendment insert "\$1,125"; and the Senate agree to the same.



Amendment numbered 82: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 82, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the matter inserted by said amendment insert the following:

"Assay office at Charlotte, N. C.: For the following, including wages of workmen and contingent expenses, from July 1 to December 31, 1913, both dates inclusive: Assayer and melter, \$750."

And the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 83: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 83, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum named in the said amendment insert "\$450"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 84: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 84, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum named in said amendment insert "\$200"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 85: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 85, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the matter inserted by said amendment insert the following:

"Assay office at Deadwood, S. Dak.: For the following, including wages of workmen and contingent expenses, from July 1 to December 31, 1913, both dates inclusive: Assayer in charge, who shall also perform the duties of melter, \$1,000; clerk, \$600; assistant assayer, \$800; assayer's assistant, \$700; in all, \$3,100."

And the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 86: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 86, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum named in said amendment insert "\$1,500"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 87: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 87, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum named in said amendment insert "\$750"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 88: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 88, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the matter inserted by said amendment insert the following:

"Assay office at Helena, Mont.: For the following, including wages of workmen and contingent expenses, from July 1 to December 31, 1913, both dates inclusive: Assayer in charge, \$1,250; chief clerk, who shall also perform the duties of cashier, \$900; assistant assayer, \$850; assayer's assistant, \$700; clerk, \$700; in all, \$4,400."

And the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 89: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 89, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum named in said amendment insert "\$2,300"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 90: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 90, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum named in said amendment insert "\$1,500"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 93: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 93, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the matter inserted by said amendment insert the following:

"Assay office at Salt Lake City, Utah: For the following, including wages of workmen and contingent expenses, from July 1 to December 31, 1913, both dates inclusive: Assayer in charge, who shall also perform the duties of melter, \$1,250; assistant assayer, \$800; chief clerk, who shall also perform the duties of cashier, \$800; clerk, \$700; in all, \$3,550."

And the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 94: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 94, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum named in said amendment insert "\$2,250"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 95: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 95, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum named in said amendment insert "\$1,750"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 150: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 150, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu

of the sum proposed insert "\$232,210"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 153: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 153, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the number proposed insert "9"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 156: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 156, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed insert "\$78,740"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 177: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 177, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed insert "\$9,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 178: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 178, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed insert "\$13,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 182: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 182, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed insert "\$23,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 183: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 183, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed insert "\$26,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 184: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 184, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed insert "\$17,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 185: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 185, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed insert "\$20,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 186: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 186, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed insert "\$10,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 187: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 187, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed insert "\$13,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 188: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 188, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed insert "\$17,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 189: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 189, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed insert "\$20,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 191: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 191, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the matter inserted by said amendment insert the following: "For surveyor general of South Dakota, \$2,000; clerks in his office, \$4,500; in all, \$6,500"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 192: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 192, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum named in said amendment insert "\$600"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 193: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 193, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed insert "\$16,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 194: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 194, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed insert "\$19,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 195: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 195,



and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed insert "\$20,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 196: That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 196, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed insert "\$23,000"; and the Senate agree to the same.

J. T. JOHNSON,  
ALBERT S. BURLERSON,  
FREDK. H. GILLET,  
*Managers on the part of the House.*

F. E. WARREN,  
GEO. PEABODY WETMORE,  
LEE S. OVERMAN,  
*Managers on the part of the Senate.*

The Clerk read the corrected statement, as follows:

#### STATEMENT OF THE MANAGERS ON THE PART OF THE HOUSE.

The managers on the part of the House at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on certain amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 26680) making appropriations for the legislative, executive, and judicial expenses of the Government for the fiscal year 1914 submit the following written statement in explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the conference committee, and submitted in the accompanying report, as to each of said amendments, as follows:

On amendment No. 2: Strikes out the name of Woodbury Pulsifer as an employee of the Senate.

On amendments Nos. 7, 8, and 11: Increases the salaries of two Assistant Doorkeepers of the Senate from \$2,592 to \$3,000 each, as proposed by the Senate.

On amendments Nos. 23, 24, 25, and 26, relating to the Capitol police: Appropriates for the number of police and for the contingent fund, as proposed by the Senate.

On amendment No. 27: Strikes out the name of George H. Carter as clerk to the Joint Committee on Printing.

On amendment No. 37: Appropriates, as proposed by the Senate, \$300 to pay Etta J. Giffin, assistant in charge of the division for the blind in the Library of Congress.

On amendments Nos. 38 and 39, relating to the Copyright Office: Provides for an additional clerk at \$1,800, proposed by the Senate.

On amendment No. 61: Appropriates \$10,000, as proposed by the House, instead of \$25,000, as proposed by the Senate, for freight on bullion and coin.

On amendment No. 68: Strikes out the provision proposed by the Senate, increasing the number of internal-revenue districts from 63 to 67.

On amendments Nos. 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 93, 94, and 95, relating to mints and assay offices: Omits the appropriations for the mint at Carson, Nev.; and appropriates for the assay offices at Boise, Idaho, Charlotte, N. C., Deadwood, S. Dak., Helena, Mont., and Salt Lake City, Utah, until December 31, 1913.

On amendment No. 139: Strikes out the appropriation, proposed by the Senate, for expenses of a national aerodynamical laboratory commission.

On amendments Nos. 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, and 156, relating to the Indian Office: Increases the compensation of the second assistant commissioner from \$2,250 to \$2,750, as proposed by the Senate; provides for nine clerks, at \$1,400 each, instead of five as proposed by the Senate and three as proposed by the House, and strikes out all other increases in the clerical force of that office proposed by the Senate.

On amendments Nos. 160, 161, 162, and 163: Strikes out the increases, proposed by the Senate, in the force employed in the Patent Office.

On amendments Nos. 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, and 196, relating to surveyors general and their clerks: Appropriates \$9,000, instead of \$7,000 as proposed by the House and \$11,000 as proposed by the Senate, for clerks, and \$2,500 as proposed by the House, instead of \$3,205 as proposed by the Senate, for contingent expenses, in the office in Alaska; appropriates \$12,000, as proposed by the Senate, instead of \$11,400, as proposed by the House, for clerks in the office in California; appropriates \$23,000, instead of \$23,590 as proposed by the Senate and \$22,000 as proposed by the House for clerks in the office in Colorado; appropriates \$17,000, instead of \$17,500 as proposed by the Senate and \$16,000 as proposed by the House, for clerks in Idaho; appropriates \$10,000, instead of \$11,400 as proposed by the Senate and \$8,000 as proposed by the House, for clerks in

Nevada; appropriates \$17,000 instead of \$18,100 as proposed by the Senate and \$15,500 as proposed by the House, for clerks in New Mexico; appropriates \$1,000, instead of \$900 as proposed by the House, for contingent and incidental expenses in Oregon; appropriates \$4,500, instead of \$5,000 as proposed by the Senate for clerks, and \$600, instead of \$800 as proposed by the Senate, for contingent expenses, in South Dakota; appropriates \$16,000, instead of \$20,300 as proposed by the Senate and \$14,000 as proposed by the House, for clerks in Utah; and appropriates \$20,000, instead of \$22,300 as proposed by the Senate and \$17,000 as proposed by the House, for clerks in Wyoming.

On amendment No. 235: Strikes out the paragraph inserted by the Senate, appropriating for the Commerce Court from March 4 to June 30, 1913.

J. T. JOHNSON,  
ALBERT S. BURLERSON,  
F. H. GILLET,  
*Managers on the part of the House.*

The SPEAKER. The question is on agreeing to the conference report.

The conference report was agreed to.

Mr. JOHNSON of South Carolina. Mr. Speaker, the conference report on the legislative, executive, and judicial bill just adopted is final and complete. As the bill passed the House it carried \$34,899,583.50. As it passed the Senate it carried \$35,403,040.62, an increase of \$503,457.12. The Senate receded on amendments carrying \$192,506.12. The House receded on amendments carrying \$310,951. The bill as finally agreed upon carries \$35,210,534.50. The amount appropriated for the current year for the items included in the bill just passed is \$35,216,133.38. This bill, therefore, shows a net reduction under the current law of \$5,598.88. This reduction is made without reducing a single salary. On the other hand we have provided for a considerable number of increases and promotions in the governmental service. This reduction is also made in spite of the fact that we were compelled to provide a much larger sum to pay the salaries of Representatives on account of the increased membership of the House after the 4th of March. We also appropriate in this bill forty-odd thousand dollars expenses for the Legislature of the Territory of Alaska, an item that has not heretofore been included in this or any other appropriation bill. We have brought into this bill items amounting to about \$1,000,000 that properly belong here, but have hitherto been carried in other appropriation bills, and in so far as we have increased this bill on account of these items, we have correspondingly reduced the bills in which they have hitherto been carried.

On motion of Mr. JOHNSON of South Carolina, a motion to reconsider the vote by which the conference report was agreed to was laid on the table.

#### NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the bill H. R. 28812, the naval appropriation bill.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT] moves that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the bill H. R. 28812.

Mr. PADGETT. Pending that motion, I ask unanimous consent that general debate may be limited to four hours and confined to discussion of the bill, two hours of the time to be controlled by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. GREGG] and one hour by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FOSS] and one hour by myself.

The SPEAKER. And pending the motion to go into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT] asks unanimous consent that general debate shall be limited to four hours, and confined to the bill.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Mr. Speaker—

The SPEAKER. The gentleman will wait until the Chair can put the request.

Mr. TRIBBLE. I rise to a point of order. Reserving the right to object, I would like to ask the gentleman if he proposes to give those members of the committee who voted against the report on this bill in the committee room an opportunity to be heard?

Mr. PADGETT. I am giving two hours of the time to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. GREGG], who controls the opposition to the bill, reserving one hour for myself, and yielding one hour to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FOSS].

Mr. TRIBBLE. Then I would like to know if the gentleman from Texas [Mr. GREGG] will yield some time to those two mem-



bers of the committee who voted against the bill in the committee room?

Mr. GREGG of Texas. The gentleman has never asked me for any time. I would take great pleasure in giving him some time, but I can not, because I have promised all the time that I shall have.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Then I object, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER. It is not debatable.

The question is on agreeing to the motion of the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT] to go into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the House resolved itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H. R. 28812) making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1914, and for other purposes, with Mr. ALEXANDER in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN. The House is in Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill H. R. 28812, the naval appropriation bill, which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read the title of the bill, as follows:

A bill (H. R. 28812) making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1914, and for other purposes.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to dispense with the first reading of the bill in the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Alabama [Mr. UNDERWOOD] asks unanimous consent to dispense with the first reading of the bill in the committee. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. The gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT] is recognized.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I shall not occupy a great amount of the time of the committee in the discussion of this bill under general debate. I realize, Mr. Chairman, that we have only about seven more working days before the adjournment of the Congress, and the state of the public business is such as to require the dispatch of business.

I have filed with the bill a report stating in detail the various items of the bill, explaining the increases and the decreases, and setting forth clearly and succinctly, yet completely, the character of the bill. The aggregate amount of the appropriations carried in the bill is \$146,618,364.53. The bill last year carried aggregate appropriations to the amount of \$123,151,538.76. This bill represents an increase this year of \$23,466,825.77.

The bill is divided into three general parts. The first part relates to the maintenance of the Navy. The appropriations last year for the maintenance of the Navy were \$102,655,634.28. In this bill the appropriations for that purpose are \$105,387,948.53, which is an increase of \$2,732,314.25.

The items of this increase are as follows: The pay of the Navy is increased \$1,983,690.75. Last year we increased the enlisted force 4,000 men, and we added 400 marines. There is also an increase in pay on account of longevity of service, the pay of the enlisted men increasing with the length of their service.

Another item of this increase is equipment of vessels, \$756,700. The department asked for one million three hundred and some odd thousand dollars, but the committee allowed only \$756,700. We now have more vessels in commission and larger vessels than heretofore, and the demand for a large equipment is growing every year.

We increased the target-practice item by \$300,000. The committee believed that the target practice is a very necessary and essential and important part of the effective administration of the Navy. Without an efficient personnel, a personnel that can handle the guns effectively and shoot accurately, the ships of the Navy would be useless in an engagement, and we felt that this \$300,000 increase was required and was justified. The bureau chief wanted an increase of \$800,000. The department recommended \$400,000. But the committee, under the exigencies of the case, have reported an increase of \$300,000.

Another item is an increase for experiments in the Ordnance Department, \$100,000. The committee believed that it was very essential that as to our ordnance—the guns, the torpedoes, the projectiles, the powder, the high explosives—there should be tests and experiments in all of those matters which are very essential to the efficiency of the Navy.

Another item of increase is an item of \$240,000 increase in the wages of the employees, the workmen in the navy yard at Washington, the gun factory, and at Indianhead.

There is a board authorized and appointed by the Secretary known as the wage board. The workmen appeared before the committee and insisted that their wages were not adequate and were not proper; that they were entitled to an increase. At the suggestion of the committee a joint board, consisting of rep-

resentatives of labor and representatives of the department, took up the matter, made a thorough investigation here and in neighboring cities, and they reported a wage scale of increase. This was submitted for review and for approval or disapproval to the regular wage board, and they, with some modification, approved it, and the department submitted supplemental estimates for this increase, and we have included the amount of it.

Mr. SHERWOOD. How much is the per cent of increase?

Mr. PADGETT. Approximately 10 per cent. We have increased the coal and transportation \$1,000,000. More coal is required, because of the enlargement of the Navy. There is an increased price of about 20 cents a ton now in coal over former prices. Transportation charges have increased largely, for the reason that heretofore we have been able to transport coal in foreign bottoms at a great reduction below the charge in domestic bottoms; but on account of the increased commercial demands the price of foreign transportation has largely increased, necessitating an increased payment for transportation of coal.

Mr. SHERWOOD. Is that increase on account of the transportation of coal to the Philippine Islands?

Mr. PADGETT. To the Pacific coast largely, and to the Philippines.

Mr. TRIBBLE. I notice, on page 5 of the hearings, that it is stated that the bureau is of the opinion that much of the coal purchased during the year 1912 was without profit to the contractor, and Admiral Cowie states "this I know to be a fact."

Mr. PADGETT. That was the statement of Admiral Cowie.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Does the chairman of the committee think it was any of Admiral Cowie's business whether or not the contractors were getting a profit on their coal, or was it his business to make the best deal he could?

Mr. PADGETT. He was making the best deal he could, and, as I understood his testimony, he drove a good bargain, and got it at a price which did not make any profit for the seller.

Mr. TRIBBLE. And he offered that as an excuse why they did not get it any lower?

Mr. PADGETT. No; he said they made no profit on the other sale, and that they wanted some profit now, and for that reason demanded the increased price. He says the increased cost will be about 20 cents a ton.

Mr. ADAIR. How much more coal will be required next year than was used last year?

Mr. PADGETT. He did not state the exact quantity, as I now remember it, but he said that there would be a slight increase in the quantity, and there would also be a slight increase in the price.

Mr. ADAIR. My purpose in asking the question was to ascertain how fast our Navy is growing, and how much more coal will be required each year by reason of new construction, and so forth.

Mr. PADGETT. The increase in the quantity of coal is not so great, but the increase in consumption of fuel oil is remarkable. Two years ago we were using about 12,000,000 gallons of fuel oil a year. It is estimated that for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1914, we will consume 30,000,000 gallons. Not only has there been an increase in the quantity of fuel oil, but the price of fuel has recently advanced 60 per cent, and a large amount of this is on account of fuel oil.

Mr. ADAIR. Our appropriations for fuel oil and coal will increase each year, as the size of our Navy increases.

Mr. PADGETT. Necessarily.

Mr. ADAIR. And that accounts very largely for the increase this year in the amount of coal and oil that will be required.

Mr. PADGETT. Yes. For instance, on page 6 of the report I have an itemized statement of the coal purchased at home. The estimate is \$200,000; freight, \$200,000; fuel oil, \$500,000; handling coal, \$35,000; coal purchased abroad, \$15,000. Those are the items of the increase of \$1,000,000 which I was stating.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. TRIBBLE. The increase in this bill for coal and oil is about \$1,000,000, is it?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Over that of last year?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Will the gentleman tell us what the increase was the year before?

Mr. PADGETT. I do not remember just now, but I can get it for the gentleman.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Let me ask the gentleman another question.

Mr. PADGETT. My recollection is that the coal appropriation last year and the year before was the same; but of that I am not sure.

Mr. TRIBBLE. The gentleman states that the oil is the principal cause of this increase; will he look at page 6 under this item and see if he does not find that oil in 1911 was \$131,000



and in 1912 oil was \$340,000? How does the gentleman use oil as an illustration of the increase with so much force now?

Mr. PADGETT. I stated that last year, for 1912, the value of the oil purchased was \$340,387. That was for 14,146,714 gallons; but for the fiscal year 1914, on account of the increased number of oil-burning vessels, we will need 30,000,000 gallons instead of 14,000,000 gallons. And then, there was an increase in the cost of about 60 per cent over the price of the year before.

Mr. TRIBBLE. That being true, I will ask the gentleman if oil is taking the place of coal, why does not the coal cost decrease?

Mr. PADGETT. The coal-burning vessels we still have. We are not disposing of any of those, and the new vessels are burning oil instead of coal.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Is it not the contention on the floor of the House and in the Naval Committee that you are abandoning the old vessels because they are gone out of date and new ones are taking their place?

Mr. PADGETT. No; there are a few small boats, like tugs and things of that kind, which wear out, but all of our principal ships we still have.

Mr. TRIBBLE. How many battleships have we now?

Mr. PADGETT. Thirty-eight completed, building, and authorized.

Mr. ADAIR. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. ADAIR. According to the gentleman's statement, our expenditures for the item of coal and oil alone will increase about a million dollars a year if we go on increasing the Navy as we have.

Mr. PADGETT. No; not that much a year. We are increasing this year, but I hope the price next year will not be 60 per cent over what it is this year.

Mr. ADAIR. It is partially due to the price this year, then?

Mr. PADGETT. Very largely.

Mr. HOBSON. If the gentleman from Tennessee will allow me, it is the plan to put four battleships, beginning with the older battleships, out of commission, and when they are put in reserve, of course their consumption of coal will be nil.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I will ask now that I may proceed consecutively with my statement. The provisions are increased \$321,113.50 on account of the addition of 4,000 men that I stated were added last year. They were authorized last year, but they have not all yet been recruited. This bill takes effect on the 1st of July and runs until the 30th of June, 1914, and the department states that they are recruiting at the rate of about 300 a week and expect to have the full enlistment by the beginning of the fiscal year.

Mr. TRIBBLE. The first item of this appropriation includes pay of officers and retired officers?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Does the gentleman know that in the increase of officers you are at the same time decreasing them and placing on the rolls retired officers by plucking them not over 30 years of age on retired salaries?

Mr. PADGETT. I do not know what their ages are?

Mr. TRIBBLE. I will furnish the gentleman with the information.

Mr. PADGETT. I will take the gentleman's word for it. We are plucking some every year in order that a young man who goes into the Navy as an ensign will not remain an ensign, but will have some hope of promotion and advancement.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Is there no other way to get them out?

Mr. PADGETT. The only other way I know is by death or resignation.

Mr. TRIBBLE. You have voluntary retirement.

Mr. PADGETT. I said for them to die or resign.

Mr. MURRAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TRIBBLE. I have the floor.

Mr. MURRAY. Why, the gentleman from Tennessee has the floor.

Mr. TRIBBLE. But he yielded to me. Officers are taken off the active list on account of incapacity?

Mr. PADGETT. Some are taken out on account of incapacity, and others are taken out who are capable officers, but who are taken out for the purpose of producing a flow of promotions.

Mr. TRIBBLE. I understand that. I will ask the gentleman now if he knows this condition to exist, that men voluntarily retire from the Navy as officers on account of incapacity, so certified by the surgeon, and that after those men retire they are again taken back on the active list as active officers and paid the same salaries again?

Mr. PADGETT. There was a provision of law in the personnel act of 1899 that allowed the Navy Department until the 30th day of this past June to employ men on the retired list in

the active service. That expired, and in the last Congress a modified law was enacted providing for the retirement and for a reduced pay of retired officers doing active duty.

Mr. TRIBBLE. I will ask the gentleman if it is not a fact that on June 7, 1910, on account of physical disability incurred in the line of duty, under section 1453, Lieut. Oscar F. Cooper was retired, so certified, for incapacity, and if he was not immediately taken back into the service after he was retired, and if he is not in the service to-day drawing a salary at an increase of \$1,323.68?

Mr. PADGETT. I do not know the exact salary. I understand that he was incapable of doing sea duty and was retired; but he was capable of doing clerical duty, and was put back to do that.

Mr. TRIBBLE. I ask the gentleman if that is not the case in a number of instances?

Mr. PADGETT. There may be some. I do not know how many.

Mr. TRIBBLE. If a man is incapable of doing official duty as an officer and is retired and placed upon a salary as a retired officer, incapable of service, does the gentleman stand here before this House and state to this House that such incapable officer has the right to be put back on the active list, to draw \$1,200 and \$1,500 a year more than he was receiving?

Mr. PADGETT. He can only be put back on the active list after he is retired by the express legislation of Congress, and that is a matter for the Congress. I have always opposed reinstatement by legislation of that character, but Congress has not always followed my wishes in the matter.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Has the gentleman joined me in the Naval Committee to reconstruct these laws and abolish the plucking board?

Mr. PADGETT. I have not joined the gentleman in abolishing the plucking board, because I do not think it ought to be abolished.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Then, I will ask the gentleman this: Does he not know that it is charged that the plucking board is an instrument that frightens officers, and that many resign and get out of the way of the plucking board, knowing that they will be put back again on the active list?

Mr. PADGETT. I know nothing whatever of that.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman from Tennessee permit me to ask the gentleman to specify one case or all cases?

Mr. TRIBBLE. Apply the facts as a general principle without being personal.

Mr. MURRAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. In just one moment. When a man is once on the retired list he can never get back on the active list except by legislation of Congress.

Mr. TRIBBLE. How did these men get back?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will call the attention of the gentleman from Georgia to the fact that before interrupting a gentleman he must first address the Chair.

Mr. PADGETT. Officers who are on the retired list may be employed. They are not on the active list, but they may be employed, providing the salary does not exceed a certain amount. On the retired list they receive three-fourths of the pay of the grade in which they retire. If they are used in active duty, although on the retired list, the Government is getting the benefit of their services at a very little additional pay, and in the higher grades there is nothing additional, whereas if they were not employed they would receive the retired pay, and the Government would get no service.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Then, I will ask the gentleman if he does not think it would be better not to retire them at all?

Mr. PADGETT. No; I do not. It is necessary to provide for retirement if we are to have capable officers and an efficient Navy.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. I do.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Does not the gentleman know it is the mecca and hope of all officers to get back on land, and this is one scheme they have of doing it when they are retired to get back on the active list, and you can not then draft them for sea service?

Mr. PADGETT. They are not getting on the active list—

Mr. TRIBBLE. They are getting active pay.

Mr. PADGETT. While doing active duty they are getting pay which is less than active pay unless it is the pay in the lower numbers.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Does the gentleman espouse on the floor of this House the proposition of Mr. Cooper and Mr. Sorely and

Mr. Pryor, and a number of others which I have in my hand, drawing \$1,200 to \$1,500 more for having gotten back on this active duty? Does he think it is right?

Mr. PADGETT. I will simply say that these gentlemen were retired under the law that existed prior to the last appropriation bill, and I contributed somewhat in the last appropriation bill to the enactment of legislation to repeal the provisions under which those gentlemen were retired. It is no longer the law, and I would call the gentleman's attention to a speech which he made a few days ago upon the floor of the House in which he stated these matters, but he was in error with reference to the law. The law he referred to was repealed last year.

Mr. TRIBBLE. The gentleman does not mean to say that the plucking board has been repealed?

Mr. PADGETT. No; I said the law was repealed that advanced them one grade upon retirement.

Mr. TRIBBLE. I did not make that statement; Capt. Hobson is the one who made that statement; I pursued the argument on the statement of the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. PADGETT. It is in the gentleman's printed speech in the RECORD.

Mr. TRIBBLE. The gentleman is mistaken. Mr. Hobson is the man who made that statement. I think I stand pretty close to the RECORD. I only accepted his statement as authority. I will quote the language of the gentleman as it appears in the RECORD, so that I may not do him any injustice in my understanding of his language:

Mr. Sisson. The gentleman from Georgia states that the incompetent officers are the ones who are plucked.

Mr. TRIBBLE. No; I did not state that. I say the department pretend that they are plucking incompetent officers, but I did not make that statement. I say they are competent.

Mr. Sisson. If the incompetent ones are the ones who are being plucked, then they are adopting a system of pensioning men for incompetency, are they?

Mr. HOBSON. It is worse than that.

Mr. TRIBBLE. I say it is a terrible arraignment of the Navy of this country and the officers of the Navy if 177 men have been retired for incompetency or something else; and still there are deadheads in the Navy yet who should be plucked for retirement, and you continue to retire them year after year. It is a terrible arraignment on the whole system as well as the men. What is the matter with them? The Secretary of the Navy says there is nothing the matter. Ah, yes; they want to promote officers to better pay.

Mr. HOBSON. The gentleman's arraignment is not as strong as he can make it, if he will allow me. I simply want him to lay all the facts before the Members, and to state that those who are plucked are promoted a whole grade in being plucked.

Mr. BEALL of Texas. Why are they promoted?

Mr. HOBSON. In order to retire them in the next higher grade.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Yes; I thank the gentleman; when they are retired they are promoted to another grade in order that their life salary may be increased—rewarded by promotion for so-called incompetency.

Mr. PADGETT. I now yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. KENDALL. The gentleman was discussing the increase carried in this bill by reason of the enlarged Navy, as I understood him, when he was interrupted by the gentleman from Georgia. I was correct in that, I think. I notice at the top of page 10 of the somewhat elaborate report that has been filed by the minority a statement that we now lack 3,000 officers and 6,000 enlisted men for the operation of the ships we now have in commission. I would like to ask the gentleman, the chairman of the committee, to address himself for a moment to that statement.

Mr. PADGETT. Well, the fact is we are about 3,000 officers short, on a war basis, to operate the ships we now have, but we are not that many short on a peace basis. Of course, if we were in war we would have to have every ship in commission with a full complement, but upon a peace basis many ships are in what is called a reserve, where they have about 25 or 30 per cent of a complement of men and officers.

Mr. KENDALL. I suppose that is ample during peace?

Mr. PADGETT. That is ample for a peace basis; and now, as a matter of fact, while the gentleman says about 6,000 enlisted men, on a war basis we are about 20,000 enlisted men short.

Mr. KENDALL. How is the compensation fixed for enlisted men, by Executive order?

Mr. PADGETT. It is fixed by Executive order, and the law provides for a certain increase for each enlistment, so much increase every time a man reenlists after a four years' enlistment.

Mr. KENDALL. I think it will be interesting to the committee if the chairman will explain how the compensation paid to the ordinary enlisted man in our Navy compares with that received by similar employees in the navies of the world, because that enters largely, I think, into the general budget for the Navy.

Mr. PADGETT. I think it is much higher; I can not give it in detail just from memory as to figures, but the men in our Navy are paid much higher than any foreign navies, as well as in all other occupations abroad, and the cost of living is much higher here than abroad.

Mr. KENDALL. And they are provisioned much better.

Mr. PADGETT. And ours are provisioned much better and they are clothed much better.

Mr. KENDALL. Is not that a circumstance that ought to be taken into account in instituting a comparison between naval expenditures here and abroad?

Mr. PADGETT. It must necessarily be so.

Now I will yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MURRAY], if he desires.

Mr. MURRAY. Mr. Chairman, I simply wanted the gentleman from Tennessee to have an opportunity to conclude his statement without interruption. It seems to be the purpose of certain gentlemen to question him paragraph by paragraph. He has only an hour, and may not be able to get more time than that.

Mr. KENDALL. I disavow any intention of unduly interrupting the gentleman.

Mr. MURRAY. Of course, I did not have in mind the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. PADGETT. I wish to yield to all which the time I have will permit me to do.

Mr. MURRAY. But over half of your time is now gone, and you have not gone more than half through the bill.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, these items are mentioned, and all of them together total an increase of \$4,667,679.25; but we made reductions of something like one million and six or seven hundred thousand dollars in other items of the bill, making the net increase, as stated, \$2,732,314.25. And I have taken the pains and the time to call the attention of the House to the items which constitute this increase, showing that the amount that I stated to be \$4,600,000, and in other portions of the bill we made decreases, reducing the net increase to \$2,732,000.

Now, then, there is another part of the bill—the payment of the obligations for the increase in the Navy heretofore authorized, amounting to \$22,284,091. These are on account of ships which have been authorized heretofore. Now, I thought it would be proper to make this statement: Something more than \$4,000,000 of that is on account of the fact that at the last session of Congress, instead of appropriating, as customary, six million two hundred thousand and some odd dollars on account of a battleship authorized, we appropriated only about \$2,000,000. For this reason, as the bill did not become a law until the 22d of August, and we were providing for a new type of ship, the like of which we did not have, and it was necessary to prepare plans and specifications and details, all of which would consume many months, and we knew that it would be up into this spring before they would be ready to submit bids for contracts. The bids, as a fact, were opened on the 18th of the present month, so that they would have not a full year, but would have only three or four months at the most in which to do work upon the vessel authorized. So we appropriated only \$2,000,000, which the department said was sufficient for the time they would have to work upon the ship.

We have got to make up that \$4,000,000 in the present bill. If it had been appropriated in the bill last year, the \$22,000,000 carried in the bill this year would have been reduced to eighteen millions.

Now, in the present bill there is new authorization. Two battleships, six torpedo-boat destroyers, four submarines, one supply ship, and one transport are authorized, the total cost of which will be \$41,710,611 instead of forty-six million and some odd, as stated in the report of the minority. They were about five millions excessive in the statement of the aggregate cost.

Mr. SHERWOOD. I would like to ask the gentleman a question. Why do you authorize more battleships when you have not enough officers now to man the battleships we have?

Mr. PADGETT. Speaking personally, in committee I favored only one battleship.

Mr. SHERWOOD. Why do you need any battleships when you have not the officers to man them?

Mr. PADGETT. I think the Navy ought to be proportionately increased, and our party says we want an adequate Navy.

Mr. SHERWOOD. Why have the battleships with no officers to command them?

Mr. PADGETT. It takes from 30 months to 3 years to build a battleship. We are increasing our officers 150 a year. The course at the academy is four years.

Mr. TRIBBLE. In the gentleman's explanation of the increase on account of battleships he did not mention the fact that we did not authorize but one battleship last year, and heretofore they have been building two, and we are taking care of one. Will he explain that?

Mr. PADGETT. I think the battleships we were building in early days were costing from four and one-half millions, in round numbers, to seven millions. The battleship we authorized last year, in round numbers, will cost \$15,000,000.



Mr. TRIBBLE. The gentleman does not mean to say that the battleships authorized previous to last year will cost much less than the ship authorized last year? You mean the early construction and not the late ones.

Mr. PADGETT. I said it cost \$15,000,000. I said from \$4,500,000 to about \$7,000,000 for the earlier ships, and then the later ones up to about \$10,000,000.

Mr. SLAYDEN. At total cost?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ADAIR. The increase in this bill, outside of these battleships and the authorizations made heretofore, must be taken care of in this bill—

Mr. PADGETT. Is \$2,732,000.

Mr. ADAIR. That is the increase outside of these other items?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir; that is the increase outside of these items, and it is made up of the items which I stated at length to the committee.

Mr. ADAIR. Yes.

Mr. PADGETT. Now, then, the amount of the appropriations carried in the present bill on account of the new authorizations is \$18,946,325. The amount for a battleship is in round figures \$6,200,000 and for each of the other ships there is carried an amount which appears in the hearings, but I do not have them at my command at this moment.

Mr. BATHRICK. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes.

Mr. BATHRICK. In the explanation of the bill I understand that \$105,000,000 is appropriated for the purpose of keeping what we have—taking care of what we have?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. BATHRICK. Does the gentleman think that any part of that \$105,000,000 could be excluded from this bill and still enable us to take good care of what we have?

Mr. PADGETT. I do not. In fact I concur with that part of the statement of the views of the minority where they say that the committee has been so economical that we have failed to provide things which the real efficiency of the Navy would justify.

Mr. BATHRICK. Now, does the gentleman think that if there is a failure to provide such things as the real efficiency of the Navy might require it is because of a sinister purpose to increase the extension program?

Mr. PADGETT. There is no such purpose; none whatever.

Mr. BATHRICK. Now, let us take the second part of the bill. It is about \$22,000,000, for the purpose of paying present obligations and those which were incurred before this Congress, were they not?

Mr. PADGETT. Yes; for several Congresses back.

Mr. BATHRICK. Yes; for several Congresses. That makes the bill \$127,000,000?

Mr. PADGETT. In round numbers \$128,000,000.

Mr. BATHRICK. Does the gentleman think that as to the second item of \$22,000,000 anything could be taken away from that and the Government still be honest and fair with the people they have made contracts with?

Mr. PADGETT. As to that I will say that the gentlemen who filed their minority views so state, and state that that \$22,000,000 must be appropriated.

Mr. BATHRICK. Then it is quite apparent, is it not, that the minority views agree on the question of the \$105,000,000, which is for maintenance, and as to the \$22,000,000, which is to pay our obligations?

Mr. PADGETT. Well, the minority in their views on the \$105,000,000 insist that we should not make appropriations for the navy yards, for their maintenance and upkeep, because there have been some discussions, I presume, in the newspapers to the effect that some of those yards might be abandoned.

Mr. BATHRICK. Now, just one word more, if I can have the gentleman's attention. How much do these navy yards require or take in this bill?

Mr. PADGETT. The estimates submitted were \$6,526,445, and we recommend in the bill \$4,433,945; in other words, \$2,000,000 less than the estimates and \$189,000 less than was appropriated last year.

Mr. BATHRICK. Now, in reducing that amount, did you take into account and have in mind the fact that we might change or abandon some of these yards? Was that one of the reasons why you reduced it?

Mr. PADGETT. No, sir. We have got yards there, and we have got millions of dollars' worth of property involved. We have got men working there. We are doing repair work. We are doing manufacturing work. We have got these establishments, and we have provided only those things which are necessary for the upkeep of the yards and have recommended

amounts which any prudent business man would expend in the maintenance and preservation of his own property.

Mr. BATHRICK. Now, in the total appropriations for these two parts, namely, that which is required for keeping what we have, and that which is required for the payment of contracts, how much did the committee reduce the estimates brought to it by the department?

Mr. PADGETT. We reduced the total estimates more than \$22,000,000.

Mr. BATHRICK. That is all.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the gentleman a question?

Mr. PADGETT. One moment; let me find out how my time stands. Mr. Chairman, how does my time stand?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has 13 minutes remaining.

Mr. HENSLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman yield?

Mr. PADGETT. I yield for a moment, and will reserve the rest of my time.

Mr. HENSLEY. I understood the gentleman to state that in his opinion none of the items could be taken out of this bill.

Mr. PADGETT. I said they could be taken out, but could not be taken out in justice to the yards.

Mr. HENSLEY. I call the attention of the gentleman to the item of \$35,000 that previously was on page 34 of the bill, and will ask the gentleman if the original draft did not contain that item, and whether the gentleman and the other members of the committee who made up this bill did not confess that that was a duplication, and finally consented to let that item be stricken from the bill on the motion of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BATHRICK]?

Mr. PADGETT. That \$35,000 item is not in the bill at the present time.

Mr. HENSLEY. No; but it was reported to the committee in the first draft of the bill.

Mr. PADGETT. It was in the first draft of the bill. It was for a duplicate air compressor at the Boston manufacturing navy yard, where we have a great number of men working who depend upon constant and unfailing power. The department said that if the existing air compressor should break down the men would be idle until it could be repaired, and they wanted \$35,000 for a duplicate. But while the subcommittee felt that as a business proposition it would be well to have that protection for the yard, the proposition was eliminated in the full committee, because we desired to bring in as economical a bill as we could.

Mr. HENSLEY. May there not be other items in this bill that are duplications, just as it was shown by the testimony before the subcommittee that this was a duplication and not needed in the bill?

Mr. PADGETT. I do not recall any now. Mr. Chairman, I will reserve the remainder of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has 12 minutes remaining, and reserves the remainder of his time.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I desire to state that the members of the Naval Committee on this side of the House are substantially in favor of this bill. It has been carefully considered in the committee, and it comes before this House, in my judgment, a carefully and well-digested bill in every respect. What is more, it continues the naval policy which obtained in this country prior to the time that the present Congress came into power. There are a number of gentlemen upon the other side of this House who, I greatly regret, have made a minority report against this bill. And yet, if any one of you will read the minority report, you will find that very little objection is raised to most of this bill.

In the first place, they divided the bill into three parts and they say we appropriate in this bill \$105,000,000 for the maintenance of the Navy as it is to-day. After making some objections they close their consideration of that part of the bill with these words:

The only just criticism on that part of the bill which appropriates \$105,587,948.43 for the maintenance of the Navy is that it embraces about \$2,000,000 to be expended for various purposes on the navy yards, and this criticism is not that these items are too large, or that the improvements for which this money is sought to be expended are not useful and needed, but the objection is that the navy yards and stations in which this money is to be expended may be abandoned, in which case the expenditure would be useless.

Mr. O'SHAUNESSY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FOSS. I regret that I can not yield.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman declines to yield.

Mr. FOSS. There is not a dollar of this \$2,000,000 appropriated in this bill which is recommended for any navy yard which is abandoned to-day. It has been the policy of the present administration to close up a few yards, the yard at New Orleans and the yard at Pensacola, and some others; but not one single dollar of this \$2,000,000 goes into those yards which

are closed up, or may be said to be temporarily abandoned. So there is no useless expenditure or appropriation of money here in this bill.

When the next administration comes into power they may perchance abandon or close up some of these yards. If so, that will be the policy of the incoming administration, but so far as the navy yards are concerned at the present time there are no appropriations recommended for any navy yards which are abandoned or closed to-day. The question of the abandonment or closing of navy yards has been a mooted question for a number of years. Different Secretaries of the Navy—and we have had any number of them in the last 10 years—have recommended from time to time the closing of this yard or that yard.

Mr. GREGG of Texas. Does not the gentleman think it is the duty of Congress to close some of the yards and rearrange the locations of them?

Mr. FOSS. No; I do not think it is the duty of Congress to close them. I think it is the duty of the administrative part of this Government to close them if advisable.

Mr. GREGG of Texas. Do you not think it ought to be done?

Mr. FOSS. The Secretary of the Navy has a perfect right to close a yard if it is not necessary for the performance of work upon our ships. He knows how much business is to be done in our industrial plants, and these navy yards are largely industrial plants. He has the distributing of the work upon the ships and can send them to this yard or that. It is properly within his jurisdiction to recommend and enforce the policy of closing navy yards or abandoning them.

That seems to me the real situation in regard to the matter. But this minority has no objection to the appropriation made for the maintenance of the Navy except for \$2,000,000 recommended for navy yards which may possibly in the future, but which are not now, be abandoned or closed. What an idle objection to this feature of the bill.

Then we come to the second feature of the bill, and that is the appropriation of money to carry out contracts on ships that are authorized. What does this minority say? After discussing this phase of the bill they say "the second phase of the bill to which we call attention is the appropriation of \$22,000,000 to complete the construction of ships heretofore authorized. These vessels are partly built, and the Government is under contract to complete them. We will either have to abandon these partly constructed vessels or lose what has already been spent on them or appropriate the \$22,000,000 necessary to complete them. We therefore agree that the \$22,000,000 should be appropriated."

This voluminous minority report, after all has been said, comes down finally to the proposition that we must appropriate the money for the ships already authorized—which anybody ought to know is the sensible thing to do—and raises only the trifling objection that I have mentioned as to the appropriation of \$105,000,000 for the maintenance of the Navy.

So the minority report is substantially in favor of this bill, of the \$105,000,000 for the maintenance of the Navy, of \$22,000,000 for the appropriation of ships already authorized. But where do they balk?

Upon the third feature of the bill—the naval program. That is the only real question before this House, whether or not we shall have a naval program this year; whether or not we have an adequate Navy to-day. Those are the real propositions before this House.

Now, during all the time in which we have been engaged in building up an American Navy—I want to say it with pride—we have never made it a party question. Until last year the gentlemen on that side of the House took the question of a naval program into a party caucus. They held caucuses—three or four of them—even after they had declared in favor of an adequate Navy at their national convention in Baltimore. Even after that declaration, in a rather bumptious plank in their platform declaring for the maintenance of the Monroe doctrine—even after all that they met time and time again, and in a Democratic caucus passed resolutions declaring against all battleships whatever.

Finally, when the public press of the country had become aroused against it and they saw that they were upon the unpopular side of this question, a final caucus was held in which it was permitted—think of it; notwithstanding the constitutional obligation and oath which every Member of Congress takes here—it was permitted to Members upon the Democratic side to vote for one battleship, but only one.

This was the first time in the history of our country in the building up of our new Navy when it was ever made a party question. The national defense, I say here and now, is above all parties [applause], and under Republican administration we always treated it so.

But the fact of the matter is that the Democratic Party has never been in favor of building up the American Navy. As I look over the record for 15 Congresses prior to this Congress I find that under the Democratic Congresses there were authorized only 144,000 tons of ships for the new Navy, whereas under 10 Republican Congresses—only twice as many as there were Democratic Congresses—there were authorized 1,066,000 tons of ships for the new Navy. That speaks volumes on the question of which party in this House has been in favor of building up the Navy and maintaining the honor of our country. [Applause.] It is reported in the newspapers that Mr. William Jennings Bryan will be the premier of the new Cabinet, and this morning it is said that he is now measuring tensile strength with the President elect. It is quite likely that he will be the dominating factor under the new administration.

William Jennings Bryan a number of years ago was a Member of this body, and in the debate which took place upon the naval bill on July 9, 1892, he made the following statement in his speech. It will be found upon page 5956 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of the Fifty-second Congress, first session. Mr. Bryan said:

I believe in a sufficient Navy. We have this now, either in existence or in construction. We do not need more.

How much of a Navy did we have at that time, when Mr. Bryan thought it was sufficient for this country? We had built and building 3 first-class battleships, 2 second-class battleships, 1 armored cruiser, 13 protected cruisers, 6 monitors, 3 unprotected cruisers, 8 gunboats, and 2 torpedo-boat destroyers—a small Navy. But if we had carried out the policy which Mr. Bryan enunciated at that time, where do you think we would have been when we met even the small naval power of Spain in 1898?

No; it has never been Democratic policy to build up the American Navy, but it has been built up under the administration of the Republican Party.

Mr. MURRAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I regret to say that I can not yield. I want the country to know this. I would never have spoken of this from the standpoint of party if the party side of the question had not been forced upon us by the action of the Democrats in the last session of Congress and in the numerous conferences which they have held during this session of Congress for the purpose of filibustering against this bill and preventing a sensible and reasonable and conservative naval program in continuance and in line with our past policies up to the time that this Congress came into power.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, will my colleague yield for a question?

Mr. FOSS. Certainly.

Mr. MANN. Do I understand from my colleague's statement that the Democratic members of the Committee on Naval Affairs have had conferences concerning this bill from which the Republican members of the committee were excluded?

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Sure.

Mr. FOSS. I am informed, I will say to the gentleman, that they have had numerous conferences.

Mr. ROBERTS of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will permit, I can state, as a member of that committee, that I went to the Naval Committee room and was told I could not go in because the Democratic members were having what they called an executive session, and that all of the employees of that committee had been excluded from that room, and they were standing out in the hallway.

Mr. MANN. Is it not entirely unusual for a committee like that to turn the whole thing into a partisan proposition?

Mr. FOSS. Why, it is something never before heard of in the history of the country, and we will undoubtedly hear of a lot of other things—

Mr. GREGG of Texas. Oh, we will teach you a lot of new things before we get through with you.

Mr. FOSS. Which have never been before heard of in the history of the country.

But why did the gentlemen on the other side object to the continuation of the naval policy? Why do they go back on the platform which was adopted in the last Democratic convention at Baltimore, in which they spoke of the Monroe doctrine and of maintaining the Monroe doctrine? Why do they go back on it, and why do they propose, a large number of them, to vote against the naval program recommended in this bill?

In the first place, I say that at heart they have not been for the building up of the American Navy, but the second reason is because they are beginning to realize that the appropriations under the management of that side of the House have been running away up beyond their dreams and expectations. For



years on that side of the House, they have said to us that we have been extravagantly appropriating for the maintenance of the Government, and they have said to the people of the country, "Let us get into power, and we will cut down the appropriations, and we will give you an economical administration." They are finding out now that the appropriations are running higher and higher, until I am told they will be at least \$100,000,000 more than they were two years ago, the high-water mark under Republican administration. And before we get through with this session of Congress, they may reach \$200,000,000 more. That is the reason why. You are beginning to see that you can not carry out your promises to the American people, and therefore you say "We will cut down the naval bill, we will cut down the naval program and try to reduce expenditures in that way." But the country will see through that sham economy, that pretense of economy.

Mr. Chairman, this program which we recommend in this bill, and which I say meets with the approval of this side of the House, is a continuance of a policy which obtained prior to the present Congress, and obtained for a number of years. We recommended two ships a year. As I look back over the history of the last 16 years I see that the Republican Party, when in power upon this floor, authorized on the average two ships a year.

It is a conservative policy, two ships a year. It only will take care of the wear and tear upon the tonnage of the American Navy. We have a tonnage to-day of about 1,300,000. One of these great battleships might be likened unto a great machine shop, and any man who knows anything about machine shops knows that there is at least from 5 to 10 per cent which is struck off for wear and tear every year upon one of these great industrial establishments, and yet in the appropriation bill of this year we only recommend these two battleships with some smaller ships which will no more than equalize the annual wear and tear upon the ships in the American Navy.

We have never tried to rival any foreign program in presenting a program to this House. England last year authorized four battleships, and it is said that she will authorize five great battleships this year, and Canada, we are informed, has already made her a gift, or is about to do so, of £7,000,000, or \$35,000,000, for the construction of three great ships in addition thereto. We have not sought to rival any foreign power, but we have maintained through the course of years a systematic, uniform naval policy in the building up of the American Navy.

There ought not to be any question in the minds of the American people but what we need some kind of a Navy, and if we need any Navy at all we need a good one. We have great interests upon this hemisphere and also upon the other. The United States to-day stands in a high position among the nations of the world because she has always been ready and always has maintained her national honor. We are to-day building the great Panama Canal. We need a Navy to defend it. Ah, you may say, we will defend it by neutrality, by an agreement among the nations, but we may be called upon to defend that neutrality in time of war, and there is nothing but a navy that can defend it, a navy that will be able to maintain the control of the sea against the contending power. Not only that, but in the building of that great canal we are opening up a great sea to the commerce of the world—the Caribbean Sea. We are changing the routes of commerce and trade. The nations will send their ships through that great canal, and the causes of friction and of trouble and of international difficulty will be magnified a hundredfold, and for that reason we need be in a position where we shall be able to maintain our rights in the new commercial and tremendous development of that new Mediterranean of the Western Hemisphere. Then, we have islands of the sea under our dominion, and it is necessary for us to protect them, and our foreign policy, which is not one whit bigger than our Navy, and for these reasons I appeal to you upon this side of the House and upon that to throw aside all consideration of party and stand once again for national honor and national defense, which is above all other considerations. [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to the passage of this bill. In the committee I voted against reporting it to the House, and I shall vote against its final passage unless it is materially amended. My opposition to this bill, Mr. Chairman, is based upon the fact that the bill, in my judgment, ignores and sacrifices the efficiency of the American Navy and proposes to squander millions of dollars upon ships that we do not need. The bill seeks to appropriate \$146,818,364.53. This sum is \$23,666,825.78 more than the last appropriation and \$9,763,165.48 more than the Republicans in the days of their wildest extravagance ever appropriated in one bill. Of this

vast amount \$105,587,948.53 is proposed to be appropriated to the maintenance of the Navy and \$22,284,091 to the cost of completing the construction of naval vessels heretofore authorized and \$46,418,925 for the building of new vessels, on account of which the bill seeks to appropriate \$18,946,325 for the first year's work of construction, leaving \$27,472,600 of that sum which will necessarily be included in the appropriation bill of the next fiscal year, if we pass this program.

In regard to the first item of \$105,587,948.53, it is nearly \$3,000,000 more than the amount appropriated for the maintenance of the Navy in the last appropriation bill, and this large increase in the appropriations for the maintenance of the Navy is brought about notwithstanding the fact that the Secretary of the Navy and every bureau in the Navy Department has exercised the greatest economy. The examples of this economy are these: In regard to powder, the testimony before the committee shows that the department is now manufacturing powder 10 per cent cheaper than it ever did before and 15 cents a pound less than it can be bought in the market. In regard to torpedoes, the first torpedoes purchased by the Navy Department cost \$9,500 apiece; that cost has been reduced to \$5,800 apiece, and the department itself is now manufacturing a good part of the torpedoes needed at \$3,500 apiece. In regard to the manufacture of large guns, the testimony shows that a short while ago they were costing \$60,000 apiece, and now our gun factory is making them at less than \$50,000 apiece, and that the cost of the gun and mount of the large 14-inch guns that we are now making is between \$20,000 and \$30,000 less per gun than the 12-inch guns cost a few years ago. Not only this, but in the matter of accounting the evidence shows that reforms have been adopted which have resulted in great saving to the Government.

Not only have the bureaus of the department manifested this commendable economy, but the Committee on Naval Affairs itself, after spending months upon this bill, have reduced, with the exception I will point out presently, every item in the bill as low as was possible consistent with the efficiency of the American Navy. Not only has the committee made a consistent and continuous struggle to reduce this appropriation as low as possible, but it has actually neglected a great many matters upon which the very efficiency of the Navy depends.

First, in regard to target practice, the Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance has told us that in his judgment we needed a certain amount of money to give the naval officers the practice that is necessary for them to know how to shoot accurately, and this bill proposes for that purpose \$400,000 less than the experts tell us we need. I wish to impress upon you the importance of this. It makes no difference what number of battleships you have, it is utterly immaterial how efficient your powder is, it makes no difference what sort of guns you have, it all amounts to nothing if the men behind the guns can not shoot with that skill and accuracy that will strike the ships of the enemy in the case of battle, and they can not acquire this skill in any other way except by target practice. And yet on this vital point of the efficiency of the Navy, this bill refuses by \$400,000 to appropriate the necessary amount of money. Again, in the matter of torpedoes, the testimony before us shows that we are deficient; that our factory is incapacitated to manufacture as many torpedoes as we need; and that we are therefore compelled to purchase them at a price \$2,400 apiece higher than we can make them. It was on this account recommended to us, or rather the experts stated, that it would require \$250,000 to so enlarge our factory that we could provide this necessary means of defense. We refused to give that \$250,000 because we were struggling to keep this appropriation for the maintenance, the efficiency, the adequacy of the Navy down to a point where there would be more chance for this Congress passing a bill to waste \$45,000,000 on new vessels. [Applause.]

The hearings make it plain to my mind that the result of a naval battle would under many conditions depend upon the use of torpedoes, and this bill has just sacrificed the efficiency of the Navy to gratify the extravagance which seems to have run wild in this whole country. Again, in the matter of mines, it is shown that they are among the most important means of defense. They are proven to be terrible engines of destruction and indispensable in time of war. In the naval battle between Japan and Russia 6,000 of these mines were used, and with them the Russians destroyed two Japanese battleships and several other vessels, and with them the Japanese destroyed a Russian battleship and so disabled several others that they could not take part in the engagement. But these mines do not cost very much. You can not squander very much money on mines. They cost just \$500 apiece. [Applause.] But a battleship costs \$16,000,000, and therefore that is the thing with which you can effectually squander the people's money



with the greatest rapidity. And so we neglect the matter of mines and devote our thought to the subject of battleships. It is the best means by which to gratify extravagance and wastefulness. [Applause.]

This all-powerful means of defense has been neglected. The experts in the Navy have from time to time urged Congress to appropriate \$1,000,000 for mines, and only \$200,000 has been appropriated. This bill carries for this purpose only \$100,000 and the result is that we have only 325 mines, while if we had a war we would need thousands of them, and our fleet would probably be defeated and destroyed because we have neglected to make provision for them. But when we run the appropriations up to \$150,000,000 to get what is useless we are compelled to deny ourselves what is needful on the principle that when we spend all of our money for ice cream and chewing gum we have nothing left with which to buy an automobile.

In regard to powder, we have only one factory, which has not the capacity to supply our needs, and if an explosion should occur there we would become wholly, as we are now largely, dependent upon the Powder Trust. We should have several powder factories. The public defense requires it, and the safety of our Navy as well as a proper regard for the personnel of the Navy demands that we should be prepared to supply them at all times with plenty of powder, but we can not appropriate the money for this purpose because we prefer to squander it on battleships.

Another matter, and that is this: It is shown to us that at present we lack 3,000 officers of having a sufficient number to man and operate the vessels that we now have. It is shown that if we did not build another ship it would take the Naval Academy 20 years at the present rate of graduation to supply the Navy as it exists to-day with a sufficient number of officers. That is the fact before the committee. But I undertake to say that the Committee on Naval Affairs did not give two and one-half minutes' attention to that fact, because we were driving toward the \$45,000,000. We did not have time to consider a question that affects the very vitals of the Navy. A battleship is utterly useless without men to operate it. Enlisted men have to be trained, and it takes time to train them. Officers have to be educated, and there is no other way that you can get officers who are competent to take charge of ships of war except to train them at the Naval Academy. And yet no provision is made for the increase of our officers to supply the vessels we now have, and not only is no provision made, but there has never been in the committee any discussion of that subject or any consideration of it, because we did not have time to do it.

Now, Mr. Chairman, notwithstanding the fact that every bureau has exercised these economies, notwithstanding the fact that the committee itself has cut down every item it could, notwithstanding the fact that it has neglected to provide what is necessary and required for the adequacy and efficiency of the Navy and for the public defense, this item of \$105,000,000 is nearly \$3,000,000 more than it was last year. In that \$105,000,000 there is only one part of it that the minority of the committee feels is subject to criticism, and that is the number of items covering about 10 pages of the bill and amounting to between two and three million dollars for the construction of new things in the navy yards. And on that point the chairman of our committee, the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT], stated in his remarks that the minority report assailed items for the upkeep and maintenance of the navy yards.

I want to tell you that he is mistaken about that. These items that we object to have nothing to do with the upkeep and the maintenance of navy yards. Ample provisions have been made in other parts of the bill to keep the navy yards going just as they are now. Why, our navy yards have been sufficient to manufacture the greatest battleships in existence with what they have now, but here is a proposition to construct new things, to make them better than they have been. We say they can go along as they are now, because they are already efficient to do the work at the present time, and our objection to these items is not that they are too large; it is not that the objects for which the appropriations are sought to be made will not be useful and needful, but we base our objection to the appropriation of this vast sum of money on the fact that nearly all of those navy yards will probably be abandoned in the near future, and if they are abandoned, then the expenditure of this money will be wasted.

Mr. O'SHAUNESSY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman yield?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes.

Mr. O'SHAUNESSY. I endeavored to interrupt the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Foss] when he was speaking about navy yards that might be abandoned, and I interrupted him in order

that I might have some enlightenment about what the committee considered in regard to those navy yards.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Oh, I have not time to listen to the gentleman talk, but if the gentleman will ask me a question I will answer it.

Mr. O'SHAUNESSY. Then I will ask it.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I will try to answer it.

Mr. O'SHAUNESSY. Can the gentleman tell me what the committee did relative to any legislation dealing with the proposed abandonment of useless navy yards?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. The committee did absolutely nothing; and it did not do anything on anything else hardly, because it was driving toward these battleships. [Applause.]

Mr. BATHRICK. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman yield?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I can not yield much time. If I did, I would not have time to make my argument; but I will yield to the gentleman for a question.

Mr. BATHRICK. Does not the gentleman think that in order to abandon these navy yards it would be necessary to have legislation or a new bill?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I can not yield. I do not think that is pertinent.

Mr. BATHRICK. Is this question pertinent, then—

Mr. WITHERSPOON. I decline to yield, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman declines to yield.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. The Secretary of the Navy has told us that these navy yards ought all to be abandoned except three. He mentioned three that he said absolutely ought to be abandoned. One of the bureau chiefs has explained to us how it increases the expenses to have so many navy yards. We have 10 navy yards and 18 naval stations. The result is that a certain navy yard will want a large crane, for example. Another navy yard wants a crane. If the work of two were concentrated in one, you would need but one crane.

Another illustration is that a great deal of money has to be expended to dredge and deepen the channels of the rivers and harbors to enable our vessels to get to those navy yards. Where you have 28 navy yards and naval stations you have got to dredge and deepen the channels in 28 places, whereas if you had them all at one place you would have to provide a channel only for one. It is pointed out to us that if they were concentrated in two or three places you would not need nearly so many power plants, and you would not need so many of nearly everything in the Navy, and it would greatly reduce the outlay and promote economy to concentrate the work in a few places. That is the argument, and the department has been contemplating, according to the Secretary of the Navy himself, the abandonment of nearly all of these navy yards. And yet it is proposed to squander two or three million dollars in those useless navy yards. We protest against that.

Now, I want to point out to you how this same folly has been exercised in the past. We expended \$12,000,000 on the navy yard at Pensacola. We expended, if I recollect rightly, about three and one-half million dollars on the navy yard at New Orleans. After all that money was wasted, then we discovered that we did not need either one of those navy yards, and we have actually abandoned both of them.

Another illustration: We invested nearly \$2,000,000 in some coaling stations. There has never been but a small amount of coal put in those coaling stations. After the money was wasted and squandered, we discovered that we did not need them, and both of them have been abandoned.

I could give you, if I had time, many other illustrations of this folly. The folly of the past consisted in not discovering that we would not need those navy yards before we expended the money. But you are asked now to commit the worse folly of squandering this money after you have found out that it is going to be useless. [Applause.]

And so we insist that the bill, as to all of those items of the class I have discussed, should be amended, and that these items should be stricken out.

So much for the contention which the minority makes as to that portion of the appropriation of \$105,587.53 which the minority report submits should be stricken out of the bill. But the point that we want to emphasize and impress upon the House is that that item is nearly \$3,000,000 more than it was last year, not because there is anything in it too great, with the exception of the feature I have pointed out, but that it is increasing and has increased solely on account of the continual increase in the number of vessels; and as long as we continue to add new vessels to our Navy this item for its maintenance is going to continue to increase by leaps and bounds, and it will be only a few years until this Committee on Naval Affairs will surpass the Committee on Pensions in the amount



of money to be expended for the maintenance of the Navy unless you stop building these new vessels.

Whenever you add one more battleship to the Navy that necessitates more men. It necessitates more coal; it necessitates more powder; it necessitates more pistols; it necessitates more clothing and more food. The fact is, it increases every expense in the department. The cost of a battleship is not the \$16,000,000 we have to pay to construct it; but no man knows what it does cost, because it increases the expense in every bureau and department of the Navy. A battleship causes all the expenses of the Navy to rise, just as the revolutions of the moon cause the tides to rise, but, unlike the moon, it never causes them to ebb. [Applause.]

And so I leave this, with the thought that you must either make up your mind that you are going to let this naval appropriation run up rapidly until it gets so big that the American people will turn us all out of office, or you have got to stop the increase in the number of vessels. That is the conception that the minority have of this bill.

In regard to the second item in the bill—\$22,000,000 for the completion of the construction of vessels heretofore authorized—we do not object to that. Those vessels are partly completed. The Government is under contract to complete them. If we did not complete them, we would lose the millions we have already spent upon them, and we see no way to reduce that item of \$22,000,000. The only thing I want to say about that is that it is \$22,000,000 in this bill, but it will not be \$22,000,000 in the next bill if you pass this building program.

Notwithstanding the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT] said we had \$5,000,000 too much in our estimate of the building program, I have obtained my figures in a way that makes me believe I am correct when I say that it is \$46,000,000.

Now, we appropriate \$18,946,325 for the first year's work, and that leaves \$27,472,600 to be provided for in the next appropriation bill. And not only will that \$27,472,600 have to be provided for in the next fiscal year, but you must have in the next appropriation bill an amount to complete those five great dreadnoughts now in process of construction that are not completed by that time, and the whole thing will run this \$22,000,000 up above \$30,000,000 in the next appropriation bill if you pass this building program.

We ought to look ahead and know what is going to confront us in the future. It is just this way: You might go down town here and buy \$10,000 worth of diamonds if you could get a man to sell them to you on condition that you pay \$5 cash and the balance next year, and it would be the next year that that balance would put you to your trumps. [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, I want to call the attention of the committee to the third part of this bill, and that is the portion which proposes to build two battleships costing \$16,345,275 apiece, or \$32,690,550 for both; six torpedo destroyers that will cost \$7,657,810; four submarines that will cost \$2,478,936; a transport that will cost \$2,051,179; and a supply ship that will cost \$1,534,450. I speak in round numbers, but if you will add up all those amounts you will find that they aggregate \$46,418,925.

It is manifest that no substantial reduction can be made in this bill if this program for the increase of the Navy is adopted, and the principal question presented by the bill is whether this enormous increase is wise or necessary. The wisdom of this proposed expenditure depends upon the question whether we now have an adequate Navy or not.

I admit that our Navy is inadequate for a great many purposes. It is inadequate for the purpose of conquest. If we were to undertake to conquer England, Germany, France, and Japan, we would find that we have an insufficient fleet for such purpose, and I hope that our Navy will always be inadequate for any such purpose. It is also inadequate to gratify the greed and avarice of those who annually make millions of dollars out of the construction, repairs, coal, powder, armor, and armament necessary to maintain and increase our Navy, and for such purpose the Navy would be inadequate if we had a thousand battleships. It is also inadequate to gratify the wild-eyed extravagance of those who measure all political wisdom by the magnitude of the fund to be squandered. It is also inadequate to defend our country from invasion in case all the great countries of Europe should unite in a war against us, and I am not in favor of building any Navy adequate for defense in such case, both because I believe we will never be confronted with any such misfortune, and also because in such case I believe the wisest course would be to permit them to land their armies on our shores and depend upon such armies as we could raise to determine again the oft-decided question whether America can be conquered. But for the purpose of defending our country against attack from any nation on earth I confidently believe that our Navy is amply sufficient and fully adequate, and for any other purpose we need no Navy at all.

The question is whether the efficiency and adequacy of the American Navy and the public defense require the addition of all these vessels to our Navy. No man can intelligently determine that question unless he gets into his mind what the Navy is at present, and I want to call your attention to the meaning of the words "American Navy" and what those words signify.

For the legitimate and reasonable purpose of the public defense we have a Navy whose officers and enlisted men number 65,614 and whose vessels, of all kinds, number 277. Among this large number of vessels there are included 38 battleships, of which 33 are ready for service and 5 are in process of construction; 11 armored cruisers; 63 submarines, of which 47 are complete and 16 in process of construction; 23 torpedo boats, 54 destroyers, and other auxiliary vessels. The 38 battleships are equipped with one hundred and forty-eight 12-inch guns, thirty-two 13-inch guns, and fifty-two 14-inch guns. The one hundred and forty-eight 12-inch guns can shoot a steel shell weighing 870 pounds 12 miles, the thirty-two 13-inch guns can shoot a steel shell weighing 1,100 pounds 13 miles, and the forty 14-inch guns can shoot a steel shell weighing 1,400 pounds 14 miles, nearly twice as far as the human eye can see a battleship on the ocean. Each of these huge guns can shoot three of these immense shells every minute, or, altogether, they can shoot 696 of these terrible missiles of destruction every minute, and in five minutes they can shoot 3,480 steel shells weighing in the aggregate 223,240 pounds. In the discharge of each gun there is between 300 and 400 pounds of powder. In addition to this we have guns of smaller caliber which no man can number.

If that many shells a minute, if that many shells in every five minutes—shells weighing 223,000 pounds of steel—if that is not enough to make the Navy adequate, I would like to know how many it would take. [Applause.]

In order for the committee to more clearly understand the adequacy of our Navy I want to compare it with the other navies of the world.

Comparing our Navy with that of Japan, ours has one hundred and forty-eight 12-inch guns and theirs 84, a difference of 64 in our favor. Ours has thirty-two 13-inch guns and theirs has 56, a difference of 24 in their favor. Ours has fifty-two 14-inch guns and theirs has 12, a difference of 40 in our favor. Ours has, in large guns 12 to 14 inch, 232 and theirs 152, a difference in our favor of 80.

And yet some people are kept from sleeping at night on account of visions that they have of the American Navy being sunk to the bottom of the sea under the weight of Japanese shells. [Laughter and applause.]

Comparing our Navy with that of France, ours has one hundred and forty-eight 12-inch guns and theirs has 118, a difference of 30 in our favor. Ours has thirty-two 13-inch guns and theirs 54, a difference of 22 in their favor. Ours has fifty-two 14-inch guns and theirs none. Ours has a total of 232 large guns and theirs a total of 172 large guns, a difference of 60 in our favor. And yet they will tell you that we ought to build more battleships because France is doing it.

Comparing our Navy with that of Germany, ours has one hundred and forty-eight 12-inch guns and theirs 198, a difference of 50 in their favor. Ours has thirty-two 13-inch guns and theirs no 13-inch guns. Ours has fifty-one 14-inch guns and theirs has 40, a difference of 11 in our favor. Of the large 13 and 14 inch guns ours has 232 and theirs a total of 238, or a difference of 6 in their favor.

But while Germany has 6 more of these large guns, yet this preponderance in her favor is on account of her having 50 more 12-inch guns. We have a large preponderance of 13 and 14 inch guns over Germany, and, as I will show you later, we have so many more larger guns that they more than overcome the difference of the 6 in favor of Germany.

Now, comparing our Navy with that of England, she surpasses us 162 guns of the 12-inch type and 152 guns of the 13-inch type. But she has no 14-inch guns and we have 52. I admit that the English Navy is much more powerful than ours, but when you remember the fact that in the case of a war England would be compelled to divide her Navy into a great many fleets or leave her vast possessions in every part of the world unprotected, it is not so clear that even England could send against us a fleet which we would be unable to resist.

But if it be true that we have not enough ships, if it be true that these 232 guns on our battleships are insufficient to defend us in an attack, then I submit to this House that no increase in the number would help the matter. If we were engaged in war with some other country and our guns were to shoot 696 of these immense shells at them every minute, 3,480 of them, weighing 23,000 pounds, every five minutes, if that did not destroy them, then no amount of shells could destroy them.



It is just like if you had 232 men around the Washington Monument well supplied with baseballs, and they were throwing those balls at the monument and it did not fall, would you say that the trouble was that they did not have baseballs enough to knock it down? Would not you know that the reason it did not do it was because the balls did not have the destructive force necessary to destroy it? [Laughter and applause.]

It is the same way if you had 38 American battleships shooting at a fleet of the enemy, and with all these 696 shells flying every minute it did not destroy them, it would demonstrate to any sensible man that these shells would not do it for the lack of sufficient destructive force, and to multiply them would not help the matter at all. [Applause.] The truth of the matter is it is almost inconceivable how you could use any more battleships than we have. It is impossible to conceive, and your committee has had before it no testimony to show how more than 38 battleships could be used to advantage in a naval battle. When these battleships are taken out on the ocean to search for an enemy they go in line. I was present last year on these ships for four days when they were engaged in target practice. The admirals explained to me that the manipulation of the ships in target practice was made such as to be as near as possible to what it would be in an actual engagement. If our fleet were sent out on the ocean to search for an enemy and destroy it, the front ship would be  $9\frac{1}{2}$  miles ahead of the rear ship, and if it should meet the enemy the front ships would destroy one another before the hindmost ones would get close enough to begin to engage in the battle, and if the enemy had twice as many ships as we had, in such a case as that their line would be 19 miles long, and the battle would be over, so far as all those in front were concerned, hours before the last ship in the enemy's line would get in sight. But suppose that our Navy should start out to hunt the enemy and the ships should travel abreast, there has to be a certain distance between the ships. If it should meet an enemy that had twice as many ships as we had, its line would be twice as long as ours, and consequently the ships in our line would engage in battle with those in the enemy's line opposite to ours. The ships of the enemy in that part of their line not opposite to ours would be too far off to take part in the engagement at all. Of course, if these naval battles were going to last for hours and days like a battle on land, it would be different, but with these immense, destructive shells, a naval battle can not last but a few minutes. If the guns can strike the enemy's ships and they have the destructive force to destroy them, the battle would be over in a very few minutes, and consequently those ships in the line of the enemy double as long as ours, which were not opposite to ours, would not be able to take part in the engagement until it was over.

It is just for this reason that you can use only a certain number of battleships in a battle. One of the admirals of the Navy told me that 16 was the number. The impossibility of using 38 battleships in an engagement is the very reason we have divided our Navy into two fleets. One is called the active fleet and the other is called the reserve fleet. The fact is that we have so many battleships that we take half of them and tie them up and call them the reserve fleet, to be used in case the active fleet is defeated.

I say that the number of battleships does not determine the adequacy and efficiency of the Navy, but that it depends upon other things. These conditions of success are the character of the powder, of the guns, of the shells, and of the men behind the guns.

First, it depends on the powder. If we have manufactured a kind of powder that is so much greater in force and of so much greater uniformity than that of the enemy, then our guns will shoot with more accuracy and with more destructive force; and if that be great enough for our shells to penetrate the armor of the enemy's vessels and their powder is not of sufficient force to penetrate ours, it is perfectly manifest to a man of common sense that our fleet would destroy the enemy's fleet, even though the enemy had ten times as many ships as we have. That is one of the real conditions—powder.

Another condition is the character of the guns. The superiority of the guns is a condition that would determine the result of the battle. The size and mechanism of the guns are far more important than their number. It has been explained to the committee by the experts that a 14-inch gun has a destructive force 50 per cent greater than a 12-inch gun, and that on account of the flatness of the trajectory, the winds, and other causes explained to the committee it shoots with 30 per cent more accuracy than a 12-inch gun. On that point I will read to the committee what Admiral Twining says:

The CHAIRMAN. What is the result of your tests of 14-inch guns? Are they entirely satisfactory?

Admiral TWINING. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the comparison between the 12-inch 50-caliber gun and the 14-inch 45-caliber gun? I believe those are the calibers.

Admiral TWINING. The 12-inch 50-caliber is the latest type of 12-inch gun.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you regard as the destructive force, the power of those two guns, speaking relatively, at 10,000 yards?

Admiral TWINING. I suppose the destructive force of the 14-inch gun is 50 per cent greater than the 12-inch at that range.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the relative percentage of accuracy of the two guns at that distance?

Admiral TWINING. The 14-inch gun is probably 30 per cent more accurate at extreme range.

Mr. FOSS. What do you base that on?

Admiral TWINING. The flatness of the trajectory and the fact that the 14-inch shell, having almost twice the weight of the 12-inch, will keep its steadiness of flight much longer and be affected much less by winds and other external conditions toward the end of its trajectory. Whereas the comparison would be in favor of the lighter shell with greater velocity over the first part of the trajectory, in the latter part the comparison is in favor of the heavy shell.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the accuracy at different distances, say 10,000 yards?

Admiral TWINING. At 10,000 yards I should estimate that the 14-inch shell would have in the neighborhood of 5 per cent more accuracy than the 12-inch.

The CHAIRMAN. And what would be the difference at 5,000 yards?

Admiral TWINING. There wouldn't be very much difference at that distance. It would be slightly in favor of the 12-inch.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the difference as to destructive effect?

Admiral TWINING. That is based on the greater probability of hitting and the greater effect of a hit. A shell weighing 1,400 pounds will have more effect when it hits than a shell weighing 870 pounds, and its bursting charge is 50 per cent greater.

Mr. FOSS. How far will a 14-inch gun throw a projectile?

Admiral TWINING. We used to have a thumb rule that a gun would fire a mile for every inch of caliber. In that case the 14-inch gun would fire 14 miles, and I think it would not fall far short of that.

If that statement is accurate, then the fact that our Navy exceeds the navies of Germany, France, and Japan so much in the number of large guns would show that our Navy would be more than a match for any one of them.

Assuming this statement to be accurate, then if the entire German Navy were engaged in a battle with ours, and if the positions could be so arranged that every ship on both sides could take part at the same time, then our eighty-four 13 and 14 inch guns, on account of their 50 per cent greater destructive force and of their 30 per cent greater accuracy, would inevitably soon put her ships with one hundred and ninety-eight 12-inch guns out of action, and on account of the greater number of our largest guns we would be more than a match for her ships with 14-inch guns.

If all of our ships were at the same time engaged in a naval battle with the French fleet, the excess of thirty 12-inch guns in our favor and the excess of thirty-two 13 and 14 inch guns would leave no doubt as to the result.

And in the case of a naval battle with Japan, the excess of sixty 12-inch guns in our favor and the excess of sixteen 13 and 14 inch guns in our favor makes our great superiority unquestioned.

But, Mr. Chairman, the efficiency of the Navy depends more upon the man behind the gun than upon anything else. It is the patriotism, the courage, the nerve, the willingness in the hearts of the men behind the guns to die rather than to see the flag go down that will enable them to shoot with the accuracy which will bring victory. [Applause.] On this point I want to call attention to the fact that the provisions made for the American Navy guarantee and assure us in the best possible way that we have secured the best officers on the face of the earth. The rigid examinations for entrance to Annapolis, the rigid examinations for passage from one class to another, and then the rigid examinations that are kept up after they become officers, whenever the time comes for them to be promoted from one rank to another, eliminates the inferior and leaves as the officers of our Navy the very highest grade of men. Besides that, we have now a great number of schools giving postgraduate courses in which our naval officers are taught and made experts in every department of naval knowledge, and these provisions make me believe that we have the best officers and the best Navy in the world. [Applause.]

If instead of exhausting our resources and impoverishing our overtaxed people in building more ships we would devote more attention and spend a little more money in torpedoes, mines, powder, target practice, and supplying the ships already constructed with an adequate number of trained officers we would, in my judgment, make the wisest possible provision for the adequacy of the Navy and for the public defense, and at the same time save the people millions of dollars.

But if I am mistaken in all this, if it be true that our Navy is not adequate and efficient, I have the consolation of knowing that I have a great deal of good company with me, and I want to call attention to that. Whether or not the efficiency and adequacy of the Navy would be increased by adding more ships to our battle fleet is a subject I want to tell this House the committee that reported this bill has never given any attention to at all. If it be true that we need more battleships the committee has not tried to find it out. We started out on the assumption that we were going to have them, necessary or not



necessary, and we have never gone into the question of whether there was any reason for having them or not. [Applause.] There has only been one question asked, and I want to call attention to that. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BATHRICK], who is always of a somewhat inquisitive turn of mind and anxious to discover the truth, is the only member of this committee who ever propounded a single question to find out whether it is necessary to have more battleships, and he propounded it to the Secretary of the Navy in these words:

Mr. BATHRICK. You have stated that it was necessary to build battleships. What are your reasons; why do you believe it necessary? Secretary MEYER. I believe it to be necessary in order to have a fleet that will meet the possible requirements of emergencies that might arise. Otherwise, if you are not going to have a fleet that will meet emergencies that may arise, a fleet made up of vessels of a character which other navies which may come in contact with us are building, it would be better to have no Navy and no fleet; better than to have a lot of vessels which would be crushed like a lot of pasteboard boxes.

Look at that answer. He was asked to give the reasons why it was necessary to build more battleships. The question meant, why is it that 38 battleships are not enough; it meant why 232 big guns are not enough; it wanted to know what good it would do to have a greater number. That is the meaning of the question, and the Secretary's answer is, to provide for emergencies that may arise in the future. Well, is that any answer to say that we want to provide for emergencies that may arise, or does it explain why 38 battleships would not provide for the emergencies that might arise; is that any answer why 41 would provide for them and 38 would not? Mr. BATHRICK was not to be put down by any such answer as that and so he said this:

Mr. BATHRICK. I rather expected to get some reason other than "may" or "might." I thought, perhaps, that you might have some specific special reason.

Secretary MEYER. I do not want to for this reason: The other day I talked rather freely about the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific, and it was all in the papers the next day. You have asked a question which it is perfectly proper to ask, and I will sit down and discuss it with you some time, but I do not want to embarrass foreign relations by making statements which might be misunderstood and create offense where none is meant to be given.

Then you are confronted with this situation: When the Secretary of the Navy is asked to tell us whether we should build more battleships, why he believes it is necessary, he declines to give any reason on the ground that it might get into the newspapers.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. HENSLEY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Mississippi may conclude his speech.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Missouri [Mr. HENSLEY] asks unanimous consent that the gentleman from Mississippi may conclude his speech.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I hope no one will object to that.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to object, I would like the information from some one as to how long general debate is to run on this bill. If some gentleman desires to ask unanimous consent for some length of time, I shall not object.

Mr. MURRAY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Mississippi be given 15 minutes to continue his remarks.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I ask that he be given half an hour.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection?

Mr. MANN. I object to the request to continue until he concludes.

Mr. GREGG of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman may proceed for 40 minutes longer.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas asks unanimous consent that the gentleman from Mississippi may proceed for 40 minutes. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Mr. Chairman, the Secretary of the Navy has not only declined to give any reason to the committee and the committee has not only no reason to give to this House which it got from the experts, or in the evidence before us, but the Secretary of the Navy has plainly told us that we did have about as many battleships as we need. He was asked this question:

Mr. GREGG. Twenty-one in the first line.

Secretary MEYER. The ideal number which the Navy Department hopes to work up to is a fleet of 41 battleships, with necessary auxiliaries, 21 in the active fleet and 20 in the reserve fleet.

According to that statement of Secretary Meyer, the ideal number of battleships is 41, and we already have 38.

Again, on page 21 of his annual report, the Secretary uses this language:

A total of 41 battleships, with a proportional number of other fighting and auxiliary vessels is, in the opinion of the Secretary, the least that will place this country on a safe basis in its relations with other

world powers. This number should be reached as soon as practicable, and then the fleet should be kept up to its standard strength by replacing obsolete vessels with new ones by a uniform yearly replacement program.

In other words, Mr. Chairman, the Secretary of the Navy himself refutes the idea that we must have a yearly program and continue to build battleships every year. He clearly tells us there is a limit to the number of battleships beyond which it is useless to go. He fixes this limit at 41, and declares that is the ideal number, but he declines to give us any reason at all why 38 is not just as ideal as 41, and I think it would be an impossibility for any human being to sit down and figure out and prove how 41 battleships with 30 more guns on them would do any more good than 38 with 232. The truth is that we have long since passed the ideal number of battleships that could be effectively used in a battle, and the building of more is a useless waste of the people's money.

But not only the present Secretary of the Navy has told us this, but it was not the first time that the Congress has been so advised by the officers of the Navy Department. We have had that information before, and I call your attention to the fact that the Secretaries of the Navy have means of information which we have not. They are in constant contact with experts on this subject. They have nothing to do but study this question, and they learn more about it than we can possibly learn.

Now, I want to call your attention to what the Secretary of the Navy said in 1905. He used this language in his annual report:

The aggregate of our battleships, armored cruisers, coast-defense vessels, built, building, and authorized, would seem, according to present indications, sufficient to provide for any contingencies within the limit of probabilities.

That is what he said about the Navy in 1905. This statement of the Secretary of the Navy was indorsed by the then President of the United States in his annual message in these words:

It does not seem to me necessary, however, that the Navy should, at least in the immediate future, be increased beyond the present number of units. What is now clearly necessary is to substitute efficient for inefficient units as the latter become worn out or as it becomes apparent that they are useless.

Mr. SHERWOOD. What is the date of that?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Nineteen hundred and five.

Now, I want to call the attention of the House to the fact that in 1905, at the time the Secretary of the Navy advised Congress that our fleet was then sufficient to provide for all contingencies within the range of probability and at the same time when the President of the United States in his message informed Congress that the units of the Navy should not be increased, our Navy consisted of 24 battleships, 12 completed and 12 under the process of construction. Since that time we have constructed 1 more battleship and 13 *Dreadnoughts*, which have more guns and more powerful guns, and which more than double the capacity of the Navy. If a Republican President and a Republican Secretary of the Navy believed, as they said they believed in 1905, that our Navy was sufficient to provide for everything within the range of possibilities, and that the units should not be increased, and if since then we have more than doubled our Navy, then I ask Democrats if they think we ought to add still more to it? [Applause.]

And I call your attention to the position of the highest authority on naval affairs in this House, the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT], who said, in his speech to the House in 1908, that he protested against adding four more battleships to our Navy, and he declared on the floor of the House that the Navy as it then existed was magnificent. Since that time we have added nine *dreadnoughts* to the Navy, and if it was magnificent then I defy any Member of this House to suggest an adjective that will accurately describe it now. [Applause.]

In 1911 there was a mobilization of a part of our fleet at New York. The number of vessels present was 123. President Taft was present, and he made a speech on that occasion, and in that speech he described the Navy as magnificent. He boasted that he had there under his eyes the fastest and the most powerful *dreadnoughts* in the world. That was the opinion of President Taft. The fact is that over a period of 120 years, from the time that John Paul Jones first unfolded the flag to the breeze of the English Channel down to this time, our Navy has always been efficient, adequate, vast, magnificent, glorious, and victorious; but when it stands in the way of extravagance and greed it sinks down to the low level of inefficiency and inadequacy. [Applause.]

But if all this evidence is insufficient to show that our Navy is fully adequate for the public defense and that its increase in the number of units would not increase its efficiency, then we submit that the expenditure of \$46,418,925 more would not help

the matter. Since 1883 we have spent on our Naval Establishment \$1,963,094,608.77, and of this vast sum \$202,195,607.83 has been invested in battleships, besides the five now under construction, which will run the amount up to \$250,000,000. If this vast sum will not secure an adequate battleship fleet, it is useless to spend more. Excepting England, we have spent more already than any other nation of the world. We have in the last decade spent \$410,455,321 more than France, \$452,666,114 more than Germany, and \$1,019,890,156 more than Japan.

The greatest total naval expenditure in one year by Germany was, in round numbers, \$110,000,000, or \$26,000,000 less than we spent in 1911. The greatest spent by France in one year is \$89,000,000, or \$47,000,000 less than our greatest expenditure. The greatest amount ever spent by Japan in one year was \$46,000,000, or \$90,000,000 less than our greatest annual expenditure. If with this enormous expenditure of money we have not been able to build a fleet adequate to protect us against any of these powers, then we had better place our reliance on other means and not depend on naval vessels.

And, again, if our Navy is inadequate to the public defense for the want of a sufficient number of vessels, then it will not help matters to build more, for the reason that we have not and can not procure the officers to man them. The testimony before the committee shows that we lack 3,000 officers and 6,000 enlisted men necessary to operate the ships we have. The enlisted men have to be trained and officers have to be educated before they are competent to take charge of war vessels. Battleships without officers and men are useless, and at the present rate of graduation it will take the Naval Academy 20 years to supply the ships we already have with officers. It is therefore nothing less than folly and the most inexcusable extravagance to continue the building of more ships when we know that we can not use them.

If the public defense were the object to be attained, if the efficiency and adequacy of the Navy were the purpose in view, if the profits to be made out of the construction of more ships were not the inspiration of the clamor for them, we would take a few of the \$46,000,000 which the bill proposes to expend on new ships and invest them in the enlargement of the Naval Academy, so as to provide the officers necessary for the ships we have.

I submit, however, that the correctness of the position taken by the minority of the committee will become still more apparent if you will just consider the arguments put forth in favor of increasing the Navy. The clamor for a bigger Navy is so dogmatic and insistent that it is perfectly plain that if there were any good reasons to be given for it they would be given, and if the reasons given for it are fallacious, it is the best assurance that no good ones exist.

I want to call your attention to these pretended reasons. I am frequently told the Navy is an insurance, and the Secretary of the Navy himself states in his annual report that it is an insurance, and uses that as an argument.

Any resemblance between the Navy and a policy of insurance is impossible for me to detect. Insurance is a contract by which the insurer, for a small amount of money called a "premium," agrees to pay a much larger amount in the contingency insured against. Now, what resemblance has a navy to that?

In the last 20 years we have had one war which, according to the best estimates, cost us about \$300,000,000. During that time we have spent \$1,963,094,608.77 on the Navy. In other words, if that be regarded as the premium on the insurance, we have paid as a premium six times as much as the loss itself and then paid the entire loss besides. [Applause.] And yet this loose, nonsensical talk about insurance finds lodgment in the minds of sensible men.

But if it is meant by saying that a navy is an insurance against war in the sense that it will prevent war, I deny that proposition. Japan and China both had navies, but that fact did not keep them out of war. Russia and Japan both had navies; it did not keep them out of war. The United States and Spain both had navies, and it did not prevent a war between them. England had a great navy, but that fact did not keep her out of war with the Boers. The fact is that three-fourths of the nations of the earth have no navies at all, and they do not have as many wars as these great countries with navies have.

Mr. SHERWOOD. How about the navy of Italy in the war with Turkey?

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Yes; that is another example. Since the destruction of the Russian fleet and of the Spanish fleet and of the Chinese fleet, and since Russia and Spain and China have ceased to have any fleet at all, they have not had any wars. The fact is that nations, just like individuals, are led into wars by their passions. It is the feeling of some real or fancied wrong, or the greed and avarice for aggrandizement or commercial advantages, that leads them into war, and it does not

make any difference whether they have navies or not. People are going to fight just as long as human nature remains as it is, and navies can not prevent it.

I would rather depend upon the Bible of God than upon these engines of destruction to protect us against war. [Applause.]

But it is told around on every side that we ought to build more battleships because we have a number of battleships that are obsolete. They tell us that when a battleship is 20 years old it becomes obsolete and should be discarded and not counted. If that were a good argument it would have no application here, because the oldest battleships we have—the *Massachusetts*, the *Iowa*, the *Indiana*, and the *Oregon*, built in 1896 and 1897—are just 17, 16, and 15 years old now, and if the 20-year argument is a good one why not just wait until the time comes before you make it?

But I say that there is nothing in that. Admiral Dewey tells us that the hull of a battleship will last 100 years, and so far as the guns are concerned, they are just as good as they were when those ships were new. Each one of those battleships has four 13-inch guns—four guns that take three or four hundred pounds of powder in them to shoot a shell—and they will shoot that shell 13 miles with the same accuracy and with the same destructive force as they did when they were first made.

How, then, does a vessel become obsolete? The only thing that wears out about these guns is the lining. After you have fired them 300 times the erosion caused by the smokeless powder prevents them from shooting with the same accuracy as before. But we have expended thousands and thousands of dollars in keeping all our guns relined, and the testimony of our experts on that subject is that when you reline a gun it shoots with the very same accuracy and with the very same destructive force that it did when the gun was new.

But the Secretary of the Navy himself tells us that the policy of the Government has been and is now to keep all these ships, with their guns, up to a state of efficiency according to the original design; and, in accordance with that policy, within the last few years these old battleships, with their armament, have been repaired and renewed and made like new. Their mounts and their turrets have been modernized. On the *Oregon* alone they have expended \$627,000 to make her as good as she ever was. Now, if these old ships are so soon to die of old age, then I say it was criminal extravagance to waste all that money on them.

But the money has not been wasted. These guns will shoot just as well as they would when they were new, and this pretext about these ships being obsolete is just one of those inventions to induce us to squander the public money. That is all there is to that.

But we are told that if we stop building battleships it will be only a few years before we will sink to fifth place among the navies of the world. That is an argument that is frequently advanced. That contention is based on a comparison between our Navy and the navies of foreign countries, and a comparison which leaves out of consideration 25 of our battleships, which 25 are to be regarded just like the drinks of Rip Van Winkle—they are not to be counted at all. [Laughter.] And it is based on the assumption that these advocates of a larger navy know what foreign governments are going to do in the future. In other words, they are prophets. They can tell you what foreign governments are going to do next year and the year after. Secretary Meyer says it is very difficult for the department itself to find out about these matters.

So, not counting the 25 of our battleships and then counting how many battleships other countries are going to build in the future, they have a process of counting by which the American Navy will sink to the fifth place in a few years. Of course that is based on the assumption that the strength of a navy is proportionate to the number of guns, which I have shown is not correct. But if that be true, I submit to this committee that it is useless to spend any more money. Since 1883 we have spent nearly \$2,000,000,000 on our Navy. Of that vast sum \$202,000,000 has been invested in battleships alone, not counting the five great dreadnoughts that are now in process of construction, and when they are completed we will have invested more than \$250,000,000 in battleships alone. Within the past 10 years we have spent \$452,666,114 more than France has spent. We have spent \$410,455,321 more than Germany has spent. We have spent over a billion dollars more than Japan has spent. The highest expenditure that Germany has ever made in one year is \$110,000,000, which is \$29,000,000 less than we spent in 1911. The greatest expenditure that France has ever made in one year is \$89,000,000, which is about \$50,000,000 less than we spent in that year; and the greatest amount that Japan has ever spent in one year is \$46,000,000, which is just \$90,000,000 less than our highest annual naval expenditure. We have spent in the last 10 years \$109,146,966 more than Ger-



many and Japan both together. In other words, for the last decade we have spent \$10,000,000 every year more than both of those countries put together. We have spent \$66,936,173 more than France and Japan both together have spent in the last 10 years, or \$6,000,000 more every year for 10 successive years than both of those nations combined. And I say that if the expenditure of this money has not given us an adequate Navy, we had better quit and depend on something else for our defense. [Applause.]

This contention really is that we ought to build more ships, not because our Navy is inadequate, but because foreign Governments will build more. The truth is that foreign Governments have been struggling to keep up with us. When within 10 years we spend \$410,455,321 more on our Navy than France, \$452,666,114 more than Germany, and \$1,019,890,156 more than Japan, it looks like the cheek of logic to contend that we ought to spend more because they will do so. We build more ships because they do and they build more because we do, and so all the enlightened nations of the earth, according to this contention, are running a race of folly to build useless ships each because the other does. Since Germany, France, and Japan have all these years been under our influence and have been impoverishing their people to build useless battleships because we have set them the example, the only logical conclusion is that if we were to abandon this foolish policy these great Governments of Europe would follow us in our wisdom more readily than they followed us in our folly. At any rate, we do not favor that monkey-like statesmanship which imitates the follies of foreign Governments.

Now, in conclusion, I want to say that the expenditure of \$46,418,925 for new ships is an inexcusable, unjustifiable, criminal waste of the public funds. [Applause.] And I appeal to the majority in this House to stand up for economy. I appeal to you to vindicate the wisdom of the Democratic caucus, which determined three different times that we did not need any more battleships, and that determination stands there unreversed and unrescinded to-day. It is the last expression of the party on that subject.

Not only that, but every Democratic platform from 1832 down to the present time has pledged the party to economy, and it is now up to us to say whether we will stand on the promises that brought us into office, or will ignore and break them after we have gotten the goods that we obtained by making them.

If there is anyone who is not willing to respond to the appeal to comply with Democratic promises, then I want to make this appeal, that they be at least as good as the Republicans have been in the past. The Republicans have had sufficient regard for economy and for the condition of the Treasury, they have had sufficient sympathy for the tolling masses of the people, who are groaning under the burdens of taxation and looking with longing hearts and expectant hopes to us for relief—the Republicans have had sufficient regard to these things during five different years to refuse to authorize any battleships at all.

In 1891, in 1893, in 1894, in 1897, in 1901 the Republicans did not authorize any battleships. In 1892, in 1904, in 1906, and 1907 the Republicans showed a sufficient regard for the condition of the Treasury, and a sufficient regard for economy, and a sufficient sympathy for the overburdened people of this country to refuse to authorize more than one battleship. And I now put it up to Democrats to show the country whether it is possible for them to be as good as Republicans. [Loud applause.]

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, on Monday last, the 17th of this month, a very different scene was presented in this Chamber, a much more interesting scene than this. Members were present in their seats to the number of about 300, and each Member with bated breath was asking his fellow Member, "Will the bill pass?" There was no declaration of war, Mr. Chairman, about to be declared, no great question of national import was under discussion; the question merely was, "Will I get that public building for my district?" and nearly all the membership of the House was here to obtain, if possible, that delectable piece of patronage. [Laughter and applause.] I venture the assertion, Mr. Chairman, that if we could take a battleship home to our district and run it up and down some local creek or river in one of the doubtful counties of our own home domain that every Member of the House would be present in his seat to-day crying for a vote on the pending measure and asking that the number of battleships be increased so that every district in this country of ours could have one.

But this is a different matter. This is a question which touches the subject of national defense and the general welfare of this country. My amiable and distinguished friend from Mississippi who has just taken his seat [Judge WITHERSPOON] informs us that wars are always the result of avarice and

passion. If I read history correctly, the distinguished gentleman's ancestor was a signer of the Declaration of Independence. I should like to ask him what element of avarice or passion entered into his ancestor's heart when he with his compatriots entered into war for this country against the yoke of England? What element of avarice or passion entered into the hearts of the American people when, with one accord in 1898, we demanded of Spain that they cease their cruelties and withdraw from the island of Cuba?

Mr. Chairman, I am old-fashioned enough to have some regard for the words and the expressed sentiments of the great Americans who have gone before. We opened the exercises of this House to-day by reading the noble words of Washington on the occasion of his farewell.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I believe it is our bounden duty to regard the immortal words of that man, and these are the words of Washington to which I refer:

The United States ought not to indulge a persuasion that contrary to the order of human events they will forever keep at a distance those painful appeals to arms with which the history of every other nation abounds. There is a rank due to the United States among nations which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult we must be able to repel it; if we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.

What is an adequate Navy? I think all parties and all men agree that we ought to have an adequate Navy. The Democratic platform says so. The Baltimore convention announced only last summer:

The party which proclaimed and has always enforced the Monroe doctrine and was sponsor for the new Navy will continue faithful to and observe the constitutional requirements to provide and maintain an adequate and well-proportioned Navy, sufficient to defend American policies, protect our citizens, and uphold the honor and dignity of the Nation.

The Republican platform declared:

We believe in the maintenance of an adequate Navy for the national defense, and we condemn the action of the Democratic House of Representatives in refusing to authorize the construction of additional ships.

The Washington or Progressive Party declared:

We favor an international agreement for the limitation of naval forces. Pending such an agreement, and as the best means of preserving peace, we pledge ourselves to maintain for the present the policy of building two battleships each year.

Those three expressions I have just read announce the determined policy of the three parties which contended for mastery last fall, and in a direct manner reflect the sentiments of the large mass of the American people. The President of the United States in his message this year said:

I urgently recommend that the Congress make up the mistake of last session by appropriations authorizing the construction of three battleships in addition to destroyers, fuel ships, and other auxiliary vessels, as shown in the building program of the general board. We are confronted by a condition in respect to the navies of the world which requires us, if we would maintain our Navy as an insurance of peace, to augment our naval force by at least two battleships a year, and by battle cruisers, gunboats, torpedo destroyers, and submarine boats in a proper proportion.

Mr. Chairman, what is the advice of the Secretary of the Navy? I think he ought to know, from an administrative standpoint at least, what the needs of the country are and what is an adequate Navy. To quote from his report:

Experience has shown the wisdom of systematic preparation for war. If we wait until a crisis comes it is then too late to make effective preparations, and the result is confusion, waste, and unnecessary loss of life. In any war involving the United States the control of the sea will be of the utmost and deciding importance. Such control can be obtained only by an efficient Navy of sufficient strength.

The question I ask of this House is, Have we an adequate Navy? Shall we recognize the truth of the proposition that the world moves? An adequate Navy depends not upon what our judgment may be concerning our armament of to-day, but it depends on how it compares with other armaments with which it may come in conflict in the coming days. I suppose, in the judgment of the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON], the navy of Commodore Perry in Lake Erie, 100 years ago this coming June, was an adequate Navy then and ought to be to-day, or that the Navy that Farragut used at Mobile Bay was an adequate Navy then and ought to be to-day; or that the Navy which Dewey employed at Manila, and Sampson and Schley used at Santiago, was an adequate Navy 15 years ago, and therefore ought to be an adequate Navy to-day. Not at all, Mr. Chairman. I beg to call to the attention of the gentleman from Mississippi, and to the attention of every gentleman of this committee who listened or applauded or said amen to his words, that the world moves, that the battleships that we are building to-day are three times the size of the battleships employed by Dewey in the last engagements in which this country took a part.

Mr. LOUD. Six times as large.



Mr. BATES. Some of them six times as large, but our first-class battleships then, the *Iowa* and the *Indiana*, were ships of only about 10,000 tons, while the ships we are building to-day, like the *Pennsylvania*, are of 31,500 tons. The iron that they threw was thrown from 6-inch guns, 4-inch guns, and 8-inch guns. Our best ships were equipped with only two 13-inch guns, whereas the *Dreadnoughts* we are building to-day, to cope, if necessary, either in moral effect or in actual warfare, with the navies of the world have 12, 13, and 14 inch guns, so that one of the ships that we are building to-day is equal to three or four in fighting capacity of those that we built 20 years ago.

What is necessary to maintain an adequate Navy? My good friend admits in his first premise that he is willing to maintain an adequate Navy, and then adds that he thinks that we have an adequate Navy. He quotes the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. PADGETT], who has presided over the Naval Committee not only with dignity and impartiality, but with fairness and rare consummate ability, delving with great diligence and research into the subjects which have come into the making up of this bill, and he quotes him as saying three or four years ago that we had a magnificent Navy and did not need four battleships. Suppose we did have a magnificent Navy four years ago. The world has moved in naval architecture and naval munitions even in the last four years.

Referring again to the very interesting remarks of the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON], I would like to ask him why Japan won over Russia—the little nation over the big? It was because Japan was ready; Russia was not; because Japan had sunk five of the enemy's ships before her opponents realized that war was on. Why did Japan conquer over China? Because she had more money? No. It was because she was ready to strike first; she was prepared; she was known among the nations of the world; and she was ready to strike when the occasion arose. The war between England and the Boers was cited by my distinguished friend as an illustration that nations would engage in wars, although they had an adequate navy. Why, the Boers had no navy, and the English navy played little part in that internal warfare. That war was not a question of naval strength at all, except in the long run it gave England an advantage which its opponents did not at any time possess. Suppose, for instance, that the Boers had had a navy, not, perhaps, as large as England's or ours, but an adequate navy to repel England's transports; that might have prevented England from landing her troops in Africa; and have even won in the end if they had been equipped with even a navy. And I want, in passing, to call to your attention what the moral effect of a navy is of benefit before hostilities are entered into. I suppose gentlemen read in the papers last week—I know I did, and with a feeling of just pride—the fact that on the west coast of Mexico, when the battleship *Georgia* and three other battleships went into those harbors, the whole feeling of danger for Americans or danger for foreigners or foreign interests at once disappeared. The moral effect of the battleships there spread a sentiment throughout Mexico that the United States was ready; that we were prepared; and because we were prepared we have not had to strike a blow in Mexico, and, in my judgment, will not be required to, because we are ready to strike the blow if occasion should demand it. And for that reason when the United States speaks, when Mr. Knox, the Secretary of State, sends a note, he speaks with authority, and when Mr. Bryan, if he should be his successor, shall speak to Mexico for order and discipline and right regard for lives and property of foreigners in that Republic, the note coming from the office of the Secretary of State, not because it is couched in this or that language, not because they have regard for the statesmanship or brains that pens it, but because they have a wholesome fear of the battleships that are behind it, it goes with authority in Mexico and it will be heeded. [Applause.] Talk about insurance. The insurance that the Navy of this country means to this country and to its people is not an insurance in money, is not the insurance in mere valuable possessions, it is an insurance against the taking of life, it is an insurance against the shedding of blood, it is an insurance against the spending of untold millions in a long-drawn-out war, and it is my candid opinion that because this country, under the administrations with which it has been blessed for the last 16 years, has maintained a state of preparedness in case war should be imminent, has averted intervention in Mexico this year. A million or two here or there may be spent each year, with great propriety and economy too, to maintain the efficiency, to keep up the adequacy of our fighting units and our fighting strength.

Oh, they say, let us put it in public buildings, let us have it in our districts, let us have it count for our renomination or reelection where the people can see it, let us build roads; all

good projects; agriculture, Indian affairs, the Interior Department, all splendid projects, but they all pale into insignificance, they all become as nothing, they all become as mere toys and flippant things compared with following the words of George Washington, to maintain an adequate defense and keep up our Army and our Navy so that in case peril should arise, in case war should at any moment be imminent, we shall be ready to strike the first blow and if possible bring about peace before hostilities shall actually commence by a settlement under the rules of honor and decency and international regard which we shall impose from time to time through the mouth of our Secretaries of State. [Applause.]

Now, Mr. Chairman, I again emphasize this proposition, that the words "increase of Navy" is a misnomer. If we should build or authorize three or four more battleships this year, as is recommended by the general board and the Secretary of the Navy, we would perhaps be increasing our naval establishment. The Secretary of the Navy, in his annual report December last, recommended 4 battleships, 2 battle cruisers, 16 destroyers, 1 destroyer tender, 2 transports, 1 ammunition ship, 6 submarines, 1 submarine tender, 1 supply ship, 2 gunboats, 2 sea-going tugs, 1 dry dock, and 1 submarine testing dock. I ask the members of this committee if in view of the request of the Secretary of the Navy, reflecting the recommendations of the general board, in view of the recommendations made in the bill that was reported practically unanimously from the committee, if that is not a modest program, to wit, instead of 4 battleships, 2 battleships; no battle cruisers, as were asked for; instead of 16 destroyers, 6 destroyers; no destroyer tender; instead of 2 transports, 1 transport; no ammunition ship; instead of 6 submarines, 4 submarines; 1 supply ship; no sea-going tugs; no dry dock; and no submarine testing dock?

If I should make no other point, I desire to make this one, that the present bill, with its 2 battleships, its 4 destroyers, its 4 submarines, its 1 transport, and 1 supply ship, is merely maintaining the present efficiency of the Navy. Why? Because, as the Secretary points out, there will be 4 battleships next year over 20 years old, and they will have to be withdrawn from the second line. They will not continue to be counted in the present strength of the fleet.

You ask me what battleships those are. Why, Mr. Chairman, their names are household words. They are the *Indiana*, the *Oregon*, the *Massachusetts*, and the *Iowa*. It was most fortuitous or providential for the people of this country that Secretary Whitney had the honor of inaugurating in a large degree what is called the modern Navy, and because there was foreknowledge enough to build those ships, whose names I have just read, we were saved from an everlasting disgrace in 1898.

Mr. O'SHAUNESSY. Then the gentleman disagrees with his colleague from Illinois [Mr. Foss] that the Democratic Party has never done anything for the Navy?

Mr. BATES. No. I think as a general proposition the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Foss] is right. I will tell the gentleman from Rhode Island why: Mr. Secretary Whitney in a lucid interval arranged for the building of our first modern cruisers—at least they were modern for that time. After the War with Spain and we had demonstrated the wisdom of that action, how wise it had been on the part of the American people to be supplied with those battleships, and had saved ourselves from a national disgrace, the Republican Party has come into this Chamber every year since with an adequate naval program and the Democratic Party has opposed it.

Mr. O'SHAUNESSY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FOSS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BATES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom does the gentleman yield?

Mr. BATES. I yield for a moment to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Foss].

Mr. FOSS. I will say to the gentleman from Rhode Island [Mr. O'SHAUNESSY] that the birthday of the American Navy was when we authorized the first ships of the present Navy. That was on March 3, 1883, in the administration of President Arthur, when Mr. Chandler was Secretary of the Navy. It is true that in Mr. Cleveland's time, under his Secretary, Mr. Whitney, an advance was made in the policy of building up the American Navy; but after that it is well known that Cleveland and his administration were repudiated by the Democratic Party and Cleveland repudiated the Democratic Party, and since that time it has passed into the possession of William Jennings Bryan.

Mr. O'SHAUNESSY. Mr. Chairman, did I understand the gentleman to say that Mr. Whitney in a lucid moment—

Mr. BATES. Oh, I used the word "lucid" purely in a Pickwickian sense. Let me substitute the words "opportune or fortunate moment."



Mr. O'SHAUNESSY. I want to say to the gentleman it was a very good thing for the Republican Party and the entire Nation that we had a Mr. Whitney to lay an enduring foundation and set an example for the Republicans to follow.

Mr. BATES. I agree with the gentleman from Rhode Island in the sentiment that it was to the great credit of Secretary Whitney to assist in inaugurating the movement, but it was not to the credit of the Democratic Party to desert him and his chief, Mr. Cleveland, after he had helped inaugurate the movement.

Mr. FOSS. In other words, it is not to be put down to the credit of the present Democratic Party?

Mr. BATES. No. And, Mr. Chairman, I will say in further answer to the question of the gentleman from Rhode Island [Mr. O'SHAUNESSY], before we had learned the lesson of 1898 we would never have had occasion to engage in war with Spain, and Spain would never have had the temerity to engage in a war with the United States had she known that we had within a few years built our modern battleships. You remember the saying of Secretary Taft, when he was Governor General of the Philippines, when our President suggested sending our fleet around the world, that "It is a good thing to fill the eye of the oriental." Very good. If we had filled the eye of the oriental, and had filled the eye of the citizens of Old Hispania about a year or two before the occurrence of 1898, I assert that it would never have been necessary to have engaged in the War with Spain, because if they had had the knowledge that we were as prepared as we were, they would never have allowed us to strike a blow, but would have withdrawn peaceably from Cuba and left the island, or at least reduced it to a peace basis, as we demanded.

But, Mr. Chairman, we are going on with the program, and I congratulate a large number of Members on the other side of the aisle that we are proceeding to maintain and keep up the adequacy of our present Naval Establishment. I am glad that so many of the Members on the other side of the aisle have some faith in the efficiency of their own party, that it will not run amuck, that it will not so cripple the affairs of this country that we can not pay the ordinary bills for the maintenance of our country, not only for battleships, but for the general maintenance of the Army and Navy and the construction of public buildings, and provide the means for the enactment of all the other great supply bills that come in from time to time. I congratulate a large number, I believe a majority of the majority, on the fact that they have confidence in the ability of their party to conduct the affairs of state, to carry on the fiscal affairs of this great Republic, and to see to it that there shall be sufficient revenues, sufficient funds to meet the needs of the country, and to keep up an adequate Navy, as was advised by Washington and is advised now by the party platforms, and to retain the place that we have won so proudly among the nations of the world. [Applause.]

Mr. WARBURTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman yield?

Mr. BATES. I do.

Mr. WARBURTON. The gentleman understands, does he not, that the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations feels it absolutely necessary to deprive the States of internal improvements in order to get this second battleship?

Mr. BATES. I beg the gentleman's pardon. Will he please state that question again?

Mr. WARBURTON. I say the gentleman understands that the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations thinks it necessary to deprive the States of necessary internal improvements in order to get a second battleship, does he not?

Mr. BATES. Oh, no; I think not.

Mr. WARBURTON. Well, the other day he showed how he had eliminated probably \$20,000,000 from the sundry civil bill that the different departments had recommended.

Mr. BATES. Well, but he stated that that had no effect on any other supply bill or appropriation bill.

Mr. WARBURTON. I am not talking about supply bills. I am talking about internal improvements recommended by the different departments, assuming that they act with some sort of judgment.

Mr. BATES. But what was the question the gentleman asked? [Laughter.]

Mr. WARBURTON. I will state it again. That the chairman of the Appropriations Committee showed how the committee had cut down the appropriations from 20 to 30 per cent on necessary internal improvements to meet the necessary deficit, and then, of course, to help out the second battleship proposition. Does the gentleman understand that?

Mr. BATES. I understand it as well as I did in the first place. [Laughter.]

I want to say to the gentleman that if the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Appropriations made such a statement—I did not hear him make it; I have a great deal of confidence in the correctness of his statements—and if he made—

Mr. WARBURTON. Did not the gentleman hear him state this, that the appropriations that he recommended on the sundry civil bill were about 20 or 30 per cent less than those recommended by the departments, and that his recommendations, or the recommendations on his appropriation bill, amounted to \$113,000,000? I think I am right about it.

Mr. BATES. I have no doubt about that. That is good housekeeping. But I do not know how that touches on the question of national defense, which is a question of national importance.

Mr. MONDELL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me for a suggestion on that point?

Mr. BATES. I yield to the gentleman from Wyoming.

Mr. MONDELL. I wanted to suggest that I think the gentleman from Washington [Mr. WARBURTON] is slightly mistaken. Many of the items in the sundry civil bill were cut down, including the item the gentleman himself is interested in, in order that we might appropriate \$5,000,000 for the fortification of the Panama Canal.

Mr. WARBURTON. That is the gentleman's own conclusion. He cut it down to \$113,000,000 in order that we might get two battleships or colliers to carry coal to Panama.

Mr. BATES. That would not have anything to do with the naval program.

Mr. WARBURTON. It had everything to do with it.

Mr. BATES. It was because the Panama Canal expenses are met by the Appropriations Committee that its chairman was concerned for colliers and transports for Panama. It had nothing to do with battleships.

Mr. MCKENZIE. The gentleman stated that the building of two battleships by this Congress, or the authorizing of their building, would not increase the Navy; that there would be four battleships withdrawn from the second line.

Mr. BATES. Yes.

Mr. MCKENZIE. I want to ask whether or not those four ships are retired from the service, or is the expense of maintaining them and their crews continued?

Mr. BATES. I think I can answer that question. The gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON] used an unfortunate word when he said they became "obsolete." That is a little too strong. They are merely withdrawn from the first and second lines of defense and used for harbor protection or in case of emergency, in case they need to be pressed into service. They are only maintained at a partial expense. Only a few men are maintained on them, not a full complement of officers and men at all, and they are usually anchored around the navy yards as emergency ships in case we should be pressed or need them, possibly, for transports for carrying purposes in case of war. They are not under the usual expense, however, of first-class battleships or cruisers.

Mr. MCKENZIE. Does the gentleman know about how much that reduction would be?

Mr. BATES. I should say 50 or 60 per cent. I have not the figures here, but they are reduced to a minimum, some of them to merely a nominal expense of possibly 10 per cent.

Mr. MCKENZIE. I am not asking these questions for the purposes of criticism, but for information. The gentleman said there would be no increase.

Mr. BATES. I understand. How much more time have I, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has 21 minutes.

Mr. BATES. I desire to use only a few of those minutes. The four battleships which the Secretary states will be over 20 years old next year, and will have to be withdrawn as fighting units at all, except in the direst extremity and necessity, are comparatively small ships when compared with those that we are now authorizing. I believe that the two battleships which are authorized in the bill this year will be able to take the place of the four which will be retired before those can be built which we are authorizing, because it takes from 30 to 36 months to build a battleship after it is authorized.

Mr. POWERS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BATES. Yes.

Mr. POWERS. Then, what is there in the argument of the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON] that these battleships are just as effective for fighting purposes now as they were 15 or 20 years ago?

Mr. BATES. I am glad the gentleman alluded to that point which the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON]



seemed to dwell upon so long, because I think the gentleman from Mississippi spoke with great lack of information on that subject. The ships which won the battles in the last three or four naval engagements have been the big ships, the ships that speak with 13 and 14 inch shells, and the ships that can throw 12 or 14 of those shells within a few moments. One of those ships can do more destruction in battle than three or four or half a dozen of the old ships of 10 or 15 or 20 years ago.

Mr. LOUD. As much as 60 such ships as they were then.

Mr. BATES. The gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON], in his very unique views of the minority which he has prepared, states a hypothetical question:

If you had 232 men around the Washington Monument and hurling baseballs at it at the rate of 696 a minute, and 3,480 every five minutes, and if these balls did not destroy it, you would not conclude that the failure to destroy it was because the number of balls was too small, and that a greater number of baseballs would destroy it, but you would know that the cause of the failure was the lack of destructive power and that an increase in the number would be useless.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BATES. No; not for a moment. The logical conclusion of every patriotic American would be to use more formidable projectiles against the Washington Monument if we desired to destroy it, and not to throw the 6-inch shells, which were used 10 or 15 or 20 years ago, but to bring up the dreadnought *Pennsylvania* or the dreadnought *Oklahoma*, which has been authorized, or the dreadnought *Nevada*, which has been authorized, and that with a broadside of twelve 14-inch guns we can reduce any fort or put out of commission a dozen of the battleships that were in use 10 or 15 or 20 years ago, and speak with the highest degree of efficiency against any ordinary armament of any ordinary nation in the world. There would not be an increase in the number of baseballs, but an increase in the size, weight, efficiency, tensile strength, and velocity with which they could be propelled.

Mr. TRIBBLE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BATES. I will.

Mr. TRIBBLE. The gentleman has referred to the naval battle in which the Spanish ships were captured. I will ask the gentleman if he knows that one year before the Spanish-American War the whole appropriation for officers, men, and everything connected with the Navy, from men to ships, was only twice as much as is now paid for the active and retired officers of the present Navy? Does he know that the appropriation now is nearly \$15,000,000 for officers, active and retired, in the Navy, and that the entire naval provision in 1896 was only \$30,000,000 for all the Navy; and will the gentleman explain why the people should be burdened to pay this enormous sum to officers when a \$30,000,000 Navy sent the whole Spanish Navy to the bottom of the sea?

Mr. BATES. I fear that the gentleman has not been in the Chamber, or, if he has, that he has not caught the drift of my remarks. I have been trying to insist to this committee that the world moves, and that we have more battleships to-day—more formidable ones—a larger complement of officers and men, than we had 15 or 20 years ago. We are a greater Nation than we were then, we are greater than we were then by twenty millions of people, we have greater revenues in the Treasury than we had then, and we have more proportionate revenue to invest in a Navy than we had then. We have a greater national pride than we had then. We speak with greater authority among the nations of the world than we did then, and we have a greater responsibility than we had then, because we have the Panama Canal, we have the Philippines, we have Porto Rico, we have the Hawaiian Islands, and we have the surveillance of Cuba as well.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BATES. Certainly.

Mr. CAMPBELL. What is the comparative naval strength of the possible enemies of the United States to-day as compared with 14 or 15 years ago?

Mr. BATES. They are much larger. I will read for the information of the gentleman and for the benefit of the committee the comparative strength of the leading nations of the world to-day as to tonnage. It is tonnage that counts; it is not the number of craft, of superannuated ships of the line 20 years ago, but it is the tonnage that counts.

England has built and is building 1,978,000 tons. Germany has built and is building 837,000 tons, or less than half that of England. We have built and are building 773,000 tons. France has built and building 630,000 tons, and little Japan has almost 500,000 tons built and building. Russia has built and building 286,000 tons. We are the third, with France and Japan pressing us closely, and if we omit our building program to a sufficient amount to maintain our present strength, they, with the great impetus they are under to-day, with their ambi-

tious naval program, will put us in fifth place in less than three years.

Mr. HARDY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BATES. Certainly.

Mr. HARDY. If in less than 15 years in a time of profound peace our naval bill is five times as much as it was 15 years ago, how many times what it is now will it be 15 years from now?

Mr. BATES. That is a fair question if it was founded on correct premises. It is not five times as much as it was 15 years ago. It has been increasing with the growth, increased wealth, and responsibility of this country, but no faster than the growth in population and wealth and efficiency and responsibility of the country.

Mr. HARDY. I do not want my premises incorrect. My understanding is that the naval bill of 1897 amounted to \$30,000,000, and to-day it is almost \$150,000,000, and that is five times the amount. Now, what will it be 15 years from to-day?

Mr. BATES. I can not tell the gentleman what it will be, but if the patriotic citizens of the Republic, irrespective of party, will have due regard to the strength, both numerical and financial, of this country, and a due regard to the building program of the other great nations of the world, our naval program will be sufficient in 3, 7, or 10 years from now. If they are wise, they will keep abreast of the times.

Mr. HARDY. Will the gentleman favor me with just one guess of what it will be 15 years from now?

Mr. BATES. That will depend upon the prosperity and strength of the country.

Mr. HARDY. Five hundred million dollars; or what would the gentleman guess?

Mr. BATES. Oh, I am not a prophet.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BATES. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. I take it from the gentleman's remarks that he favors the extension of the Navy for the purpose of national defense, for the purpose of being ready for an emergency.

Mr. BATES. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. Has the gentleman read in recent months of the strained relations that existed between England and Germany?

Mr. BATES. I have.

Mr. KAHN. Does not the gentleman think that war has been averted between those nations by the fact that each of them is prepared in its own sphere of military and naval readiness?

Mr. BATES. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the time of universal peace will come when every great nation will be in that condition of preparedness that will make war impossible, and that is the condition that exists between England and Germany to-day. I believe that this Nation will avert war and maintain its own dignity when it is able to speak with authority, when it sends a note not only to Cuba or to Mexico but to some South American Republic, or to Spain, or some of the prouder nations beyond the Atlantic. I say, let no war come, but I believe that the day will be nearer when no war will be in the horizon when we shall have actual preparedness, so that there will not be the hardihood on the part of the other nations of the world to provoke us into a bloody struggle.

Mr. CLINE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BATES. Certainly.

Mr. CLINE. The gentleman says that next year we are going to retire the *Indiana*, the *Oregon*, the *Massachusetts*, and the *Iowa*.

Mr. BATES. Yes.

Mr. CLINE. I would like to know for what reason. Is it because of the defectiveness of the construction of those vessels or because the equipment is not up to date?

Mr. BATES. Both. They are too small and too slow. They have no capacity for the big guns that are needed to-day to cope with the big guns of other nations, and because in a hundred respects they are out of date.

Mr. CLINE. I would like to ask the gentleman if all of those vessels are not equipped with 12-inch guns?

Mr. BATES. Oh, no; they are equipped with two each. The *Massachusetts* has two or four of the large guns. Their guns are mostly small. The ships that we are building to-day have 12, 13½, and 14 inch guns.

Mr. CLINE. I would ask if there was not recently expended on one of those vessels over \$600,000 to equip it with up-to-date equipment?

Mr. BATES. Oh, no; they are not heavy enough.

Mr. CLINE. Was not that amount of money expended on one recently?

Mr. BATES. One or two of them have been well overhauled. But if we are going to sell either a navy yard or a ship, we



want to keep it in good repair. If the gentleman has a house that he does not need any longer for his family, that is no reason why he should not paint it and indulge in all ordinary repairs. These are the ordinary repairs that are being put on the older ships of the line.

Mr. Chairman, I believe the way to avert war is to be prepared for war. I hope that war will not come to this country in any way whatever, as long as anyone in this Chamber sees the light of day; but if it should come, I believe it is the desire of every patriotic man and woman and child in the country that we shall be ready; that we shall be as ready as Perry was in his poor way 100 years ago on Lake Erie, or as ready as Farragut was at Mobile Bay, or as Dewey and Schley and Sampson were at Manila and Santiago, to strike and strike successfully for the honor and dignity of the American people and the American flag. [Applause.]

I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from California [Mr. KNOWLAND].

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, in the limited time allowed me I will have opportunity only to make reference to a statement made on the floor of the House yesterday by the gentleman from Wyoming [Mr. MONDELL] in relation to the fortification of the Panama Canal. I read from his remarks:

As our treaty obligations now stand the two greatest nations in the world are pledged to the defense of the canal.

I wish to call attention to the fact that that statement is incorrect. Under the first Hay-Pauncefote treaty the following language was used:

The high contracting parties adopt as the basis of said neutralization—

And so forth.

Under the second Hay-Pauncefote treaty, the one which was finally ratified by both great Governments, the following language is used:

The United States adopts as the basis of such neutralization—

And so forth.

In a memorandum sent to the Senate at the time the treaty was pending, Secretary Hay made this statement:

By a change in the first line of article 3, instead of the United States and Great Britain jointly adopting as the basis of the neutralization of the canal the rules of neutrality prescribed for its use, as was provided by the former treaty, the United States now alone adopts them.

Continuing, Secretary Hay states:

It relieves Great Britain of all responsibility and obligation to enforce the neutrality of the canal which, by the former, has been imposed upon or assumed by her jointly with the United States, and thus meets the main stress of the objection which seemed to underlie or be interwoven with her other objections to the former Senate amendments. The United States alone, as the sole owner of the canal, as a purely American enterprise, adopts and prescribes the rules by which the use of the canal shall be regulated and assumes the entire responsibility and burden of enforcing, without the assistance of Great Britain or of any other nation, its absolute neutrality.

The gentleman from Wyoming made the statement I quoted as an argument to show that we did not need to fortify the canal, and the same argument could be advanced to prove that an adequate battleship fleet was not necessary to maintain the neutrality of the canal. These are the facts, for I have quoted the exact language of the treaty and the memorandum which was sent to the Senate by Secretary Hay, proving conclusively that the full responsibility now rests upon the United States.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I wish to make a consecutive statement before taking up in detail the remarks of gentlemen who have preceded me, and during the period of the consecutive statement I would request gentlemen to postpone interrupting me.

The earnestness shown on both sides in discussing this question is a matter for general congratulation. It is when men are really in earnest that they proceed to search carefully and find the truth.

There is no great subject of national importance upon which there has been given so little earnest thought by the American people, and no great subject upon which careful thought and investigation are more necessary to avoid error and fallacies. I understand this perfectly. We are a nonmilitary people. We are absorbed in a great period of internal development, a period of spreading industrialism and commercialism, and it is natural that we should not give attention to questions of the outside world.

It is unfortunate to hear applause as we have to-day from Members of this House when references were made a short while ago to the supposed uselessness of navies, that we could get along very well if we had substantially no navy, that three-fourths of the nations of the world do get along all right without any navy. But, Mr. Chairman, I do not consider that the question at issue in this bill. I am convinced that the majority of Members on both sides of this House realize that we must

have a navy, and are searching to determine what is an adequate navy, not whether we should have no navy or whether we should have an overweening navy. Therefore my theme is what should be the dimensions of an adequate navy.

In order to remind gentlemen that this is an inherent part of our institutions I will take up the authority upon which it is founded. Starting first with the preamble in the Constitution of the United States we find in the first sentence the reasons stated for establishing the Constitution of the United States, and among those comprehensive reasons is the following: "To provide for the common defense."

Again, in paragraph 13, of section 8, of article I of the Constitution, Congress is given power "to provide and maintain a Navy." It is not necessary to follow further the question of authorities, other than to cite the Democratic platforms of the last two campaigns. I will read a paragraph from the Democratic platform of 1908, as follows:

The constitutional provision that a Navy shall be provided and maintained means an adequate Navy, and we believe that the interests of this country would be best served by having a Navy sufficient to defend the coasts—

That is plural—

of this country and protect American citizens wherever their rights may be in jeopardy.

The provision of the Constitution referred to in the above plank is the one cited above:

To provide and maintain a Navy.

It follows paragraph 12, of the same section, which authorizes Congress to raise and support armies with a limitation that no appropriation for the Army should extend more than two years, but it will be noted no limitation is put upon the duty to provide and maintain a Navy.

That means all over the world.

I now read from the Democratic platform of 1912—the Baltimore platform—as follows:

The party that proclaimed and has always enforced the Monroe doctrine—

I desire my Democratic colleagues to bear that in mind—the specific reference to the Monroe doctrine. I shall refer to it later—

and was sponsor for the new Navy will continue to develop and observe the constitutional requirements to provide and maintain an adequate and well-proportioned Navy sufficient to defend American policies, protect our citizens, and uphold the honor and dignity of the Nation.

Therefore, accepting the proposition that gentlemen on this side as well as the other desire to provide and maintain an adequate Navy, I shall endeavor, very briefly, to point out what the elements of national defense are from which to determine what constitutes an adequate Navy.

To start with, what is it we must defend? In my analysis I invoke the careful analytical and logical thought of all Members. What must be defended? Life, property, institutions, and policies. I wish to remind gentlemen here when they begin to systematize the elements involved to bear in mind that we have 5,300 miles of coast line on the Atlantic Ocean; we have 4,700 miles on the Gulf; we have 3,100 miles on the Pacific; and this is continental coast line. When we refer to Alaska, to the Aleutian Islands, to Hawaii, to the Philippines—yes, when we refer to Panama, when we refer to Cuba and Porto Rico, without including the coast lines under the Monroe doctrine, we find that America has a vaster coast line exposed to attack from the water than any Nation in the world, not excluding Great Britain.

Furthermore, we find this: That the Old World built its centers of population inland in the early ages of the race, when water transportation was in its infancy. America, on the other hand, laid the foundation of her centers of population late, when she depended largely on transportation by water. Our great centers of population are exposed to attack by water as in no other country. To sum it up, without dwelling too long on the details of this one element, America has 30,000,000 of her citizens living within gunshot of the water, and America has thirty-seven billions of her property lying within gunshot of the water. There are more values of homes and property exposed to naval attack in America than there are in all the rest of the world combined.

Next to the question of life and property, and closely allied with them, comes the question of our institutions. Let me remind my colleagues that our institutions are founded on the principle of the right of local self-government, and that that principle has not been accepted by the other nations of the world. The first element in this principle is State's rights. No great military nation on earth has accepted that principle in America. When Italian citizens were lynched in New Orleans, and the Italian Government said she would hold our Federal Government responsible, our Federal Government



calmly told her they regretted the incident very much, but the Federal Government's authority under the Constitution could not invade the police power of the State of Louisiana, nor could the Italian Government negotiate with that State. Italy replied she would still hold the Federal Government responsible.

When the school question arose in San Francisco, a municipality on the coast, when the question of segregation arose in the Legislature of California, the city of San Francisco and the State of California could not insist upon being protected in the exercise of their rights. The Federal Government was not in a position to fulfill the first obligation it owes to the States—that of protecting them in their rights.

The colonies, when they gave up their armies and navies to the Federal Government, did so under the contract that the Federal Government would maintain them. Think of it, gentlemen, the Federal Government to-day can not protect the States of the Pacific coast in the exercise of the functions of a republican form of government.

The next element of our free institutions is the principle of equality of opportunity, which principle is being projected out by us into the competition for the commerce and the markets of the world. We should not forget that every great military nation in the world with a colonial system absolutely denies that principle. Take our Monroe doctrine. We may differ in many respects as to the responsibilities we bear for the weaker peoples in this hemisphere, but we do not differ on the principle that the colonial systems of Europe shall not be extended over any of them. Those peoples and their countries are going to be developed under the principle of equality of opportunity for all. We shall not hoist our flag there and claim any special advantage, and we will not permit any other nation to do the same. The completion of the Panama Canal will bring to a head the question of the future development of Central and South America. You can not escape that fact. Now, as man is conquering the obstacles of nature, controlling steam and electricity, and conquering the air as well as the land and water, these developments come swiftly. The great natural resources of the world are not going to be held back from supporting the civilization of the world. These lands and these countries are going to be developed, and the question must be settled as to whether they are going to be developed by the system of European colonization and restriction, which embodies the principle of privilege and special advantage of the distant mother country, or whether they are going to be developed under the Monroe doctrine, with the principle of equality of opportunity for all along with the freedom of those people.

Let me also remind my colleagues on this side of the fact that, whether we like it or not, the Monroe doctrine has extended across the Pacific Ocean. We have a greater responsibility for the destiny of the Filipinos than we have for that of the Mexicans or the Cubans. We may give them independence. I believe Americans wish them to have independence as soon as it is consistent with their capacity for self-government. But whether they are made independent or not, we can never allow any monarchy, whether of Europe or of Asia, to establish a colony there. We must defend them as we must defend the weaker peoples of Central and South America, whether we like it or not.

I say this principle of equality of opportunity has gone across the Pacific Ocean. It has been proclaimed in far-off China in the open-door policy, and yet great military powers have already closed the door in Korea and are now closing the door in Manchuria.

When Japan and Russia went into Manchuria, the very first year we lost \$22,000,000 of our market for cotton goods and have never gotten it back, and their systems of transportation and administration, now controlled by their Governments, are throttling American trade.

This principle of equality of opportunity, the very end of justice, lies at the foundation of the world's future happiness, and in my judgment is the foundation of peace between nations. America embodies it and is committed to it, and no other great military country of the earth admits it.

We thus have great principles underlying our institutions and great world policies affecting our prosperity and happiness, and the welfare of the world, as well as stupendous values of lives, homes, and property of our citizens, all of which must be defended.

Having taken account of what must be defended, let us now examine the means available for their defense. Inside of a civilized community the means for defense of peace and security of life and limb and rights are provided by the community as a whole. But be it remembered the foundation of this defense is power, power provided by the community, that is greater than the power of any outlaw or any person who does not wish

to abide by the law and agree to the settlement of differences by recourse to law founded on right and justice. I will ask my colleagues here, without going into a lengthy discussion, Would they for a moment leave the defense of their country to rest upon any international organization for a common defense of the nations of the world?

As yet there is no organization with authority to make law for the nations to live under. The Hague Conference is but a parliament in embryo. The delegates to The Hague Conference have no authority. Even among themselves they take rank not by any principle of justice, but according to the military power of their countries. At the last conference the Chinese delegates went there representing 450,000,000 souls. They were put down as a fourth-rate power, with Montenegro. The Japanese delegates went there representing 40,000,000 of souls and were put in the first rank. The Korean delegates went there to plead the right of their country to live; they were not allowed to enter the conference.

There is no international judiciary with authority to adjudicate. There is no international judiciary with authority to say what is international law and what is not. In the true sense of the word there is no such thing as international law. Some writers have simply been expressing their opinions about principles of justice and the precedents and practices of nations.

Out between the nations of the world we are to-day, at the present stage of international evolution, about where the English-speaking people were 1,500 years ago. In the evolution of international common law we have not reached the point of having an authority even to say what is precedent. The nations are a long way off from the development of an authoritative international parliament and an authoritative international judicial system, but they are still further off from the development of an international executive, of a power out among the nations stronger than any individual nation, a power which would protect the individual nation in the exercise of its rights as society protects you in the exercise of yours. There is none such.

In the absence of any real international organization for peace and justice some would rely upon treaties of arbitration. Yet the best arbitration treaty in the world between nations of any size in the very terms of the treaty specifically excludes arbitration for questions of honor and questions of vital interest—the very questions over which nations fight. As a matter of fact, the opportunity for recourse to earn this limited arbitration is proportional not to the justice of the appeal but to the size of the applicant's armaments. Would you rest your country's defense upon the strength of treaties of any kind? With whom would you have treaties? Suppose you succeeded in getting every nation in the world to enter into an agreement to protect America, as they agreed to protect Turkey, what nations would they be? The seven great nations of Europe who are now signatories to the treaty of Berlin?

Austria-Hungary is a signatory of the treaty of Berlin; and yet Austria-Hungary proceeded to seize Bosnia and Herzegovina. Was there a protest from the other signatories? No. Germany and Italy backed her up. Italy is a signatory of the treaty of Berlin, yet Italy proceeded to seize Tripoli. Did the other signatory nations protest? No. They backed Italy up. Has China realized national defense from her treaties with the great nations or these nations among themselves? Have treaties defended Korea?

Some argue for defense in the balance of power between other nations. Turkey has worked this a long time; so has China, playing one nation off against another. But nations thus played with sooner or later agree upon the spoliation of their common victim.

My friends and colleagues, amongst the great nations of the earth, in the evolution of social organisms, which goes on like the evolution of all other living things, there is only one defense that is now available to guarantee survival, and that is individual provision by each nation for its own defense.

No other means is reliable. No other means is worthy of a great nation. Realizing that we have vast interests and sacred principles to protect, and that we must rely upon ourselves, let us examine the agencies and instrumentality available for our national protection. A nation's defense is founded upon its people. The gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON] was absolutely correct when he said in the last analysis it is the man behind the gun. It depends upon the physique, the intellect, but above all the character of the average citizen who makes up the nation, provided he has the implements and the weapons that compare with those of his opponents.

But give an Indian a Winchester and he could kill a hundred white men of the highest evolution if they undertook to attack him unarmed. It is all well enough to talk about the man behind the gun, but I will ask the gentleman from Mississippi,



why does he not take some of the advice of the man behind the gun? [Applause.] He says our officers are such wonderful officers. True enough. Why does he not follow their unanimous advice as to matters of national defense upon which they are experts? If the man behind the gun is such a fine fellow, then he is entitled to have a weapon in his hand with which to have a chance not only for his own life, which he holds lightly, but a chance to deliver victory into the hands of his country and to give effective defense to the great principles for which his country stands. If you believe in the man behind the gun, give him a chance. [Applause.]

But let us go further. There must be the resources behind the population. When I see gentlemen go far afield upon the question of the actual needs of national defense, when I hear them begin to discuss the national defense as though it were a hairsplitting proposition of a compromise between public building bills and other matters of ordinary domestic economy, it is actually discouraging. To listen to them you would believe that the question of having one battleship, more or less, in a naval program would determine whether the American people were going to be ground down with the burdens of taxation or not. America has \$17,000,000,000 in bank assets. All the rest of the world have but \$17,000,000,000. There are gentlemen here who would have us recoil from making provision for national defense on the supposition that other nations would go on faster and that we can not keep up with them and parallel their great armaments. The idea is absurd. We have the men and we have the money. Now, what is the rational method of procedure? It is to take the money and provide economically and efficiently the instrumentalities through which the Nation can operate for an effective self-defense.

There are two great national weapons of defense. One is the Army and the other is the Navy. The Army is founded upon the military activity of the population. I am now speaking of modern armies. Olden-time armies oftentimes were paid mercenaries, hired to fight for the country which employed them, but modern armies are founded upon the principle of the military activity of every able-bodied citizen.

My analysis of the origin of institutions has convinced me that it is military activity of the people that produced and brought forth monarchical systems with attendant oppression. In the centralization that is necessary for efficiency in armies I see the centralization of Governments that were founded after the great wars and invasions of the past. In the hierarchy of the military system I can see the social stratification of the nations of the Old World which confine men's activities to narrow spheres in contrast with the unlimited possibilities of men's activities in our land. I can see there the taking away of men from industrial pursuits that lowers the productiveness of the people. I can see the turning of men's thoughts to the pomp of the military and the cult of privilege and power, lowering the true ideals that a people ought to have of individual worth and useful service. I can see in militarism the greatest obstacle of the past and the greatest obstacle of to-day to the development and progress of Christian civilization. This is fundamental. A nation should employ her men in military activities as little as possible, and the nations that have done so in the past and that were able to do so are the nations that have made the greatest progress.

In contrast with an army, a navy demands but few men. Sea power does not involve military activities of the people. Consequently industrial activities and liberal institutions attend upon sea power.

History shows that every Republic has been founded upon power by sea. There has been no great Republic founded on militarism. For a thousand years England has never been invaded, and to this good day the English have not been compelled to resort to conscription of citizens for their army. That is why the Anglo-Saxon has been able to evolve free institutions ahead of all others. Members of all parties and all ideas will accept this proposition that a nation should employ her resources, her property, rather than her men, as far as she can, for her national defense. The Navy represents property; the Army represents men.

It is estimated that one battleship requiring 1,000 men is the equivalent of an Army corps taking 50,000 men. That one little thousand out on the sea may be military among themselves, but they do not exert any example of militarism to our people. The beauty of our geographical situation is that it is transcontinental, and that all the great nations of the earth lie across the ocean from us. Having boundless wealth, it lies within our power to derive an almost perfect and complete defense through property by putting adequate fleets upon the seas to stand between ourselves and the world's great armies. When I say "great armies" I speak accurately. We are living in a

period of armaments such as the world has never seen. There are 30,000,000 armed men across the water ready. When I say "ready" I mean they are not only organized, drilled, armed, and equipped, but that they have the transportation with which they can cross in a few days and reach our shores. It is simply in keeping with elemental instincts of self-preservation, and it is in accord with the evolution of free institutions that America should take full advantage of her geographical position and put sufficient ships between her peaceful shores and the world's great standing armies. [Applause.]

Since we stand only for equality of opportunity, against which none can justly complain, and would never seek a quarrel with others, and being thus protected, others would not seek a quarrel with us, we could live in peace and security as complete as is possible at the present stage of evolution of the race, and could exert an ever-growing influence in the course of peace and free institutions for the world at large. Thus the Navy should be the main instrumentality for our country's defense; indeed, upon it will rest, in large measure, our country's destiny and the future of the world.

We are now prepared to determine the proper size of the Navy, our true naval policy, and the number of vessels that should be provided in this year's appropriation bill. The size of a nation's Navy is intimately connected with the size of the Army in an inverse proportion. The greater the ability of the Army to provide defense, the less the reliance upon the Navy, and vice versa. A big Army can go with a small Navy, but a small Army requires a large Navy. A Navy without a great Army behind it, as in our case, can not deliver a death blow beyond the water; but a great standing Army, when the sea is cleared, can strike a deadly blow beyond. America having no great standing Army could have control of the sea without menacing any nation, but a military power with a great standing Army would be a serious menace to us if left in control of the sea. It should be borne in mind that without a mobile Army our coast fortifications are open to capture by an enemy in control of the sea, landing troops beyond the range of the forts' guns and taking the forts from the rear. It is logical, it is just and right, that as between America and any great military power we are entitled to and must have control of the sea, for we are absolutely dependent upon this control of the sea as no other nation in the world.

Now, take the Atlantic. On the other side there is a great nation that should be different from all others, and that is Great Britain. She has no great standing army that could strike us, and has her most promising colony with a long contiguous frontier here with America. Canada, like America, has no army, and our preponderating size places her at our mercy. I therefore proceed at once to eliminate the power of the British Navy in deciding the question of what is the proper strength of our fleet in the Atlantic.

What are the other nations? Take the greatest nation with the greatest standing army. This is Germany. Germany has no coast line to defend to speak of, and we could not strike that coast line to do serious harm even if we had control of the sea. But if Germany should have control of the sea in case of a war with America, she could strike our coast line from Maine to Texas, and then through the Panama Canal—because the control of the sea is going to settle the possession of the Panama Canal in war—she could strike it as far up as she pleased in the Pacific.

If Germany has undisputed control of the sea, our American policies must also fall before Germany's policies in Central and South America. Over the sea we are as far from South America as is Germany.

The Germans have not accepted the Monroe doctrine. Their citizens are colonizing in South America. This is not a matter of hypothesis. Many of you remember a few years ago that Germany landed in Venezuela and hoisted her flag. We called on her to retire. Fortunately, as the result of the Spanish War, not from any foresight of our own, but by accident, the mere condition of public opinion temporarily giving some attention to this question having caused us to build up a good Navy for those days, we were the second naval power in the world. Our fleet was probably 60 per cent stronger than the German fleet. We had undisputed control of the sea as compared with Germany. We assembled our whole fleet at Guantanamo. We ordered Admiral Dewey to go down there and take charge. Then, in the most polite and diplomatic language, we requested Germany to retire. She retired in peace with good grace, recognizing that if we insisted our policies must prevail while we controlled the sea.

Since the Russo-Japanese War a new type of ship has come into being—and I will refer a little later to the details of ships—called the dreadnoughts. Gentlemen who are familiar



with industrial matters know that from time to time new machinery is introduced in all of the great industries, and when new machinery is introduced every up-to-date manufacturer who does not wish to go to the wall begins to systematically equip himself with that new machinery. That is what every nation in the world has been doing in respect to dreadnoughts. Take Germany, for instance. Germany has been building four battleships a year, three of them known as dreadnoughts, and one as a dreadnought cruiser, the law providing for them years in advance. America has not averaged two. Last year we got down to one. Suppose when the Panama Canal is completed, and when the question of the development of Central and South America becomes acute, Germany should again hoist her flag in Venezuela or in Brazil or the Argentine. That is not hypothetical. She would be far more likely to hoist her flag then than she was before the Panama Canal was undertaken, far more than formerly, since her citizens have steadily gone to Brazil and the Argentine. Suppose she were to hoist her flag on any part of Central or South America. America would then promptly call upon her to retire, and what would be the situation? By tables I could show you just what it would be, but it is not necessary. I can tell you briefly. We would have all told 12 dreadnoughts and Germany would have 29. I will discuss in a few moments the marvelous theory of the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON] as to what constitutes a fleet and its integrity. I will simply now take what the nations of the world look to. They look to the first line, to the dreadnoughts. Germany would have 29 and we would have 12. Germany would be in absolute control of the sea. Under those circumstances we would be compelled to surrender the Monroe doctrine or to fight, and fight at great disadvantage.

Mr. MURRAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOBSON. I would like not to be interrupted.

Mr. MURRAY. I just want to ask the gentleman a question about the relative marksmanship of the men of the two navies.

Mr. HOBSON. I will come to that a little later.

Mr. MURRAY. I wondered if that would have any serious weight in our favor.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I will tell the gentleman that the general principle is that while you have trust and confidence in your own men you do not assume that your opponent is so much your inferior. I know the time—and some of you can remember—when gentlemen like the gentleman from Mississippi—and unfortunately there were many such men in those days in Mississippi and Alabama and other States in the South—thought that 1 southerner could whip 10 Yankees. That is not a wise basis for national defense. I am assuming that the nations, backed up by adequate resources of their own and realizing fully the necessity of national defense, when the time comes will be found as well prepared and with as high efficiency as we are, where our people are continually neglecting the whole question and do not hesitate at times to sacrifice the efficiency of the Navy for a pork barrel. I would like to have the gentleman ask all those questions when I get through with my consecutive statement.

To continue, we would be compelled to fight or surrender the Monroe doctrine. I want each Member here to answer in his own heart which he would do. We would fight. If the gentlemen here would not, the American people would. I claim—and you can not escape it—that the war would be due absolutely to the fact that while this Nation asserted the Monroe doctrine it did not proceed in an intelligent way to make the provision under which that doctrine would be respected and would be effective.

I come back now to a reference of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BATES] to the Spanish War, which furnishes a good illustration. You may recall that in the early nineties we began to insist upon reforms in Cuba, and Spain continued to refuse to make those reforms. Anyone looking into the questions at issue between the nations would have recognized that the policies of the nation that had control of the sea leading to Cuba would have to prevail. If we had proceeded to insure an undisputed control of the sea in the nineties, all of the problems in Cuba would have been settled by diplomacy. Our demands would have been reasonable, and Spain would have granted them. But we failed to provide for control of the sea, and yet became more insistent in our demands for reforms in Cuba.

While the world believed and Spain believed that her fleet was superior to ours, the result was inevitable. We had war. I want now to refer to the cost. Four more battleships at that juncture, which would have been double what we had, would have given America in the eyes of all the world and in the eyes of Spain the undisputed control of the sea and we would have had no war. As soon as we gained control of the sea

the war ended. Twelve million dollars would have bought and paid for those ships, but then, as now, were were dealing with pork barrels and quarreling about economy. We did not provide those ships and we had the war. During its progress the war cost \$500,000,000, and it is conservatively estimated that directly and indirectly, all told down to date, with pensions which are just beginning and they will run for 100 years, that war has cost us \$1,500,000,000. Gentlemen will tell you what it will cost to have equilibrium with Germany on the sea. They will tell you that it will mean tens of millions. They do not tell you what would be the cost of the war that would result from not possessing control of the sea while we insisted upon our policies in conflict with German policies in the development of a continent. Twelve million dollars more put into battleships would have prevented the war with Spain and a few tens of millions now put in judiciously to give us control of the sea would absolutely insure permanent peace with Germany or any other great continental nation of Europe. The Monroe doctrine would be a reality and we would insure the peaceful development of the continent that is below us. We would insure the spread of free institutions and the principle of equality of opportunity in the Western Hemisphere. Gentlemen can well imagine the cost of such an unequal war with Germany.

As I said before, we were the second naval power in the world a few years ago. We are now the fourth. Germany has gone ahead of us. France has gone ahead of us. Germany is building four Dreadnoughts a year and has 23 of these Dreadnoughts available, whereas we have 13, and that is assuming we have completed all and is counting the *South Carolina* and *Michigan*, which only are of 16,000 tons, which we ought not to count. They are good ships, but they are but 18 knots speed, but admitting those, we find France has 13 and is building 7. We have gone below France. And keeping on at one battleship a year what do we find? In 1914 we would have 14, France 15, Japan 11; in 1915, we would have 15, Germany 28, France 17, Japan 13; in 1916, Germany 30, United States 16, that is counting two more than ought to be counted, France 21, Japan 15, Italy 14, and Russia 11.

Going a few years longer, on a one-battleship program, by 1920 we would have 20 dreadnoughts, Germany 40, France 27, Japan 22, Italy 22. We would be the sixth naval power in the world, with Russia coming up fast to make us the seventh. Thus, a one-battleship program would speedily cause America to drop out from among the naval powers of the world. Does any Member of this House imagine that the American people wish their Navy to thus disintegrate at this critical juncture when the world is so disturbed and the Panama Canal is nearing completion?

Now, gentlemen, suppose war does come as a result of our not controlling the sea? Have you investigated what it would mean? Our fourth, fifth, sixth rate Navy, as the case may be, is quickly swept from the sea. The war games show that Germany could then land an army on the coast of Long Island and another on the coast of New Jersey and capture Norfolk, Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, and destroy our navy yards, shipyards, and arsenals before we could organize any serious opposition. After exacting a high ransom from these cities, she would reembar her troops and occupy strategic positions in the West Indies, would occupy the Panama Canal and Panama Canal Zone, and would occupy any part of Central America or South America she chose. Her fleets would destroy our coastwise and high-sea commerce, and blockade our harbors on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, and prostrate business from one end of the land to the other, and we would be absolutely helpless, unable to strike a blow. In 1866 Prussia struck Austria. The war was over in a few weeks; Prussia was prepared, Austria was not. In 1870 Germany struck France. The war was over in a few weeks; Germany was prepared, France was not. Reference has been made to the war between Russia and Japan. Gentlemen who rely solely upon America's vast resources should carefully note the course of this war. Russia had boundless resources. The Japanese Army never got within 4,000 miles of Russia's vital territory, but the war was over in a few months, with Russia in defeat. Russia had gone on the supposition Japan would not dare attack her, and was found unprepared. Japan for 10 years had been making preparations for just such an attack. You may recall that America was foremost among the civilized nations of the earth that went down to Russia after the Battle of Tsushima and the Battle of Mukden and insisted that she accept the defeat and end the bloody war. With America's fleet swept away and America powerless to strike, the nations of the earth would come down to us and take the very words out of our mouth which we used to Russia and say, you must not continue to disturb the world's



peace; you are whipped; renounce your Monroe doctrine, cede the Panama Canal or buy it back, pay your billions of war indemnity, and in the name of humanity put an end to this bloody war.

Pressure from within would join the pressure from abroad. Great financial centers, where stocks and bonds preponderate, controlling the cosmopolitan press, would demand that the war end. Project your thoughts into the crisis that would arise. Do you see what it would mean? Pressure from within, pressure from without, to end the war. Suppose under this pressure that we should allow the war to end in humiliation and defeat. I do not know what good gentleman it was who said that if we go on building naval programs the American people, writhing under the taxation, would some day rise and wipe us out of office. I want to say, neglect to take the elemental precautions for the defense of your country that you take for yourself, that you take for your animals, and have the country actually precipitated into war because she did not have the instrumentalities you should have provided, and then, through the same neglect, entail upon this proud Nation the humiliation of defeat—can you picture the public wrath that would fall upon your guilty heads? What would you think of the paltry millions you saved on battleships when for every million you saved you entailed a loss of a hundred millions and put your country in the ashes of defeat and brought about the overthrow of her beneficent policies for this hemisphere? But these terrible consequences would not compare with the after effects upon the course of our institutions. An all-consuming wrath of public opinion would shake the Nation from ocean to ocean and imperiously demand that stupendous preparations be made to fight the war over again in the future—a far more imperious public opinion than that in France, which, since Alsace-Lorraine was surrendered, has for 40 years demanded the militarization of the French Nation.

Now, project yourselves into those conditions and picture what the consequences would be. Every able-bodied man would be drafted into the Army. Military systems would permeate the Nation. Yes; we quibble over 1 battleship or 2 battleships now, but there would not be any quibbling of 10 or 20 battleships then. Yes; we would find it would take some 15 or 20 years to become adequately prepared. During that period there would be anger, rancor, and revenge in the hearts of the American people, and especially the hearts of the growing youth. Talk about amity and good will for all the world! We would have it no more. The militarization of the people would bring the centralization of our Government, the curtailment of State rights and individual liberties. Then it is the demagogue would rise, and if he had sufficient power of intellect would menace our institutions.

This country is safe and its institutions are safe as long as the fiery furnace of war does not engulf us in its flames. By the time we were finally prepared and fought out that second war, what would be the condition of the Union? America would be as military as France. America would be as military as any military nation of the earth. You need not think we are so different from the European nations that our industrialism is fixed. We sprang from them. The heredity of thousands of generations is behind us as it is behind them. Begin to beat the drum here as in the Venezuelan message of President Cleveland, scratch the skin of an American, and you find a fighting man. We would experience what is called in the biological history of evolution a reversion to type. This beautiful civilization of ours, built upon the principle of peace and producing, and not the soldier with the rifle on his shoulder—this beautiful civilization based upon equality of opportunity for all—would have reverted back to the old civilization of the bayonet, from which it recently sprung. The wreck of free institutions would rest upon our heads. The victory of Prussia over Austria gave an impulsion to armaments; the victory of Germany over France gave another impulsion to armaments; and the victory of Japan over Russia gave another impulsion to armaments. No wonder that all the nations of the earth who have looked into this question have leaped to arms. And such a defeat for America at the hands of a great military nation would give a new and even greater impulsion to armaments. For generations the hope of peace would recede, while industrialism would be engulfed again in the old militarism that produced and maintained the oppression of the world for ages. I am not a pessimist, but as a scientific man I know that the forces of gravity are going to hold and the mighty sociological forces operating between nations are going to hold. No one can name the hour, the month, or even the year of its coming, but as surely as this policy of neglect continues—and I believe it is going to continue, for a two-battleships-a-year program is but a policy of neglect—the day is going to come, whether you believe it or not, when we

shall find ourselves in the crisis I have described, humiliated at the hands of a great military power. In my judgment, that will be the greatest crisis in the history of the human race. The future of industrialism, the peace of the world, the happiness of mankind will hang in the balance. Oh, the pity of making such a crisis inevitable! But when it comes we can not allow the war to end. With our institutions and the future of civilization at stake, the war of survival must not end in defeat, no matter what may be the cost of victory—

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. MURRAY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman may be permitted to conclude his remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MURRAY] asks unanimous consent that the gentleman from Alabama may be permitted to conclude his remarks. Is there objection?

Mr. HOBSON. Suppose you give me the time you gave to Judge WITHERSPOON.

Mr. MURRAY. Mr. Chairman, I revise my request, and ask that 40 minutes more be given to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. HOBSON. I shall try not to impose unduly on your patience.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MURRAY] asks unanimous consent that the time of the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HOBSON] be extended 40 minutes. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to request my colleagues here who are to return to their homes—and it is a great regret to me that some of them are not to come back—that when they go back amongst the people they will bear this coming crisis in mind, whether they agree with me or not as to its approach, so that when it does come they may be prepared to help create at once the public opinion that would cause Congress to act wisely from the very start. Otherwise, it is possible that under this stupendous pressure to end the war the consequences of defeat might not be fully realized by our people. Upon the approach of war the American people ought quickly to be shown how the future of our civilization is at stake, with the future of peace and industrialism for the world hanging in the balance, so that, like one man, they may resolve from the outset that the war shall never end in defeat. [Applause.]

In the face of the inherent weakness of free institutions, the inevitable neglect by our people of these great questions, the mightiest element of our national defense will be this: To let the great military nations of the earth recognize that we foresee that we shall be found unprepared, and therefore that they can not reasonably expect us to permit the issue of the war to be settled simply by a test of preparations, as we have none. Therefore, immediately—simultaneously with the declaration of war itself—we ought to serve notice upon the nations of the earth that we can not entertain at any time any suggestion to end the war quickly, but propose to turn the pages of history back about 300 years and compel a war of endurance; that we do not propose to let the stupendous issues be settled by a test of preparations, where we are weak, but by a test of resources, where we are strong; that we propose to make it a war of exhaustion, as in our Civil War. When this great war comes it will be a test of survival between militarism and industrialism. The happiness of generations unborn will hang upon the issue. Industrialism unprepared must not be measured against militarism ready and prepared. Industrialism's strength is in its boundless resources. When the test of survival comes, we must appeal to the strength of industrialism and not rely upon its weakness. We must not have to fight but one such war. When we are challenged by some great military power because we are unprepared and because we insist on just policies, then, no matter what may be the odds against us at the start, no matter how long it may take, no matter what the cost in treasure and in blood, that nation, whether in Europe or in Asia, must be brought to an unconditional surrender or it must be ground to powder. If Germany or any other great military nation fully realized that a war would not end with the test of preparations, it would very substantially increase our national defense.

But, my friends and colleagues, it is such a pity that there should be any such war. The Almighty has planted industrialism here on the face of the waters so that it could, for all time, insure its free institution, its peace and prosperity through property instead of men with no danger of war and its attendant militarism. The same ships that would guarantee to us peace and security at home would make effective the Monroe doctrine in the Atlantic and the open-door policy in China. Such a Navy would project the influence of America across the waters to the nations of the earth in the interest of equality of opportunity—with equality of opportunity insured in the



Atlantic and in the Pacific, the mighty armaments of the world would not bring special advantage, and survival would be determined by productiveness, not by war.

That is the way to put an end to the mad race of armaments to establish this mighty equality of opportunity and render the armaments unprofitable. Then our Nation and the other industrial nations would survive. The nation that insisted on maintaining great armaments would be handicapped by the operation of economic laws, the stratification of society, turning men away from productive pursuits. America and similar nations that produce would gain the markets and the commerce of the world. The great forces of commerce and industry, the forces of education, the moral and religious forces, the forces of growing sympathy would undermine militarism in its own strongholds. It would be really the dawn of the day of disarmament. Then it would happen, my friends and colleagues, that when American delegates go to The Hague conference and plead that larger authority ought to be given to delegates in order to hasten the evolution of an international parliament, they would be heeded as they have not been heeded thus far. Then it would happen that when we appeal for The Hague tribunal to be developed into an international court instead of a diplomatic body, we would be heeded. The world would then heed us when we suggested the advisability of passing from individual armaments to collective armaments, to the advisability of organizing an international army and navy under the direction of an international council of nations and the ultimate pooling of armaments amongst the most civilized, so that the combined armaments would be greater than the armament of any individual nation. When such an international organization had demonstrated its capacity to protect individual nations in their lives, liberty, vital interests and rights, and had fully demonstrated its ability to settle the differences that inevitably arise between great nations by recourse to law and to justice instead of war and might, then the world would be ripe for the laying down of its armaments, and we should see the dawn of that happy day that has been dreamed of and longed for down the ages, when there would be peace on earth and good will to men.

But, Mr. Chairman, whether we choose this happy road of peace or whether through neglect we stray down the long road through the fiery furnace of war we come out at the same point, America's control of the sea in the interest of the principle of equality of opportunity. We can not escape this impending destiny. The day is going to come when America, the Nation that has no enemies, the Nation that seeks no conquests, the Nation that embodies for the strong and the weak, the rich and the poor, the Jew and the Gentile, the principle of justice and equality of opportunity, when America will reach her white arms out over the oceans and in the name of humanity command to the troubled waters, "Peace, be still," and then a great calm will reign, and we will teach men no longer to raise their hands against their fellows, but to reach out with a hearty handclasp of cooperation extending from State to State, from nation to nation, from continent to continent, till we shall have a veritable handclasp of cooperation girdling the whole world in a brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God.

Mr. SAMUEL W. SMITH. Will the gentleman permit me to interrupt him?

Mr. HOBSON. I have almost reached the point when I shall be glad to meet all interruptions. One more point, and then I am ready.

Our investigation, then, shows that America has stupendous values of life and property to protect, great and beneficent world policies to insure in the Atlantic and the Pacific, and institutions which we hold in trust for all mankind that call for peace and security. We have found that the Navy is the instrumentality upon which we should rely. With conflicting policies of European nations as to the Western Hemisphere the true basis for an adequate fleet in the Atlantic is one able to insure to us the control of the sea as against any nation of Europe maintaining a great standing army, which at present means Germany. Such a fleet in all human probability would insure our peace and could give no offense to any nation that harbors for us no sinister purposes. We are in a position to define the minimum fleet as well as the adequate fleet.

In case militarism is not willing to abide by the Monroe doctrine, in case it seeks to encroach upon liberty and to destroy equality of opportunity, in case it insists upon oppressing the weak peoples of Central and South America and of the world, in case war must come, we must have at least enough of a navy to enable us to keep the enemy from destroying our shipyards, navy yards, arsenals, harbors, and ports, to keep him from destroying those resources that would enable us to develop the Nation's fighting power so that we would not be compelled to conclude an ignominious peace in order to turn our

resources into fighting power. That is the minimum foundation for a rational national defense.

Now, recognizing that we have no mobile Army as the other great military powers have, I submit to you that while we ought to have undisputed control of the sea in the Atlantic, which would mean a good margin of superiority, the minimum basis is at least an equilibrium of naval power in that ocean as compared with any great military power of Europe that has a mighty army ready. It would mean that in the Atlantic we must have at least an equilibrium with Germany.

Now let us turn to the Pacific. My former speeches on this question have dealt largely with the Pacific. I have purposely avoided the Pacific to-day. When I have discussed international relations and strategic positions and have analyzed forces in an impersonal way as officers and legislators of all nations always do in dealing with these great questions, my motives have been questioned. But I want to sum up and remind gentlemen here that the question of the open-door policy is not the only question in the Pacific Ocean to be settled now. We are located in Pearl Harbor. A circle of 4,000 miles in the heart of that ocean has only one harbor, and that is Pearl Harbor. We can control the sea for 2,000 miles from a base. The nation that has control of Pearl Harbor will enjoy the control of the Pacific. As between the white race moving westward with the sun, that has now at last put its frontier out in mid-Pacific; and the yellow man, moving east against the sun, who has put his foot there, too, the race that permanently controls Pearl Harbor will imprint its civilization as against the other on the future of the world. There is no use of ignoring this great historic fact, this critical question of destiny. Our flag is flying over Pearl Harbor, but there are 35,000 Japanese troops there. That is the official report of an Army officer. Pearl Harbor is the most strategic point in all the history of the world. Do you think this Nation or any nation can occupy Pearl Harbor, out in mid-ocean, without the control of the sea? If you think so, you fly in the face of history; you have never looked up the history of Gibraltar and Malta and every other strategic point. Take Guam and the Philippine Islands and the harbors there right on the flank of the great trade routes of the Far East. Do you think we can hold those without control of the sea? If you think so, you rush in the face of history. Take Alaska, a defenseless treasure house. Take Panama. Say what you please about it, the completion of the Panama Canal makes Panama, next to Pearl Harbor, the second most vital strategic point in all the world. If we have control of the sea, Panama is ours for mobilization, for the passage of reinforcements. If the enemy has control of the sea, Panama is his. Do you think we can occupy that vital strategic outlying territory without control of the sea? If you do so, you rush in the face of all history.

Now, it is unwise for us to ignore the fact that the peoples of Asia and the peoples of Europe and their descendants do not live together in close contact. The war in the Balkans ought to remind us that they never have lived together, and that the race hatred that is beginning to develop on the fringes of the Pacific Ocean is but a forerunner of the problem between the white and yellow races that must be settled some day, and settled by America.

I referred to San Francisco, the municipality that had to surrender its right to manage its own schools in its own way. I refer to the Legislature of California, that had to surrender the right of passing segregation laws, laws that would have been just, because the Japanese segregate us. You can not go to Japan and buy a house and lot and live there. I lived there, and they segregated me. They should not find fault with us for treating their people like they treat ours; but we could not mention this—we were at their mercy. The legislature had to surrender the right of local self-government. The full exercise of the police power of this municipality and the Commonwealth, the exercise of the principle of the right of local self-government, were surrendered and are surrendered to-day.

However, I will not dwell on this, but will sum up briefly: The open-door policy involves the great question of the ages, the competition of trade and commerce, a prolific cause of war; the possession of vital outlying territory is a second great historic cause of war; race hatred is a third cause of war; and the conflict of vital institutions the fourth. Those are the four great historic causes of war between nations. They are all four in operation. The only possible way to remove them is to establish a condition of equilibrium. We should establish a condition where we could meet Japan in mutual respect and make mutual concessions. Only then can we hope to solve these problems. If these great causes of war are not removed or counteracted, war must follow as surely as effect follows cause. Reasoning for the Pacific as for the Atlantic, we should have control of the sea, as compared with any military nation of Asia, which means a fleet with a good margin of superiority over the Japanese



Navy. The very minimum is to have always in that ocean an equilibrium, a fleet equal to the Japanese Navy.

Since the Pacific is so vast and vital points so distant from the Atlantic, each ocean must have its own defense. Having the Panama Canal, with its possibilities for concentration, provided we can hold it, we can safely proceed on the minimum basis for the two oceans. Therefore our plan is simple—each year get the ships laid down in Germany, get the ships laid down in Japan, and then lay down enough ships to equal the two. That would mean at the present time, while Germany averages four and Japan averages two, we should average six dreadnoughts.

Now, one step further, and I am through with the analysis. I spoke of a dreadnought. There are really two classes of dreadnoughts—a dreadnought proper and a dreadnought cruiser. I have seen the war games fought out at Newport as to the advantage of the composition of the fleet. I have been there myself and helped fight them out with the naval officers. They find this: That a homogeneous fleet of battleships has advantage over a homogeneous fleet of battle cruisers, for the reason that, while they can not compel an engagement, they could go wherever they pleased and control the sea.

But it also shows that for the battle fleet to realize its full advantage it ought to have fast wings, just like an army whose strength is in the infantry ought to have cavalry. With the present strength of our fleet we ought to have four dreadnought cruisers, two for each wing. Germany builds one battle cruiser and three dreadnoughts; England about the same; Japan a

larger proportion of battle cruisers. Therefore the program I am recommending this year, since we have no battle cruisers, is four dreadnoughts and two dreadnought cruisers. This is the program recommended by the General Board.

Now, I want to say to my friends here that for years I have not advocated on the floor of the House what I believed to be the proper program, and my colleagues on the Naval Committee have not done the same. I have never had sufficient time to fully discuss an adequate program in the committee.

It sounds strange to say I could not get the time in committee after the statement of the gentleman from Mississippi that the committee gave so much time pressing forward to battleships that it did not have time to consider the other items of the bill.

The subcommittee, that worked day in and day out for seven weeks on the other matters, did not even recommend the battleships. The whole question of the building program of the Navy was left to the full committee and was settled at one meeting. When I pleaded for time to discuss it a point of order was made, although it was withdrawn. I was going to be limited to 5 minutes, but I got 10. The position of the committee heretofore has been this: The older members would say that, considering the sentiment of the House, the wise thing to do was only to recommend what they thought we could get, and this never exceeded two battleships a year. I present here a table prepared by the Office of Naval Intelligence from the programs of foreign nations, which shows that a two-battleship program will consign us to the position of a fourth or fifth rate naval power:

*Strength of the United States in capital of ships built, building, and authorized, compared with other naval powers on Jan. 1 of each year from 1913 to 1920, inclusive.*

DREADNOUGHTS (BATTLESHIPS AND BATTLE CRUISERS).

Countries.	1913			1914			1915			1916		
	Built.	Build- ing.	Total.	Built.	Build- ing.	Total.	Built.	Build- ing.	Total.	Built.	Build- ing.	Total.
England.....	23	13	36	27	14	41	32	13	45	36	13	49
Germany.....	13	10	23	17	9	26	21	7	28	23	7	30
United States.....	8	5	13	10	5	15	12	5	17	13	6	19
France.....	6	7	13	8	7	15	10	7	17	13	8	21
Japan.....	4	6	10	5	6	11	7	6	13	9	6	15
Italy.....	1	7	8	4	6	10	6	6	12	8	6	14
Russia.....	0	7	7	0	11	11	4	7	11	7	4	11
Austria.....	1	3	4	2	2	4	4	0	4	4	1	5

  

Countries.	1917			1918			1919			1920		
	Built.	Build- ing.	Total.	Built.	Build- ing.	Total.	Built.	Build- ing.	Total.	Built.	Build- ing.	Total.
England.....	41	13	54	45	14	59	50	14	64	55	14	69
Germany.....	26	7	33	28	8	36	31	8	39	34	8	42
United States.....	15	6	21	17	6	23	19	6	25	21	6	27
France.....	15	6	21	17	6	23	19	6	25	21	6	27
Japan.....	11	6	17	13	6	19	15	6	21	17	5	22
Italy.....	10	6	16	12	6	18	14	6	20	16	6	22
Russia.....	7	4	11	11	2	13	11	4	15	11	6	17
Austria.....	4	2	6	4	3	7	5	2	7	6	2	8

The above table has been compiled from the most authentic information on hand.

German program last ship authorized to be laid down in 1917.

English program is that stated by the first lord of the admiralty and a reply to the German law.

The French program expires with the laying down of the last ship in 1917.

The Russian program provided for 4 battle cruisers by 1917.

The Japanese program has not been acted upon, but 13 ships extending to 1920 are to be asked for.

Austrian program expires upon the completion by 1915 of the 4 ships now building, an increase of at least 1 ship annually will be proposed.

The Italian naval law authorizes the expenditure of given sums of money for new construction up to and including the fiscal year 1917-18. The types of ships to be constructed is left to the minister of marine.

For the United States, an increase of 2 capital ships yearly has been assumed.

After the expiration of the current programs, an average of the new construction of each nation has been assumed for the ensuing years.

The effect of advocating only what we thought we could get has educated Congress and the country to think that two battleships a year is a big program. I believe the policy is wrong. I gave way to my colleagues' longer experience, but I shall give way no longer. The true policy for me and, I believe, for a committee is to recommend what we feel, after investigation, to be right and leave Congress to decide the result. Henceforth I am going to insist on time in the committee to discuss the question of battleships, and I am going to come into the House each year that I am here and tell my colleagues what, after earnest and careful and painstaking thought and investigation extending over many years, I believe to be the minimum program. [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, I shall now be very glad to answer any questions that may be propounded by any gentleman. I have kept a few notes, made during the remarks of the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON], and if I have failed to touch upon all of the subjects that he touched upon, I hope the gentlemen

here will ask me anything they have in their minds to bring them out.

Mr. SAMUEL W. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the gentleman if he is in favor of fixing the time when the Philippines are to be given their independence; and I would like also to ask a question respecting the officers necessary to man our ships? I understand we lack about 3,000 officers. How would the gentleman provide for these officers in case of war?

Mr. HOBSON. For the officers?

Mr. SAMUEL W. SMITH. Yes.

Mr. GREGG of Texas. Three thousand officers?

Mr. SAMUEL W. SMITH. Yes.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, we have not properly organized the personnel of the Navy. That is one of the great reforms that the Navy needs. I am hoping that we shall have the instrumentality before long by which we can proceed—under the joint direction of Congress and the Executive, through joint boards, made up of subcommittees from the Naval Com-



mittees of Congress and officers of the Navy, who will investigate and report plans for reorganizing the whole personnel of the Navy, plans for reorganizing the navy yards and naval stations, reorganizing the Navy Department and naval administration, and reorganizing the methods of making the annual estimates. When such a joint board reports, it will have worked out what the number of officers and men should be, and I am confident the number will be based upon and automatically made proportional to the tonnage of the active fleet, with a reserve personnel proportioned to the tonnage of the reserve fleet. I will say to the gentleman from Michigan that we have to-day more than enough officers to man all of our battleships, including the old ones and the new, and there need not be any hesitation about providing battleships upon the supposition that we would not have enough officers to man all of the ships. When we put all vessels in commission when war comes—not only the old battleships and the old monitors and the old cruisers and the old gunboats, but every other old craft, down to the old torpedo boats and auxiliary torpedo boats, and all on a war basis—then we would be about 3,000 officers short.

Mr. SAMUEL W. SMITH. In the Naval Militia.

Mr. HOBSON. I would add that with enough officers to man the battleships we can improvise from the Naval Militia for auxiliaries and for mosquito fleets—

Mr. GREGG of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I would like now to ask the gentleman a question.

Mr. HOBSON. But it is too late when war comes to build battleships.

Mr. SAMUEL W. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the gentleman answer the question respecting the Philippines.

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Chairman, I believe that Americans are a unit in wishing the people of the Philippine Islands Godspeed in their development and are a unit in encouraging their political capacity by giving them increasing opportunities to exercise it by teaching the child to walk by letting it walk, but I do not believe that we ought to expect a child to rise up out of swaddling clothes and run a race. [Applause.] I do believe we are going to protect them as long as American character is what it is to-day. [Applause.]

Mr. GREGG of Texas. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman spoke something about manning the mosquito fleet. Does the gentleman count destroyers as part of the mosquito fleet?

Mr. HOBSON. No, indeed; and I am glad the gentleman has brought that out, because when you authorize a battleship you must not think that finishes the authorization. You ought to have four destroyers for every battleship, and the destroyers should be commissioned while the battleship is commissioned. I am glad the gentleman brought that out, and I want to pay my respects to him, for he has been a consistent supporter of the proposition of having sufficient of these auxiliaries to go along with the battleships. I am sorry that I can not say as much for the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON], and it is a remarkable fact that men who come in here and talk about our lack of auxiliaries as a reason why we ought not to have battleships are the very men who vote against auxiliaries in the committee.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Chairman, I have been very busy in my committee room, and I have not had the pleasure of listening to the gentleman, but, speaking of auxiliaries, has he discussed that question?

Mr. HOBSON. I have just gotten to it now.

Mr. CANNON. If the gentleman will allow me, what I do not know practically about a navy would make a great library—

Mr. HOBSON. Will the gentleman permit me to interrupt him to say that his modesty, with a great deal of valuable information from long years in dealing with these problems, is exceedingly characteristic and in extraordinary contrast with the astounding wisdom and know-it-all attitude of gentlemen opposing this bill, who have dogmatically settled all the technical questions from strategy and tactics down to the last test for ballistics of great guns [laughter and applause], while some of them never saw a battleship and have been here just long enough to sprout their pinfeathers as Members of this House.

Mr. CANNON. What I wanted to ask was this as a foundation of my query of the gentleman. When that fleet went around the world I was mortified beyond measure that the colliers and a number of other auxiliaries had to sail under a foreign flag, and I am anxious to vote for battleships; but at the same time I am anxious to know that in the event of war that we have proper auxiliaries, because it takes that class of vessels to utilize the battleships.

Mr. HOBSON. I am very glad the gentleman brought that point. We are slowly equipping our Navy with colliers, but

in a great war a nation must have an ocean merchant marine from which to draw sufficient colliers and similar auxiliaries. I hope the time is approaching when we shall have a large merchant marine. In this connection I will remark that the naval bill to-day as it comes in is the best-balanced bill that has come in since I have had the honor of being in Congress. It provides six destroyers and six other auxiliaries. I think I may state without involving the secrecy of the committee proceedings that an effort was made to make the number 16. We have not one destroyer per battleship to-day, not one efficient destroyer for a battleship. We ought to have four. Every time we authorize a new battleship we ought to authorize four destroyers in the same bill.

Mr. WILSON of Pennsylvania. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. HOBSON. I will.

Mr. WILSON of Pennsylvania. Does the gentleman believe it is necessary in time of peace to have a well-balanced Navy and auxiliaries?

Mr. HOBSON. Certainly I do.

Mr. WILSON of Pennsylvania. Equivalent to what you would have on a war basis?

Mr. HOBSON. I certainly do.

Mr. WILSON of Pennsylvania. Is it not a fact that it takes a longer time to build a battleship or a cruiser than it does to build these auxiliaries?

Mr. HOBSON. Very much longer.

Mr. WILSON of Pennsylvania. Then, if it was the purpose of the gentleman—

Mr. HOBSON. That is, the necessary time.

Mr. WILSON of Pennsylvania (continuing). To have a Navy to meet emergencies, what is the necessity of having auxiliaries that can be built in a short period of time?

Mr. HOBSON. I want to say that my statement was only comparative. On a pinch you can build destroyers very much more rapidly, but it is very much better not to have to do it. The destroyers ought to be built with the battleships; the mosquito fleets can be improvised and, for a maritime nation, the colliers to which the gentleman from Illinois referred, but in our case, without a merchant marine, it is necessary to provide colliers in advance.

Mr. GREGG of Texas. Is it not a fact that it takes about three months to build a torpedo destroyer?

Mr. HOBSON. I will say to my friend we have run along about that time. I also mean to say you do not have to build any armor for them or heavy guns, and in number their engines are standardized. The armor and heavy guns is what usually takes the longest time in building the battleships.

Mr. GREGG of Texas. Does not it take 30 months to build them now?

Mr. HOBSON. It takes about that time, a couple of years.

Mr. GREGG of Texas. In stress, can not we build battleships in a comparatively short time?

Mr. HOBSON. The gentleman is very much mistaken. If you try to turn out large numbers of battleships you have to consider the question of armor-plate factories and gun factories, which are not commercial plants, and it takes time to make large extensions of these plants. If we tried to build 20 battleships it would probably take four or five years, or even longer on the average. But, if we had to build 10 or 20 or a hundred of these smaller boats, we could turn them out probably in 12 months and later on in 9 or 10 months—

Mr. LOUD. The war would be over by that time.

Mr. HOBSON. Yes; under certain conditions.

Mr. GREGG of Texas. I understand the gentleman that the department is willfully taking 30 months to build something that can be built in 12.

Mr. HOBSON. Oh, no. Does the gentleman have any other questions to ask.

Mr. CURLEY. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. HOBSON. Certainly.

Mr. CURLEY. How long did it take to settle the naval supremacy between Russia and Japan?

Mr. HOBSON. Well, the first battle was fought on the 12th of August before Port Arthur. Tsushima was fought several months later. War was declared in February, if I remember correctly.

Mr. CURLEY. Then the naval supremacy between Russia and Japan was settled in a period of about five months?

Mr. HOBSON. No. They carried on those operations around Port Arthur a long time before they fought the Battle of Tsushima, and the Russian fleet had to be fitted out at Cronstadt and come around. If I should guess at it, I should say about a year.

Mr. CURLEY. How long did it take to settle the naval supremacy between the United States and Spain?



Mr. HOBSON. The war was declared about the 21st of April, and the battle of Santiago was fought on the 3d of July.

Mr. CURLEY. A period of about four months. So that it is possible to destroy a navy in about one-fifth the time it takes to build a destroyer?

Mr. HOBSON. The gentleman recognizes here that in that case it was settled by one battle. I will point out to the gentleman—and this brings up a very interesting line—the question of these other battleships. There ought to be two lines of battle, the first line composed of dreadnoughts, the second composed of older battleships. If two fleets of the first line are anywhere near balanced in power, they will both pretty nearly cripple each other. If an appreciable percentage of those dreadnoughts on either side come out unscathed, they will determine the control of the sea, but the chances are if it should be an equal fleet between America and Japan or America and Germany, the fair assumption is they would both destroy each other, and then the control of the sea would rest upon the old-time battleships of the second line that would be in commission and ready.

Now, then, a third line of defense would be behind those, and there is where you would have the mosquito fleets. But I will say to the gentleman that the battle between those dreadnoughts will take place very shortly if the inferior fleet is willing to accept battle, so that for your first line you can only utilize the destroyers you built in time of peace.

Mr. SAUNDERS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOBSON. I will.

Mr. SAUNDERS. This whole matter is within the meaning of the word "adequate." Having reference to present conditions, and what you think a reasonable likelihood as to the future, what ought our building program to be in order to have an adequate Navy?

Mr. HOBSON. For how long?

Mr. SAUNDERS. Starting now.

Mr. HOBSON. Just as long as Germany and the—

Mr. SAUNDERS. I mean in the number of ships. I said having reference to the present conditions and reasonable likelihood of the future, as you view it, what ought to be our present building program in order to establish an adequate Navy?

Mr. HOBSON. I am telling the gentleman—

Mr. SAUNDERS. I mean in the number of ships.

Mr. HOBSON. I am telling him. It would be what Germany is averaging a year plus what Japan is averaging, making six battleships—two of the battle cruisers and four of the dreadnoughts.

Mr. SAUNDERS. Our present Navy is very inadequate, because of that view?

Mr. HOBSON. It is fast becoming so. I want to say to the gentleman from Mississippi, who was discussing those old ships, that if you let a manufacturing plant that is going to come in close competition with another rely upon its old tools and begin to patch up and repair those old tools it will soon go into bankruptcy. Under his standstill idea the American Nation would soon become insolvent as to national defense. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HOBSON] has expired.

#### MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE.

The committee informally rose; and Mr. DENT having taken the chair as Speaker pro tempore, a message from the Senate, by Mr. Crockett, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed bill of the following title, in which the concurrence of the House of Representatives was requested:

S. 8414. An act to authorize aids to navigation and other works in the Lighthouse Service, and for other purposes.

#### NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL

The committee resumed its session.

Mr. GREGG of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 minutes of my time to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. DIES], and after that I yield another 30 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. GRAHAM].

Mr. DIES. Mr. Chairman, the conception of the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. HOBSON] of an ideal nation is a large number of very large battleships surrounded by a sufficient amount of land for coaling stations. [Laughter and applause.] But I must thank him for relieving my nerves during the course of his remarks. He throws one of these fits annually upon the occasion of the bringing in of the naval appropriation bill.

Now, I am one of those gentlemen, like my friend from Mississippi [Mr. WITHERSPOON], who has scarcely sprouted his pin feathers, but I have already been here long enough to hear one of the gentleman's prophecies made when he wanted a larger appropriation for battleships. And, being a new Member,

my nerves were of course shattered by the direful forebodings of the warlike gentleman from Alabama. As he stood there, with perspiration bursting from his patriotic visage, he portrayed what would occur in this benighted country within 12 months from the time he was then speaking. Twelve months, or 10 months? Well, a month or two in destroying a great Republic like this is not considered in the arithmetic of the gentleman from Alabama. [Laughter.] He destroys them upon short notice.

Upon that occasion the gentleman from Alabama was destroying this Republic with the grim guns of Japan. I wondered then why gentlemen did not go into paroxysms of fear. It is probably because they had heard his prophecies oftener than I had. [Laughter.] When he said our country would be flat upon its back in 10 months, and Japan would have her yellow hands upon our white throats, I was almost persuaded to give him the two battleships. But he said then just what he said a moment ago: Two battleships were not worth a baubee. It would take six to do the work. [Laughter and applause.]

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Alabama is the Don Quixote of this Congress when it comes to war measures. I do not believe, sir, that we are in any great danger from the nations of Europe. I do not believe that because England has a greater navy than we have we should strive to have a Navy equal to that of England. I do not believe that we should strive to have a Navy equal to Germany's navy. I do not know much about war, and not as much about history as the gentleman does, but I do know that England and Germany and France are arming themselves, and that for centuries they have impoverished the taxpayers and the agrarian populations of their lands to arm themselves in defense, one against the other. I do know that if Germany were to leave Europe and come over into this country, making war upon the United States she would be banished from the map of Europe.

It all resolves itself into this: The cry is for Armies and for Navies, and I say that in the light of history there is not a scintilla in the history of the nations of the earth to justify a standing Army or a great Navy in this Republic. We are separated from the politics of Europe by a great ocean. As long as we stay upon this hemisphere—ample, indeed it is to support all of the children of the generations to come—and attend to our own business, unless we are rushed into a war by loud-mouthed jingoes against the peace and security and happiness of this country, we shall remain at peace. [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, I have heard a good deal about economy, and, being an unsophisticated new Member, with pinfeathers scarcely sprouted, I took a good deal of it seriously. I heard a good deal, I say, about economy. But I have learned two things, Mr. Chairman, in my short service here. A man can bring himself into disrepute in this House more quickly by defending the Constitution and opposing the appropriation bills than by any other course that can be followed. [Laughter and applause.]

When the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Foss] began his delightful address, he prefaced his remarks by saying that he was gratified that a Democratic House was following the policy established by the Republican Party. The gentleman's criticism is well taken. The difference between an extravagant Republican and an extravagant Democrat is a difference of principle, and the compliments all go with the Republicans. [Laughter.] The Republican wants to uphold the protective-tariff system. He believes—or tells the gullible world that he believes—that you can make people prosperous by taxing the lights out of them [applause], and that all you have got to do is to tax everything and everybody and thereby make the country wax fat and happy. [Laughter.]

But we Democrats have taken the other view. There is not a Democrat on the floor of this House who has not told the country that for every dollar we take out of the pockets of the people by this protective-tariff tax and get into the Treasury of the United States, it costs the American people \$5 to collect it. Then, if what I have said is true, we have an awful accounting to give to the people when they come to judge us for the deeds done in the Sixty-second Congress.

I do not know by just how many hundred millions the appropriations of this Congress will exceed the appropriations of the last Republican Congress, but I do know that we started off with a pork-barrel pension bill that increased the pensions of this country some \$40,000,000 or \$50,000,000. We promised then that the pork-barrel feature of private pension bills would be dispensed with, but still every Member comes in and gets his pork from the Pension Committee when the time rolls around. So as to the other pork-barrel bills that come before this body. Every man must have his public building in his little town; it is



immaterial whether it has 700 or 7,000 people, according to statements made on the floor of the House. He must have it. If it costs \$100,000, according to our Democratic theory it costs the taxpayers \$500,000. The trouble about these pork-barrel bills is this, that the committee practice that is followed is "Equal rights for every member of the committee, and special privileges to nobody else." [Laughter.] I do wish and I do fervently pray that the time may come when a public-building bill will be made according to the population and post-office receipts at the place where it is proposed to establish the building, and I do hope the time may come when it may be an automatic matter, so that when a town reaches a certain size and the receipts are a certain amount, the building may result. I say, and I measure my words when I say it, that these pork-barrel bills are a stench in the nostrils of the American people. [Applause.] I know that they are gotten up for the protection of the Members. I know that there is a powerful temptation and a powerful force behind their organization, but that temptation ought to be removed.

I am not as much of an economist now as I was when I first came here. [Laughter.] I have seen so much grand and petit larceny that I am like a soldier who has witnessed bloody carnage on many battlefields. I look upon a little larceny with more complacency than I formerly did. [Laughter.] My feelings on that subject remind me of what occurred when I was a boy. I hope I may be permitted to rescue a dumb brute from some little obscurity. I was raised in the cross timbers of Texas; that is, with the prairie on one side and the timber of the woodlands on the other. We had a little farm of 114½ acres in the timber belt. We had a good rabbit dog that we called Hunter, and a faithful dog he was. He was part Newfoundland and part shepherd, and old Hunter, on good, level ground, could catch a cottontail rabbit in anywhere from 200 to 250 yards, and on plowed ground he only wanted 60 or 70 yards to catch him. As we boys grew up we needed a little more land to cultivate and my father rented a little farm over in the prairie section, and we carried old Hunter over with the wagon and plows. Over on the prairie they had what they called the mule-eared rabbits, and they said it took a fast dog to make one of them put down his fourth leg. [Laughter.] It was not more than a few hours before one of these mule-eared rabbits got up, and old Hunter took after him, and he made a noise about like a flock of quail flying. He ran the rabbit for a mile or a mile and a half, and in an hour or so he came back with his tongue hanging out, and he was shaking all over, and he lay down under the wagon and stayed very quiet.

The next day a mule-eared rabbit got up in front of him, and he ran him about 200 yards and came back. By the end of the third day the rabbits could play all around old Hunter and he would just raise his head and look at them, but would not stir a step. [Laughter.] I remember when I first came here some one ran into the cloakroom and said the House was about to squander \$10,000,000. I jumped up and bounded into the Hall and ran down the aisle and shook everybody as if the Capitol was on fire, and I said, "The people are about to be robbed of \$10,000,000." But now, Mr. Chairman, it can be announced in the cloakroom that they are about to be filched out of \$50,000,000 and, like old Hunter, the Members just barely look up. [Laughter.]

But, Mr. Chairman, while we are engaged in the erection of all these magnificent stone structures in Pumpkinville and other great centers of the country for our political safety, it is well to take a little peep into the future as to what people are going to do when we present them with the bill at the next election. They have authorized us now to levy and collect an income tax. We are likely to start out with \$5,000 or \$6,000 as the minimum income which will be taxed; but even though the tax collector only looks for men with \$5,000 incomes, he will find a man or two in every one of these little towns in the South and the East and the West and the North, and I want to say that when a tax collector, authorized by Congress, taps this gentleman on the shoulder and says, "Mr. Brown, we want a couple of hundred from you;" "Mr. Smith, we would like to have \$10,000 from you"—I am not referring to any one of my colleagues, but speaking figuratively—the gentlemen who pay this tax will be a powerful advance army fighting for economy in this country. They are going to say, "Why did they build that public building down in that little town over in RODDENBERY'S district, where there are only 2,000 people?" They are going to say that there is \$65,000 at 3 per cent interest, there is a janitor, there is the insurance, and there is all this expense, and they are going to wonder what sort of economy it is to spend these vast sums of money in towns where the rents are not equal to one-tenth of 1 per cent of the interest on the money. And so it is all along the line of appropriation bills. I wish, Mr. Chairman,

and I look forward with pleasure to the time when the income tax shall be developed, as it is sure to be developed, in this country. As a matter of principle and justice, a man ought to pay taxes on what he owns and not on what he consumes, and as soon as our industries can all be made to stand alone and gradually from year to year we develop the income tax, we can take the money from the men who have money, taking a part of the income—if it is a little income, taking a little, and if it is a big income we will take a lot. They will hang a great many of the economists who passed the bill, but it will be a good thing for the American people. [Laughter.]

You will go home and face an outraged constituency. They will not meet you with brass bands and ask you if you got that appropriation for Mud Creek, to dredge it out where it is knee-deep, but they will meet you with a frown and a tax receipt in their hands, and ask you why you sent the tax collector for these amounts to squander in needless appropriations.

Oh, the Republican Party has searched for every excuse to spend money as a prop for the protective-tariff system, and, as was truly said on the floor of the House, that in order to bolster up the protective system the Republican Party would be willing to collect the money and put it in tugboats and carry it out and sink it in the ocean in order to sustain the stock argument that they believe that prosperity is based on the protective system, and to tax the people is to increase prosperity.

Now mark you, Mr. Chairman and my Democratic friends, our position is vastly different. We believe that a tariff is robbery. I want to see a system of direct taxation that will give pause to the tendency of the times to the increase of Federal activity.

You know at the last Congress we almost embarked on a good-roads system. That will come next. The public buildings and pensions are here. Now I want to pay a compliment to the old Union soldiers of this great Republic. Mr. Chairman, they not only saved the Government in the time of war but they have saved it in time of peace, because if they had asked this Congress for the Capitol and all the wealth of the Nation they would have gotten it by a large majority. [Laughter and applause.] Considering their opportunity, considering the flexible nature of the Congress, I wonder at the tremendous moderation of the Union soldiers rather than at their excess. I think they are to be complimented if they have not come in and asked for one hundred and fifty billions instead of a hundred and fifty millions.

There is going to be a great amount of walling and gnashing of teeth at the next election. Now, I do not think for a moment that our friend RODDENBERY has done the Democratic Party a bit of harm. I wish they would keep talking about it. He said no more now than every Republican will say when it comes to the next election. He said there is no bridle on Congress, and there is none. For one, I doubted the wisdom of taking the power from the Speaker, because I thought it was necessary to lodge the responsibility somewhere that there might be a check on the committees of this House. If the Speaker had had the power that the previous Speaker had, while perhaps he would not have wielded it with such harshness and such unpopularity, still he would have been in a position to have said to these committees, "Thus far shalt thou go and no further." But, Mr. Chairman, I do not know how far the appropriations will go. The gentleman from Alabama wants six battleships, and they are likely to get two. Of course, the Republicans want to get us into all the folly they can. They were too wise to appropriate for battleships, too wise to let the public buildings get so large as to be a stench in the nostrils of every decent man.

They were too wise to let the pork barrels run riot, but rather the old gentleman who was in the chair at that time, the distinguished gentleman from Illinois [Mr. CANNON], of blessed memory—and his fame will grow in this country—sat upon the lid and kept it down to within proportions that the constituencies of the country would stand for. But there is nobody on the lid now, Mr. Chairman, and there is going to be an explosion. If you do not cut out this public-building bill, which will carry forty or fifty million when it gets back from the other end of the Capitol, and if you do not watch the river and harbor bill, if you do not get on your knees and pray to the economists who are in charge of the pension measures, if you do not do something to pare these appropriation bills, we will be known as the party who made more promises and more appropriations than any party which ever had charge of the Federal Government. [Laughter and applause.] I do not want this Government to go to building public buildings in every village in the country. I do not want it to go about undertaking to make navigable the dry creeks and small streams of this country, and, with all due respect to my economic friend from Missouri [Mr. SHACKLEFORD], I do not want it to go into the road-



overseer business or the business of building public roads in this country. The pension bill, the public-building bill, the river and harbor bill, would be but as one hog jowl compared to the barrel of pork that we would have if they ever get a bill known as the public-roads bill. [Laughter and applause.] Think of what it will amount to. Every member of the committee will get a hundred miles of road, and every other gentleman, in proportion to his standing, will get from 30 to 40 or 50 or 60 miles. Mr. Chairman, I believe in economy. I do not want the kind of Nation that my friend from Alabama [Mr. Hobson] wants. I do not want an Army of hundreds of thousands of bristling bayonets and an ocean dotted with tremendous, frowning guns on dreadnoughts. I would rather that we would stay on this God-blessed land, between the oceans, away from the politics of Europe. I wish we could get rid of our miserable little pickaninny holdings in the Pacific Ocean. We have no business with them. They are 8,000 miles from our shores. I do not know where Pearl Harbor is. The gentleman says whoever gets Pearl Harbor will determine whether the race shall be white or black. [Laughter and applause.] Think of it, Mr. Chairman. Awful contemplation! I do not know where Pearl Harbor is, and yet the gentleman tells us if the yellow race gets it we will be yellow, and that it is up to the white race to appropriate all of their earthly possessions to build battleships to hold Pearl Harbor. Do you know we need a good deal of common sense in the Congress of this Nation? and we have got it, too.

Ninety millions of people, the greatest land thieves in the world, descended from the greatest land thieves of history, are not going to be driven off an inch of this tremendous country. We are here. We have driven back all of the foes of our fire-sides in the years that are gone. We have marshaled armies on the field of battle. We have met foreign countries when there were but three or four or five million of us, and from the issue of those conflicts has risen this great Republic. It is childish, it is foolish, to talk about these 90,000,000 of free people, practically the only republic in the world, giving away their history and traditions, going step by step to a military government, because some gentleman in his fevered imagination has heard something that a war college said might happen to the country. [Laughter and applause.] We can drive back any force upon this earth. So long as we uphold liberty in this country, so long as we uphold the equality of man in this Republic, all of the nations of the earth could not come on this soil and destroy the liberties of the people, and we ought not to want to wage a foreign war.

Mr. Chairman, instead of profiting by the lessons of history, which teach that navies and armies and generals are the bane and foe of liberty, instead of staying on this continent and attending to our own business, rearing schoolhouses and churches and teaching the rising generation to love and watch their liberties and to practice a devotion to their institutions, we are finding ways to build a great navy and a great army. We are tricked in this way and that way. We give our wealth to build a Panama Canal, to have a general come up with his epaulets and blandly advise us, "Now you have done that which means an addition of 25,000 to the standing army." We have been begged to build the Panama Canal, and then we are assured by gentlemen that in order to hold it we have to have a great navy at each end of it. I do not believe that. If the whole world is in conspiracy against us and the size of the navy shall determine the color of the race, we may not be yellow as the gentleman surmises, but we will undoubtedly be English again, because we will never be able to build a navy as large as England. I wish gentlemen could get rid of this nightmare, not only the gentleman with the grand nightmare, but gentlemen with little nightmares all over the land. [Laughter.] I wish they could get it out of their heads that we must stand here trembling because we are about to be invaded. Who wants to invade us, except to buy our cotton and corn and beef—and marry our rich girls? [Laughter.]

Mr. Chairman, I challenge the historians of this House to point to a single nation that ever existed upon the earth that was completely fitted by geography to do without an army and navy to maintain free institutions, except the United States.

France can not do it; she has got to have an army and a navy. Germany can not do it, England can not do it, Japan can not do it, but God has placed us upon this continent, separated from the world by seas and impassable barriers of nature, and if we run to military seed, as every other republic has done in the past, if some general—some Diaz or Huerta—comes on horseback, and finally this Republic goes down in the night of military despotism, as every republic in every age of the world has done, we will owe it to the fantastic Don Quixotes who tax the people to fight windmills of their own imagination. [Applause.]

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I reserved a portion of my time, and I desire to yield it to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Lord].

Mr. LOUD. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BATES] in his remarks made some comparison between the ships of our Navy at the time of the Spanish-American War and the battleships of to-day. It reminded me that when I was at Annapolis on the Board of Visitors, in conversation, a gentleman—a civilian, but who was a graduate of the Naval Academy—said to me, "Do you know that a battleship of to-day is equal to 60 *Oregons* of the Spanish-American War?" I was astounded, and I said, "I think you are somewhat radical." He said, "You think of it and see"; and so I did study it afterwards, and I want to give you the result of my thought upon that subject.

As I looked into it I found that the guns of our Navy to-day are double the efficiency of the guns of 15 years ago. The 14-inch guns of our battleships to-day carry shot weighing fourteen hundred and odd pounds. The 13-inch guns of the *Oregon* carry 1,130 pounds. The 13-inch guns of those days were 35 calibers in length, and our 14-inch guns are now 45. We now have a muzzle energy and penetrating force of over double what we had then. So much for the guns.

The battleship *Pennsylvania* of to-day will carry 12 guns. The *Oregon* carried 4, so we have three times the number of guns on the battleship of to-day we had then, and three times two makes six—six times the efficiency we had at the time of the Spanish-American War. Then, at the time of the Spanish-American War, we could load and fire the 13-inch guns once in five minutes. Now we can load and fire three times in one minute. Speed in operating the guns is fifteen times as much as it was then. Fifteen times six makes ninety. There you have a little more than the 60 of my friend; you have 90.

Then, again, the accuracy of our gunners. We find that in those days the average percentage of hits was 3 to 5 per cent, but for comparison we will give it the larger number of 5 per cent. To-day it is upward of 50 per cent, or ten times the accuracy we had then. Ten times ninety makes nine hundred. I am not going to tell you a battleship of to-day is equal to 900 *Oregons*, but I am giving you the figures and you can draw your own conclusions. It only goes to show that skill and brains have gone into the building of our ships and what magnificent results they have brought forth. We now have larger ships—two or three times larger. We now have heavier armor on our ships, and our ships have 5 knots greater speed than they had at that time. The battleship range then was from 3 to 5 miles, and the *Oregon* in its longest shot, made at the Battle of Santiago, carried an elevation for 10,000 yards. Now the range of our 14-inch guns is at least 21,000 yards and a battle range of from 8 to 10 miles. So much for the ships of those days and the ships of to-day. I do not argue that the ships built by other countries have not been making the same advance. They, too, have been building better ships, and we must not underrate the ships of other countries.

Now, what is the amount that we should expend? Our bill carries \$146,000,000. We find Great Britain spent last year \$228,430,064, and the year before \$216,000,000, and the year before \$197,000,000. Germany spent, a year ago, \$110,715,043, and the year before \$107,000,000. France spent \$81,692,832, and the year before \$80,371,109. Japan spent, 1912-13, \$46,158,216, the largest amount, I think, that they have ever spent in one year. Now, there are two things to which I desire to call attention concerning the amount of money spent on the navy in those countries. In the first place, Japan, for instance, in its financial condition after the Russo-Japanese War, has had far greater difficulty in bearing the expense of \$46,000,000, with the smaller population of that country, than \$146,000,000 is with us, the richest nation on the whole face of the globe.

Not only that, but \$46,000,000 in Japan will go two or three times as far as that amount would in the United States, and the same in smaller measure can be said of Germany. The amount of \$110,000,000 in Germany will go at least 50 per cent further, because most of it in the final analysis goes to labor, which is far cheaper in that country than in this. That is equivalent to a good deal more than \$146,000,000 in this country. How much shall we spend? We should spend enough to maintain the honor of this country, to maintain a Navy large enough to guard us from all danger from any other country. When you ask what size of Navy I would advocate, I believe with the importance of this country and our great wealth, the richest nation in the world, that we should stand at least second among the nations of the earth. [Applause.] If we stand second to Great Britain we need not have over half their naval strength and still be stronger than Germany, the now second power.



When we compare the navies of the various countries there are same facts which I think it would be well for us to consider and which I desire to put into the Record. We find that in capital ships—battleships and battle cruisers—built and building by the various powers that England will have 76, with a tonnage of 1,417,935; Germany, 43 capital ships, with a tonnage of 766,894; while the United States will have 37 ships, with a tonnage of 610,796; France, 27 capital ships, with a tonnage of 447,649; and Japan 20 ships, with a tonnage of 372,980. While England will have 76 ships and Germany 43 and we 37, do not overlook the fact that the average tonnage of the English ships will be 2,000 tons more than our own. The German ships will average more than 1,000 tons per ship than ours. When we take the dreadnoughts that are built or building we find that England will have 25, with a tonnage of 580,350; Germany 17, with a tonnage of 384,730; the United States 12, with a tonnage of 276,650. Of battle cruisers, England 11, with a tonnage of 248,300; Germany 6, with a tonnage of 139,364; with the United States, none at all; Japan 4, of 110,000 tons.

It is not because we do not want battle cruisers. They are strongly advocated by our naval board and by the Secretary of the Navy, but believing that the House would not consider any more than two battleships we have had to strike them out of this bill in the committee. I hope the day will come, and come soon, when we can have not only battleships but have a reasonable number of swift battle cruisers to go in our fleet. As far as other cruisers are concerned, England has 124, with a tonnage of 873,475; Germany 52, with a tonnage of 256,946; the United States 26, with a tonnage of 223,055; France 31, with a tonnage of 256,375; and Japan 27, with a tonnage of 198,813.

We have the smallest number of any of the five powers. England has 124, Germany 52, France 31, Japan 27, the United States 26.

Of torpedo boats and torpedo-boat destroyers England has 233, with a tonnage of 147,074; Germany 140, with a tonnage of 73,894; the United States 50, with a tonnage of 37,815; France 241, with a tonnage of 52,046; and Japan 112, with a tonnage of 28,441.

This illuminates the subject of auxiliaries, which has been discussed here upon the floor, showing how poor we are in auxiliaries as compared with the other navies of the world.

In submarines England has 86, with a tonnage of 39,508; Germany has 32, with a tonnage of 15,340; United States 39, with a tonnage of 13,781; France 109, with a tonnage of 35,259; and Japan 16, with a tonnage of 4,434. In total tonnage built and building here are the comparative figures: England, 2,478,152 tons; Germany, 1,124,257 tons; United States, 898,345 tons; France, 806,729 tons; Japan, 613,724 tons.

In every line, large and small, we stand far below the second nation—Germany. It is not for me to pose as an authority before this House as to what we should have as a Navy. I know you would prefer some higher authority, and I have it here on my desk.

At the time of the Spanish-American War it so happened that I was on the other side of the globe, and it also happened that I was in Dewey's fleet. I had the opportunity—a glorious memory to me—of seeing the personnel of our Navy in action, and it was a sight that would delight any patriot's heart to see how our men and officers carried themselves on that crucial day in far-off Manila Bay. [Applause.] While one admired every man in that fleet, officer and enlisted man, yet one carried away great admiration and love and respect for the grand man who commanded that fleet and who won that victory, utterly destroying the Spanish fleet without the loss of a single American life. [Applause.] And surely that man, who is now promoted to the head of this Navy of ours, who stands as the president of the General Board, is so respected that his opinion is worth consideration by every Member of this House. I am going to read in my time the views of Admiral Dewey upon the size of the Navy which he would recommend, and this article was published a week ago last Sunday in 11 of the largest newspapers of the country.

He says:

Admiral Mahan has stated that the size of the Navy must be determined not so much by what a nation is willing to accomplish as by what it is willing or unwilling to concede in respect to national policies.

The United States must, therefore, measure its strength with the nations that are most likely to oppose our policies, and this strength must be judged by comparative and not by absolute strength.

The United States Navy at present ranks third, with Great Britain and Germany first and second, respectively, and France fourth. With the definite building programs possessed by Great Britain, Germany, France, and Japan, the United States will soon drop to fourth place. The General Board of the Navy (of which I am president) recommended as early as 1903 that the ultimate strength of the United States Navy should be 48 battleships with the necessary auxiliaries, and this policy has been consistently advocated from year to year.

Dreadnoughts must constitute the basis of our building program. At the present time the United States and Germany are nearly equal in capital ships now built or building; but we will soon be third. At the rate of two battleships each year, the United States in 1921 will have 35 dreadnoughts and pre-dreadnoughts; Germany, according to her 1911 program, 55; and Japan, as nearly as can be determined, 36. Situated as we are with such an extensive coast line and interests in the Atlantic and Pacific, our Navy must be prepared for an enemy in either ocean.

#### PANAMA THE NEW NAVAL KEY.

The Panama Canal, however, will be of immense military advantage to us, because it will enable the concentration of the fleet on either coast in a much shorter time. Without the canal, to insure naval supremacy we should possess a fleet in each ocean superior to that of our most probable enemy in that ocean. With the completion of the canal, the United States, due to its ownership, assumes new responsibilities and obligations. It must exercise military control of and maintain peace in the Canal Zone and its vicinity. Our traditional Monroe doctrine and the open-door policy must be supported. We must be prepared to defend these policies and be ready to defeat any antagonist likely to challenge them. This can only be done by having a Navy adequate to meet any sudden emergency.

And here is a word—"adequate"—which is the very crux of the whole matter:

By "adequate" is meant a navy powerful enough to seek and destroy that of the enemy.

Wars are certain to come, and the Nation must be prepared. The history of all ages has shown that the proper provision for peace is preparedness for war. A large navy makes for peace and is an essential asset to the nation possessing it. National supineness has cost us much in the past, and we can not afford to have it repeated.

#### WEAK NAVIES HAVE SPELLED DEFEAT.

Cornwallis was not properly supported by the navy. Consequently England lost her colonies. Napoleon fell because Villeneuve was no match for Nelson. The Confederacy lost because the Federal Navy blockaded all its ports, shutting off supplies and revenues. After Spain's Navy was destroyed her colonies were no longer tenable. The defeat of the Russian Navy by the Japanese decided the Russo-Japanese War. Italy in its recent war had command of the sea, and Turkey had to make peace. The Greek Navy at the present time has been a powerful factor in the success of the Balkan States against Turkey.

To have a weak navy courts attack, disaster, and defeat. Diplomatic demands in international affairs will be heeded only if a nation has the necessary force to back them up. The navy is an important factor in international settlements. This Nation can not afford to be content to have its Navy relegated to fourth or fifth place.

The Spanish-American War, which lasted about 100 days, cost us approximately \$500,000,000, or about four times the total annual expenditure for the Navy, and this does not include the yearly pensions resulting therefrom, to say nothing of the lives sacrificed. Fifty million dollars properly spent on battleships preceding 1898 would have made this war a hopeless undertaking for Spain.

#### OUR STANDING BEFORE THE WORLD.

The United States in recent years has become a world power, necessitating the assuming of corresponding responsibilities. These obligations our representative citizens are willing to accept, but turn to our military experts for guidance; and their studies, and not political or economic conditions, must decide.

We must have a Navy, not to wage but to prevent war. It must be a well-balanced Navy—that is, battleships, with the proper proportion of auxiliaries, such as destroyers, scouts, supply and repair ships, etc.; but battleships are paramount, and the building of them must continue. It requires three years to build a battleship, and they can not be bought or improvised. Battleships deteriorate and become obsolete in time, so that provision must be made to replace those in service. Carefully studied and scientific preparation for war must be made in times of peace by our naval officers, but Congress must provide them with the necessary ships. If they fail in this, when war comes—as it surely will—the Nation will not be entitled to win success, but only humiliation and defeat.

Mr. Chairman, during the existence of our country, in 137 years we have been engaged in a war six different times, on the average once in every 23 years; and according to the law of chances it is surely living in a fool's paradise to say that because we are at peace to-day there is no danger of war hereafter.

The condition in our country to-day is a good example of what is liable to come to us at any time. A year ago no one would have thought of such a thing as our being embroiled or brought into war with our neighbor on the South, and yet for the last 10 days we have been on the very brink of it, and we are now drawing a long sigh of relief, hoping that the danger has passed and that war will not come to us again at this time. And yet, Mr. Chairman, a year ago we were in just as much danger of being embroiled in a war with the countries of Europe as we have recently been in danger of becoming embroiled with Mexico. God forbid that the day will ever come, but on the law of chances we must expect that sooner or later we shall have a war with some other country.

I was not here in Washington, or, indeed, in this part of the world, when the Spanish-American War began; but one who is near and dear to me sat in the gallery yonder and heard right here upon this floor Members upon that side demand an immediate declaration of war against Spain, and because our good President would not at the moment consent he was vilified upon this floor and called all the names that congressional etiquette would permit here. He was vilified as much as a man could be simply because he would not declare war as soon as they wanted it right here, and he was burned, as I understand, in effigy in some parts of the country because it was thought



that he lacked the proper resolution. I do not know how to state the reason in decorous terms, but he was vilified because he would not declare war when they demanded it. And when a month had gone by and he, in the meantime, with his Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War, had made the preparations that were needed, war was declared, and from that day to this not a man in the United States has ever criticized our splendid President, William McKinley, because he did not declare war when it was first demanded. [Applause.] And those who object most to preparing for war and object most to the proper upbuilding of our American Navy would be the very first, if a crisis came, to complain of our unpreparedness. It is the duty of every patriotic citizen of this country, I believe, to stand by the Navy, because when war does come, as it will, it must come primarily upon the sea. This will probably be the last time I shall ever have a chance to vote for battleships, but if I had my way I would gladly vote for three this year to make up for the deficiency of last year, and I would continue the policy of two or more battleships year in and year out until we had a Navy fully equal or a little superior to that of any other power in the world except England. [Applause.]

Let me repeat with emphasis, and call it my swan song if you will, I believe it is the duty of this country to stand at least second among the nations of the earth as a naval power. [Applause.]

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. HARRISON].

[Mr. HARRISON of Mississippi addressed the committee. See Appendix.]

Mr. PADGETT. I yield to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. WARBURTON].

[Mr. WARBURTON addressed the committee. See Appendix.]

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to close general debate on the naval bill at this time, so that we may begin reading the bill under the five-minute rule.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Tennessee asks unanimous consent that general debate on the naval bill do now close.

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I object.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

The committee accordingly rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. ALEXANDER, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that committee had had under consideration the bill (H. R. 22812) making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1914, and for other purposes, and had come to no resolution thereon.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the naval appropriation bill, and pending that motion I move that general debate on the bill be now closed. On that motion I demand the previous question.

Mr. SAUNDERS. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The question being taken, on a division (demanded by Mr. PADGETT), there were—ayes 28, noes 20.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Speaker, I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The Clerk proceeded to call the roll.

During the call,

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to vacate the roll call and all proceedings connected therewith, and that general debate on the naval appropriation bill close at the expiration of two hours on Monday.

Mr. MURRAY. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Speaker, I would like to inquire if the standing order of the House to meet at 10.30 o'clock applies on Monday?

The SPEAKER. It does. The House meets to-morrow—Sunday—at 12 o'clock for eulogies, but that does not interfere with this request. The gentleman from Tennessee asks unanimous consent to vacate this roll call and all proceedings connected therewith, and further asks unanimous consent that general debate on the naval bill on Monday shall not exceed two hours. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

#### LEAVE OF ABSENCE.

Mr. TALCOTT of New York, by unanimous consent, was granted leave of absence for three days, on account of sickness in his family.

#### ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED.

Mr. CRAVENS, from the Committee on Enrolled Bills, reported that they had examined and found truly enrolled bills of the following titles, when the Speaker signed the same:

H. R. 26279. An act granting the Fifth-Third National Bank of Cincinnati, Ohio, the right to use original charter No. 20; and H. R. 20102. An act relating to proof of signatures and handwriting.

#### SENATE BILL REFERRED.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXIV, Senate bill of the following title was taken from the Speaker's table and referred to its appropriate committee, as indicated below:

S. 8414. An act to authorize aids to navigation and other works in the Lighthouse Service, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

#### ENROLLED BILLS PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS APPROVAL.

Mr. CRAVENS, from the Committee on Enrolled Bills, reported that this day they had presented to the President of the United States, for his approval, the following bills:

H. R. 26648. An act for the relief of David Crowther;

H. R. 3957. An act for the relief of Isaac Thompson;

H. R. 17260. An act to amend an act entitled "An act to establish in the Department of the Interior a Bureau of Mines," approved May 16, 1910;

H. R. 28187. An act to authorize the construction, maintenance, and operation of a bridge across and over the Great Kanawha, and for other purposes;

H. R. 27837. An act to authorize the Buckhannon & Northern Railroad Co. to construct and operate a bridge across the Monongahela River, in the State of West Virginia;

H. R. 21220. An act to extend the power of the Commissioner General of Immigration, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor;

H. R. 26812. An act to provide for selection by the State of Idaho of phosphate and oil lands; and

H. R. 23293. An act for the protection of the water supply of the city of Colorado Springs and the town of Manitou, Colo.

#### ADJOURNMENT.

Mr. PADGETT. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 6 o'clock and 54 minutes p. m.) the House adjourned until to-morrow, Sunday, February 23, 1913, at 12 o'clock noon.

#### EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1. A letter from the Secretary of War, transmitting, with a letter from the Chief of Engineers, report of examination and survey of Wills Strait, Casco Bay, Me. (H. Doc. No. 1416); to the Committee on Rivers and Harbors and ordered to be printed with illustrations.

2. A letter from the Secretary of War, transmitting, with a letter from the Chief of Engineers, report of examination and survey of Sulphur River, Tex. and Ark. (H. Doc. No. 1418); to the Committee on Rivers and Harbors and ordered to be printed with illustrations.

3. A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting copy of a communication from the Attorney General of the United States submitting supplemental estimate of appropriations required by the Department of Justice for the fiscal years 1912 and 1913 (H. Doc. No. 1417); to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

#### REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XIII, bills and resolutions of the following titles were severally reported from committees, delivered to the Clerk, and referred to the several calendars therein named, as follows:

Mr. CLAYTON, from the Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the bill (H. R. 28764) to amend section 2 of an act entitled "An act regulating fees and costs, and for other purposes," approved February 22, 1875, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 1567), which said bill and report were referred to the House Calendar.

He also, from the same committee, to which was referred the bill (H. R. 28809) to provide for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States, reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 1566), which said bill and report were referred to the House Calendar.



He also, from the same committee, to which was referred the bill (H. R. 28765) to amend section 44 of an act approved March 4, 1909, entitled "An act to codify, revise, and amend the penal laws of the United States," reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 1565), which said bill and report were referred to the House Calendar.

He also, from the same committee, to which was referred the bill (S. 7802) to amend section 103 of the act entitled "An act to codify, revise, and amend the laws relating to the judiciary," approved March 3, 1911, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 1568), which said bill and report were referred to the House Calendar.

#### PUBLIC BILLS, RESOLUTIONS, AND MEMORIALS.

Under clause 3 of Rule XXII, bills, resolutions, and memorials were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. PUJO: A bill (H. R. 28838) to establish a fish-cultural station in the State of Louisiana; to the Committee on the Merchant and Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. STEPHENS of Nebraska: A bill (H. R. 28839) providing for the election of postmasters in second and third class post offices; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. GUERNSEY: A bill (H. R. 28840) authorizing the construction of a railroad bridge across the St. John River between the town of Van Buren, Me., and the parish of St. Leonards, Province of New Brunswick, Dominion of Canada; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. STANLEY: A bill (H. R. 28841) providing that the Director of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing shall be a practical plate printer; to the Committee on Appropriations.

By Mr. FLOYD of Arkansas: A bill (H. R. 28842) to improve the postal service and to fix the salaries of postmasters of the fourth class; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. PARRAN: A bill (H. R. 28845) to provide for the creation of the office of assistant to the medical officer in charge of physical training and naval hygiene and physiology at the United States Naval Academy; to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

By Mr. HARRISON of Mississippi: Resolution (H. Res. 860) to reprint 1,000 additional copies of the Soil Survey of the Biloxi Area, Mississippi, for use in the House document room; to the Committee on Printing.

By the SPEAKER (by request): Resolution of the General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, relative to an amendment to the Constitution of the United States giving Congress power to regulate the hours of labor; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also (by request), joint resolution of the Senate and Assembly of the State of Wisconsin, that Congress be memorialized to grant a pension of \$2,500 a year to the widow of the late Lieut. Gen. Arthur MacArthur; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. CARY: Memorial from the Legislature of the State of Wisconsin, memorializing Congress to grant a pension of \$2,500 a year to the widow of Lieut. Gen. Arthur MacArthur; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. NELSON: Resolution of the Legislature of the State of Wisconsin, favoring a pension for the widow of Gen. Arthur MacArthur; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. ESCH: Resolution of the Legislature of the State of Wisconsin, favoring the granting of a pension of \$2,500 a year to the widow of the late Lieut. Gen. Arthur MacArthur; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

#### PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. DICKINSON: A bill (H. R. 28843) granting a pension to Carrie Powell; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. HARDY: A bill (H. R. 28844) for the retirement of James C. Gunn, first lieutenant, Philippine Scouts; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

#### PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

By Mr. BURKE of Wisconsin: Petition of the Women's Club of Beaver Dam, Wis., and of Mrs. H. E. Andrews and others, of Portage, Wis., favoring the passage of the McLean bill for

the Federal protection of migratory birds; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. CARY: Petition of the Chamber of Commerce of Milwaukee, Wis., favoring the passage of legislation for the establishment of a permanent tariff commission; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. CLARK of Florida: Petition of sundry citizens of Miami and Pensacola, Fla., protesting against the passage of certain bills regulating pilotage; to the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. DYER: Petition of W. T. Eddingsfield, Henry J. Hallam, Jackson A. Winer, J. L. Rednor, N. M. Williams, and the Pastors' Federation of Washington, of Washington, D. C., favoring the passage of the Jones excise bill for limiting the number of saloons; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

Also, petition of Otter F. Stieffeland, H. A. Steinwender, and W. J. Steinwender, of St. Louis, Mo., protesting against the passage of the Johnston excise bill for the proper observance of Sunday in the District of Columbia; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

Also, petition of Mrs. W. F. Dimock, New York, favoring the passage of Senate bill 5494, granting the George Washington Memorial Association the armory square as a site upon which to build the George Washington memorial building; to the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds.

Also, petition of Joseph Helde and 11 other citizens of St. Louis, Mo., protesting against the passage of Senate bill 5461, to regulate the traffic of liquor in the District of Columbia; to the Committee on Appropriations.

Also, petition of George M. Gilbert, St. Louis, Mo., favoring the passage of House bill 25685, providing for the labeling and tagging of all fabrics and articles intended for sale under interstate commerce; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

Also, petition of Francis O. de Luze & Co., New York; Iowa Liquor Dealers' Association, Clinton, Iowa; Melvale Distillery Co., Baltimore, Md.; Imperial American Wine Co.; Bishop-Babcock-Becker Co., and St. Louis Brewing Association, of St. Louis, Mo., protesting against the passage of Senate bill 5461, to regulate the traffic of liquors in the District of Columbia; to the Committee on Appropriations.

By Mr. ESCH: Petition of the Chamber of Commerce of Milwaukee, Wis., favoring the passage of legislation for the establishment of a permanent tariff commission; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. GARDNER of Massachusetts: Petition of the General Court of Massachusetts, favoring the passage of an amendment to the Constitution of the United States giving Congress power to regulate the hours of labor; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HOWELL: Petition of citizens of Utah, favoring the passage of legislation asking for a Federal investigation of the persecution of the editors of the Appeal to Reason; to the Committee on Expenditures in the Post Office Department.

Also, petition of the J. C. McDonald Chocolate Co., Salt Lake City, Utah, favoring the passage of legislation for placing nuts on the free list; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. LANGLEY: Petition of J. P. Brest, Moravia, Pa., favoring the passage of House bill 1339, granting an increase of pension to veterans of the Civil War who lost an arm or leg; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. LINDSAY: Petition of George E. Blackhall, George Brady, Richard Vdmittke, Alexander Findlay, and W. J. Murray, Brooklyn, N. Y., favoring an amendment to the naval appropriation bill providing for the building of one of the new battleships in a Government navy yard; to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

Also, petition of the Interborough Association of Women Teachers, Brooklyn, N. Y., favoring the passage of House bill 19115, for payment due old men and women found by the Court of Claims for labor in the navy yards; to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. LOBECK: Petition of the Grand Army of the Republic of Nebraska, protesting against the passage of the bill to transfer the Pacific Branch of the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers to the War Department; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. MARTIN of South Dakota: Petition of sundry citizens of Vale, S. Dak., favoring the passage of Federal legislation authorizing national banks to make loans on farm-mortgage securities; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. NEELEY: Petition of citizens of Pawnee County and Barton County, favoring the passage of House bill 28188, providing for reconstruction and maintenance of the old National

Road from Cumberland, Md., to St. Louis, Mo.; to the Committee on Agriculture.

Also, petition of citizens of Kansas, protesting against the passage of legislation requiring higher licenses and qualifications on rural salesmen of home remedies, spices, toilet articles, etc.; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

Also, petition of citizens of Barton County, Kans., favoring the passage of the Kenyon-Sheppard bill preventing the shipment of liquor into dry territory; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, petition of citizens of Finney County, Kans., favoring the passage of legislation for the establishment of a system of foreign credit; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. PORTER: Petition of citizens of Allegheny County, Pa., favoring the passage of the Weeks bill for Federal protection of migratory birds; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. SCULLY: Petitions of citizens of Asbury Park, Woodbridge, Jamesburg, Englishtown, South River, Freehold, and Metuchen, all of New Jersey, favoring the passage of legislation compelling concerns selling goods direct to the consumer by mail to contribute their portion of the funds for the development of the local community, county, and State; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. THOMAS: Petition of members of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, Bowling Green, Ky., protesting against the passage of the Johnston Sunday bill (S. 237) for the proper observance of Sunday in the District of Columbia; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. TILSON: Petition of Mary Floyd Tallmadge Chapter, Daughters of the American Revolution, favoring the passage of the McLean bill for the Federal protection of migratory birds; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. UNDERHILL: Petition of the United Hatters of North America, Brooklyn, N. Y., protesting against the passage of legislation reducing the tariff on hats; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

## HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

SUNDAY, February 23, 1913.

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. Henry N. Couden, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Hear my cry, O God; attend unto my prayer. From the end of the earth will I cry unto Thee when my heart is overwhelmed; lead me to the rock that is higher than I. For Thou hast been a shelter for me and a strong tower from the enemy. I will abide in Thy tabernacle forever; I will trust in the covert of Thy wings.

From time immemorial, O God our Father, men's hearts have turned instinctively to Thee in great crises for help, in sorrow and grief for comfort, in every contingency for inspiration and guidance; so our hearts turn to Thee as we assemble in memory of men who by faithful service in State and Nation gained for themselves the respect and confidence of the people, wrought well among us, left the impress of their personality upon our minds, and made a place for themselves in our hearts which time nor space can erase. "For we know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved we have a building of God, an house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens."

"We leave this and straightway enter another palace of the King more grand and beautiful."

We mourn their going, but not without hope. We are cast down but not overwhelmed, dismayed but not confounded.

For the love of God is broader  
Than the measures of man's mind,  
And the heart of the Eternal  
Is most wonderfully kind.

Enter Thou O God our Father into the desolate homes and bind up the bruised and broken hearts with the oil of Thy love, that they may look through their tears to the rainbow of hope and follow on without fear and doubting into that realm where all mysteries shall be solved, all sorrows melted into joy, soul touch soul in an everlasting communion, and eons of praise we will ever give to Thee, in the spirit of the Lord Christ. Amen.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will read the Journal of the proceedings of yesterday.

Mr. MORGAN of Louisiana. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the Journal be dispensed with.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Louisiana asks unanimous consent to dispense with the reading of the Journal. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none. Without objection, the Journal will stand approved.

There was no objection.

### THE LATE REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT C. WICKLIFFE.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the special order. The Clerk read as follows:

On motion of Mr. MORGAN of Louisiana, by unanimous consent, Ordered, That Sunday, February 23, 1913, at 12 o'clock m., be set apart for addresses upon the life, character, and public services of Hon. ROBERT C. WICKLIFFE, late a Representative from the State of Louisiana.

Mr. MORGAN of Louisiana. Mr. Speaker, I offer the following resolution.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the resolution. The Clerk read as follows:

House resolution 861.

Resolved, That the business of the House be now suspended, that opportunity may be given for tributes to the memory of Hon. ROBERT C. WICKLIFFE, late a Member of the House from the State of Louisiana.

Resolved, That as a particular mark of respect to the memory of the deceased and in recognition of his distinguished public career the House at the conclusion of the memorial exercises of the day shall stand adjourned.

Resolved, That the Clerk communicate these resolutions to the Senate.

Resolved, That the Clerk send a copy of these resolutions to the family of the deceased.

The resolution was unanimously agreed to.

Mr. MORGAN of Louisiana. Mr. Speaker, we are here convened to pay honor to the memory and to delineate the life, character, and public service of one of Louisiana's most promising and polished sons, the late ROBERT C. WICKLIFFE, who, on the 11th day of June, 1912, was cut off in the flower of his youth and in the height of a career of usefulness to the people.

In the usual course of human events the sadness of death is softened in the preparation of its inevitable coming, but when, without premonition or warning, it takes from our midst the loved and honored and lays at our feet the cold and inanimate clay in exchange for the pulsate life of a warm and joyous heart, the blow falls heavily, and the will of God seems a wondrous way that is hard for us to understand. Yet I know of no one better prepared to face the judgment of God without preparation.

ROBERT C. WICKLIFFE was born on May 1, 1874, at Bardstown, Ky., while his parents were visiting relatives in that State; hence Kentucky commingles her pride and her sorrow with that of Louisiana in the life and death of her illustrious son. They both suffered a common loss.

He received his primary education in the public schools of West Feliciana Parish, La., thereafter entering Center College, Danville, Ky., from which institution he graduated in 1895 with the degree of B. S. Immediately after, he matriculated as a student in the law department of the Tulane University, at New Orleans, La., completing his course in 1897, after which he returned to West Feliciana Parish and actively entered into the practice of his chosen profession.

His people, at once recognizing and appreciating his transcendent ability, elected him to represent that parish in the constitutional convention of 1898, and after the adjournment of that august body he enlisted in Company E, First Louisiana Volunteer Infantry, and served throughout the Spanish-American War, and was mustered out with his regiment in October the same year. He returned again to West Feliciana Parish to resume the practice of law, and in 1900 was elected district attorney of the twenty-fourth judicial district of Louisiana, serving his people in that capacity with distinction up to 1904.

In 1908 he became a candidate for the nomination for Congress from the sixth congressional district, and, having received the nomination in the second primary, was elected to the Sixty-first and reelected to the Sixty-second Congress without opposition.

Mr. WICKLIFFE was of noble and distinguished extraction. His grandfather, Charles A. Wickliffe, served several terms in Congress, was governor of Kentucky, and subsequently Postmaster General in the Cabinet of President Tyler. His father, R. C. Wickliffe, was governor of Louisiana.

Now, while it is perfectly clear that a great name was handed down to "BOB" WICKLIFFE, yet it is equally obvious that he united distinction to the honors his ancestry had already gained.

In looking over the life of Mr. WICKLIFFE the soil of my nativity becomes dearer to me for having nurtured such a man, not that his accomplishments have drawn him into the spotlight of public recognition, not that his genius overshadowed the efforts of his fellow men, but that he crowned manhood with the dignity of honor and the spirit of loyalty, linked the refinement of the southern gentleman to the rugged worth of the son of toil, and by no act of his lessened the respect due to his life of usefulness. The result of his work in the estimation of his char-